





POLICY FOCUS

**JORDAN-ISRAEL PEACE,
YEAR ONE:
LAYING THE FOUNDATION**

STEVEN A. COOK

THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE





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RESEARCH MEMORANDUM

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since the signing of the Jordan-Israel treaty of peace on October 26, 1994, the two countries have made impressive progress toward implementing their accord. Official relations between Amman and Jerusalem have advanced quite well as Jordan's King Hussein and Israel's late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin expanded on their warm personal ties and transformed past enmity between the two countries into a cooperative relationship.

The most remarkable aspect of the peace treaty is its emphasis on collaboration and joint economic development. The two countries have already made considerable progress toward implementing numerous projects in the fields of tourism, agriculture, energy, environment, and civil aviation. For example, integration of electrical grids servicing Eilat and Aqaba, which began during the summer of 1995, represents an initial step toward linking Jordanian and Israeli infrastructure on a wider scale. Tentative steps have even been taken to lay the foundation for future military coordination. Thus far the two parties have explored the possibility of "hot lines" linking military command centers, cooperation to combat terrorism, and joint programs related to the countries' defense industrial projects.

The emerging bilateral relationship is not, however, without difficulties. Significant differences concerning both political and economic interests led to arduous negotiations in several areas, particularly trade and transport. Israel's economy, approximately fifteen times larger than Jordan's, causes considerable anxiety for the kingdom's business elite. Nevertheless, the Jordanian government argues that the benefits of trade with Israel outweigh any potential disadvantages. However, Amman pressed Israel to postpone discussion of a free-trade pact, preferring instead a three-year agreement during which it will enjoy preferential trade benefits. Amman will use this time to assess the impact of trade with Israel before moving forward on free-trade negotiations.

The Palestinian issue, which encompasses many topics (e.g., Jerusalem, settlement of property claims, and the status of refugees and displaced persons) intrudes on the Jordan-Israel relationship and also poses potential problems. In contrast to the warm government-to-government relationship, a significant portion of the Jordanian population (especially, though not exclusively, the large percentage of Jordanians of Palestinian origin) is reluctant to normalize relations with Israel, though it has accepted without violent protest the decision of its political leadership to pursue a "warm peace." This gap between elite and popular views of peace casts a shadow on future relations between Jordan and Israel. The Amman government has begun to investigate the legality of anti-normalization efforts by licensed professional organizations and political parties, and inaugurating a new, tough stance against them.

JORDAN-ISRAEL PEACE, YEAR ONE: LAYING THE FOUNDATION

In the year since Jordan's King Hussein and Israel's prime minister, the late Yitzhak Rabin, met in Wadi al-'Araba for the signing of the Jordan-Israel treaty of peace, the two countries have worked vigorously to fulfill their agreement. They have signed or initialed implementation accords for many of the most important treaty provisions, establishing cross-border cooperation in numerous fields. Concrete progress is evident in the agreed-development of the Jordan Rift Valley and the Eilat/Aqaba region and the tens of thousands of Israelis and Jordanians who traveled across the border last year without incident.

Still, important differences remain concerning both political and economic issues, such as the fate of "displaced persons" and the best path to free trade. Furthermore, active opposition to peace continues from Jordanian Islamist, leftist, and Arab nationalist parties as well as influential professional associations. Though these groups do not possess the ability to scuttle the treaty, they have fostered an ambivalent, if not hostile, atmosphere among the Jordanian population. More generally, Jordan's demographic reality—its large Palestinian population—ensures that the warmth of bilateral peace between Jordan and Israel, will to some extent, be hostage to the fate of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, despite the strong desire for peace among the Jordanian political leadership.

For Jordan, economic progress is an essential element of widening popular support for peace. So far, the country is on the right track, with the Jordanian economy enjoying significant growth over the past year. In 1995, Jordan's gross domestic product is projected to grow about 6 percent. Even greater growth is necessary to stay ahead of an expected population growth rate of 4 percent,¹ but all relevant economic indicators suggest that Jordanians are wealthier after a year of peace. Jordan's enhanced economic performance has, however, not filtered into a wider appreciation of the benefits or wisdom of making peace. Although progress on the official level has been impressive, the leadership in both countries face a long road toward building warm feelings between Jordanians and Israelis and institutionalizing their relations beyond the strictly government-to-government level.

A year is still a relatively short period of time, though, and the past year has witnessed great strides forward in the process of cementing the bilateral relationship and laying the foundation for its future growth and development. Even more important than the personal relationships of the countries' leaders, which can be changed by a single assassin's bullet, is the treaty of peace.

This report is an article-by-article analysis of the progress toward implementation of the Jordan-Israel peace treaty in the first year of the treaty. Articles 1, 2, 28, 29, and 30 are not included because as a general rule they are not subject to implementation agreements. A full text of the treaty is included in the annex.

ARTICLE 3—INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES

On January 30, 1995, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) completed the first of two negotiated withdrawals from Jordanian territory by evacuating a 170-kilometer stretch extending from the Eilat/Aqaba border crossing to the al-Ghamr region in Wadi al-'Araba. Immediately following

¹ *World Development Report* 1995, (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1995).

this initial redeployment, the IDF undertook the second phase of the withdrawal by returning territory in the al-Baquara region in the north near Irbid. With the completion of these operations on February 10, 1995, Jordan re-established its sovereignty in these areas. Under an innovative provision of the treaty, however, Jordan granted Israel conditional "rights of usage" for Kibbutz Tsofar to continue to cultivate 2,000 dunums of land in the Arava Valley for twenty-five years. An additional 800 dunums of land in an area known as Naharayim near the Yarmouk River also fall under this arrangement.² Although this stipulation has often been misrepresented in the media as a lease agreement, Amman is not compensated for the privileges Israel enjoys within Jordan's international boundary. These areas remain subject to Jordanian laws and regulations. In accordance with Annexes Ib and Ic, however, Israel's laws governing extra-territorial activities will apply to these territories and Jordan's criminal code will not apply to incidents involving only Israeli nationals.

The process of installing 123 concrete pillars that will demarcate the 220-kilometer Jordan-Israel border extending from Aqaba/Eilat to the Dead Sea began last June and is expected to take nine months.³ More recently, Jordan's Crown Prince Hassan and then-Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres signed the first maritime boundary agreement between Israel and a neighboring country, establishing an international border that runs through the middle of the Gulf of Aqaba, on October 18, 1995.

After the Washington Declaration of July 25, 1994 officially ended the state of war between the two countries, two new border crossings were established and the administrative status of a third changed. On the Israeli side, jurisdiction over the Allenby Bridge near Jericho transferred from the IDF to Israel's civilian Ports Authority immediately following the Declaration. The Arava crossing just north of Eilat and Aqaba opened initially to third-country travelers during the summer of 1994, and then to Israeli and Jordanian citizens after the peace treaty was signed. The third crossing, the Geshar-Sheikh Hussein bridge, inaugurated with ratification of the treaties in November 1994, connects the Beit She'an and Irbid regions in the north.

ARTICLE 4—SECURITY

The Jordanian-Israeli security agreement, signed on February 9, 1995, is not available for public review, making it difficult to determine the contours of the intended security relationship. Nevertheless, the parties have scrupulously complied with important security aspects of the peace treaty itself, particularly Articles 4.3(b) and (c), and 5(a), (b), and (c), which commit the two sides to prevent military as well as terror activity against each other and provide further evidence of a strong commitment toward implementation.

In May, Jordan ordered two leaders of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), Mousa Abu Marzouk and Imad al-Alami, to leave the country, although it permitted less prominent Hamas operatives to remain. Authorities have also undertaken periodic security sweeps aimed primarily at the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). In early September 1995, ten members of the *Bayat al-Imam* (Pledge of Allegiance to the Leader), an indigenous Jordanian group which opposes the peace treaty, were charged with subversion and attempted sabotage.⁴

Israel has proposed elevating military cooperation with Amman, making suggestions to conduct joint training exercises, forge cooperation between the Israeli Air Force (IAF) and its Jordanian counterpart, and establish links in defense industrial projects. Generally, the kingdom has remained cool to these ideas in the absence of a comprehensive Middle East settlement (i.e.,

² *Jerusalem Post*, October 18, 1994.

³ Reuter, June 26, 1995.

⁴ *Jordan Times*, September 2, 1995.

an Israel-Syria peace agreement). Evidently, such close cooperation with Israel would complicate Jordan's relations with the Arab world at a time when Amman is keen to re-establish ties with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

The two sides have discerned a number of areas of future cooperation including "hot lines" between command centers, anti-terror operations, and arrangements for aircraft overflight. In a symbolic step toward developing military relations, the Israeli and Jordanian air forces participated in a joint air show on October 22, 1995 to commemorate the first anniversary of peace between the two countries. Israeli F-15s and F-16s flew in formation with Jordanian F-5s and Mirages along with helicopters bearing Israeli and Jordanian flags and a banner proclaiming "Peace." The air show passed over Tiberias, Acre, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Amman, Irbid, and Zarqa. On a more substantial note, Israel has actively supported Jordan's efforts to acquire F-16 fighter aircraft from the United States.

ARTICLE 5—DIPLOMATIC AND OTHER BILATERAL RELATIONS

Israel and Jordan formally established diplomatic relations on December 11, 1994, with the official opening of embassies in Amman and Tel Aviv. An exchange of ambassadors followed six weeks later. Over the last year, sixteen implementation agreements have been signed in areas ranging from trade and transportation to health and the environment. The two remaining issues, refugees/displaced persons and financial claims, are under negotiation. The emerging Israeli-Jordanian relationship is not, however, solely the province of diplomats and technical experts. High-profile meetings between each side's principals—King Hussein, the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Crown Prince Hassan and now Prime Minister Shimon Peres—to discuss a variety of bilateral and multilateral issues underscore the desire of both parties to construct extensive relations.

Despite these efforts, relations between the parties have not been without difficulties. Jordan's ambassador to Israel, Marwan Mu'asher, recently acknowledged that sharp differences between the parties resulted in difficult negotiations over the trade and transport implementation accords. Both of these negotiations have concluded with agreement, however.

Israel's intention to declare "eminent domain" over Palestinian land in Jerusalem in April 1995 to build local housing was an early test of the emerging bilateral relationship. The resulting criticism from Muslim capitals was to be expected, but the particularly harsh criticism from some quarters in Jordan caught the Israelis by surprise. Despite demands from some Jordanian parliamentarians to abrogate the treaty, as well as Arab action against Israel in the UN Security Council, King Hussein opted for quiet diplomacy to influence Israel's position. From Jordan's standpoint, East Jerusalem is part of the occupied territories and subject to the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 242; it is also a powerful symbol to all Arabs and Muslims. Although domestic political considerations determined Israel's decision to abandon the land confiscation, a personal appeal in the form of a letter from Hussein to Rabin reportedly played an important part in the prime minister's decisionmaking.

The decision by Israel's High Court of Justice in August 1995 to permit Jews to pray on the *Haram ash-Sharif* (Temple Mount) precipitated a new round of mutual recrimination between the two countries. Whereas Amman deemed the decision a violation of Article 9 of the treaty, which affirms Jordan's "special role" in the Muslim holy places of Jerusalem, the Israeli government considered the issue a matter of sovereignty over its capital. These two episodes indicate significant disparities in the Jordanian and Israeli views of Jerusalem, which pose potential difficulties for the future relationship in the absence of an Israeli-Palestinian "final status" agreement.

ARTICLE 6—WATER

Last June, Israel began pumping water from Lake Tiberias to the Jordan Valley through a three-mile pipeline as part of its pledge to provide Jordan with 215 million cubic meters of water annually. This amount represents approximately 30 percent of Jordan's renewable water resources prior to the treaty. The two countries are also seeking European financing for a project that includes construction of dams on the Jordan and Yarmouk rivers and a desalinization plant on Israel's Mediterranean coast. Crown Prince Hassan and Shimon Peres met with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and representatives of the European Union (EU) in March 1995 to present detailed plans for the dam projects. Germany and the EU agreed to contribute to the \$400 million venture. The framework for these projects is laid out specifically in paragraphs 7.4 and 7.4(a) of the treaty, which acknowledge the mutual benefits associated with cooperative efforts to increase the water supply to both parties.

ARTICLE 7—ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Section 7.2(a) of the treaty requires Israel and Jordan to end "all discriminatory barriers to normal economic relations [and] to terminate economic boycotts." Toward this end, the Jordanian parliament voted during a special session in late July 1995 to cancel Law 66 (1953) that outlaws trade with Israel and the Unified Boycott Law (1958) that brought Jordanian law into line with the Arab economic boycott of Israel.⁵ The repeal formally ended Jordan's participation in the boycott and cleared the way for future business activity. In addition, Jordan's parliament approved a new law in September 1995 opening Jordan's economy to foreign ownership and ending discrimination against non-Arab investors, thus enabling foreigners—including Israelis—to invest in Jordan and repatriate their earnings.⁶

With prejudicial barriers to commercial activity no longer in effect, Jordan and Israel have moved to define the parameters of their economic relations. In accordance with Section 7.2(b) of the peace treaty, Amman and Jerusalem entered into negotiations to eliminate structural barriers to trade. Upon resolution of differences related to "dumping" and subsidies, which had delayed a trade pact for five months, the parties finalized their draft document on October 24, 1995.

Under the accord, Israel will extend preferential treatment to selected Jordanian goods along three tiers. Some products will be exempt from import duties and others will enjoy preferences of 20 percent and 50 percent. Consequently, Israel will grant preferences to imports of cement, furniture, foodstuffs, antennas, pharmaceuticals, toys, and other unspecified goods. In return, Jordan granted concessions of 10 percent for two years on a limited number of Israeli goods entering the kingdom and an additional 5 percent thereafter. The Israeli goods in this category include plywood, tires, foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals, electronic components, medical equipment, communications equipment, and locks and safes.⁷

The two parties will operate under this limited arrangement for three years, during which they will attempt to expand the system of preferences. Israel dropped its initial demand for a free-trade agreement within three years of the trade accord. Given the huge disparity in size between the two economies—Israel's 1994 gross domestic product (GDP) was \$74 billion as compared to Jordan's \$5.2 billion⁸—Amman prefers to move more slowly on the free-trade track in order to assess the effects of trade with Israel before making a commitment to remove all barriers to trade.

⁵ As a result, Jordan rejected the Syrian government's repeated invitations to attend the meeting of the Arab Boycott of Israel Bureau held in Damascus in early October. See *Akhbar Al-Ushu'*, September 21, 1995.

⁶ Reuter, September 13, 1995.

⁷ Israeli Ministry of Industry and Trade, October 24, 1995.

⁸ Embassy of Israel, Washington, DC, and Jordan Information Bureau, Washington, DC.

Despite the difficulties Jordan and Israel encountered in establishing a formal framework for trade relations, their public and private sectors have developed proposals for an array of innovative projects designed to benefit both economies. Among the more prominent are a private ferry service linking the two countries over the Dead Sea, a joint airport serving Aqaba and Eilat, cooperation in the currency and banking fields, and refurbishing four Jordan River crossings, as well as opening the ports of Ashdod, Ashkelon, and Haifa to Jordanian importers and exporters. At the same time, Jordanian and Israeli business representatives are exploring potential areas for joint ventures. In fact, the first major Jordanian-Israeli joint venture was initiated on October 13, 1995, two weeks before the peace treaty's first anniversary. Jordan's Arab Potash Corporation and Israel's Dead Sea Bromine initialed a \$50 million agreement that will establish an equal partnership in a bromine plant on the Jordanian side of the Dead Sea.

Both parties consider joint ventures crucial to the development of their export markets. Although Jordan maintains Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status with the United States and is an applicant to the World Trade Organization (WTO), joint ventures would allow Jordanian producers to benefit further from the preferential status Israel enjoys under the Israel-EU and Israel-U.S. free-trade agreements. The Israelis, in turn, would have the potential to dramatically expand their reach into Arab markets that remain officially closed to their goods.

Although the Arab states that continue to boycott trade with Israel could direct similar efforts at these joint ventures, the Jordanian leadership believes that the economic advantage of unprecedented access to European and American markets is worth the risk of alienating the remaining boycotters. At the same time, Amman hopes the economic benefits of joint ventures could help overcome the latent opposition to economic cooperation from Jordanian business leaders who believe that Israel is an economic behemoth poised to impose a new economic order on the region. These entrenched interests tend to see future economic opportunities in Jordan's traditional trading partners, Iraq and the Gulf states, rather than with Israel, Europe, and the United States.

Jordan and Israel have also participated in a series of multilateral efforts to promote regional commercial relations. They joined Egyptian and Palestinian representatives in a series of conferences addressing issues ranging from the specific problems of the plastic and rubber industry to the feasibility of developing a regional Chamber of Commerce. In late September 1995, under the auspices of the Regional Economic Development Working Group (REDWG) of the multilateral peace process, delegates from the Middle East and Europe met in the Egyptian capital to focus their efforts on projects in the Gulf of Aqaba and the southeastern coast of the Mediterranean.⁹ The Cairo meetings laid some of the groundwork for the second Middle East and North Africa Economic Summit held in Amman the following month.

The Amman conference was the follow-up to the November 1994 Casablanca summit. At the close of the summit, the participants announced a number of initiatives, including the establishment of a Regional Business Council; an Economic Summit Secretariat, to be located in Rabat, Morocco; the Middle East-Mediterranean Travel and Tourism Association; a REDWG Monitoring Committee Secretariat based in Amman to facilitate integration of trade, infrastructure, financial markets and macroeconomic policy coordination; and despite continuing differences, the Bank for Economic Cooperation and Development in the Middle East and North Africa (more commonly referred to as the Middle East Development Bank, MEDB).

Recognizing both the economic and symbolic importance of the proposed bank, the United States, Jordan, Israel, Egypt, and Palestinian Authority (PA) intend to move forward with plans for the MEDB, notwithstanding resistance from key EU members and Persian Gulf states. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are reluctant to finance a new bank because both

⁹ *Middle East Economic Digest*, September 29, 1995.

states have other priorities. London, Paris, and Bonn fail to see the economic need for the new Cairo-based bank with an initial capitalization of \$5 billion. They contend that five other multilateral lending institutions with far greater resources already serve the Middle East. Citing a lack of worthy projects rather than funds, the Europeans prefer a “financial intermediation organization” responsible for identifying promising projects and securing funds from existing multilateral financial agencies. While negotiations over the establishment of such an organization continue, EU members (with the exception of Italy, Ireland, and the Netherlands, who support the bank) have so far opted not to contribute funds to the MEDB.

ARTICLE 8—REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

In the year since the conclusion of the peace treaty, the Jordanians, Israelis, Palestinians, and Egyptians have held three rounds of consultations regarding refugees and displaced persons (DPs). The first meeting of the quadrilateral committee, held in March 1995, was devoted to finding an acceptable framework for negotiations rather than discussion of core issues. It is important to point out that, under the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles, the fate of refugees from the 1948 war will not be considered during these negotiations; their disposition will be determined in the final status talks between Israel and the PA.

The August meeting dealt with the question of Palestinians displaced during the June 1967 war. The participants sought to determine the number of displaced persons, establish a timetable for their return or resettlement, and estimate the amount of international aid required to do so. The talks faltered on the definition of “displaced persons,” leading to considerable differences among the parties on the number of Palestinians eligible to return. The Israelis insist that the term apply only to those who abandoned the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which they estimate at 220,000. The Arabs contend that all Palestinians who fled during the June war, including those originally from within Israel, should be counted as DPs, leading to a far higher figure of 800,000 including descendants; the Arab point is that all DPs should have an unconditional right of return.¹⁰ The group reconvened in September to overcome these differences but failed to come to a solution. The parties were to have met again in Israel in November, but the Rabin assassination just two days prior to the event forced a postponement.

ARTICLE 9—PLACES OF HISTORICAL AND RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE

The Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty “respects the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in Muslim holy shrines in Jerusalem.” In addition, in the context of negotiations on the final status of the Palestinians, the treaty commits Israel to “give high priority to the Jordanian role in these shrines.” In the past year, this article of the treaty has provoked considerable response in the Arab world. Many Arabs perceive this as an example of Jordanian-Israeli collusion to erode the Palestinian claim to Jerusalem. Egypt’s semi-official newspaper *al-Ahram*, for example, criticized what it said was an Israeli conspiracy to exploit differences between Jordan and the PA but also chastised Jordan for allowing itself to fall for Israeli machinations.¹¹

Libya declared the treaty a “capitulation” and chided King Hussein for reducing Jerusalem from an issue of Palestinian national rights to one of guardianship of religious sites.¹² Morocco’s King Hassan II, who heads the Islamic Conference Organization’s Jerusalem Committee, also reprimanded Jordan implicitly for yielding to Israeli power, but implored the Arab and Muslim

¹⁰ *Journal of Palestine Studies* 24 (Summer 1995): 125.

¹¹ *al-Ahram*, October 19, 1994.

¹² *Jamahiriyah News Agency (JANA)*, October 25, 1994.

worlds to seek new solutions for Jerusalem and recognize that returning to the *status quo ante* in the city is unrealistic.¹³

The most vociferous reaction came from Palestinians, who believed that Jordan had undercut their position. PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat scolded King Hussein over the stipulations of Article 9 and accused Israel of purposely contravening the Declaration of Principles.¹⁴ In a bid to mend fences, Crown Prince Hassan declared in November 1994 (three weeks after signing the peace treaty) that the Palestinian Authority would assume “trusteeship” of the Muslim holy places once the final status of Jerusalem is settled.¹⁵ He explained that it was necessary for Jordan to act as a “moral authority” in Jerusalem until Israel recognized Palestinian rights in the city. In expressing their satisfaction with Hassan’s statements, Arab and Muslim capitals apparently chose to ignore the second portion of the Crown Prince’s announcement, which advocated a distribution of moral authority between Jews, Muslims, and Christians within the Old City, but did not imply any modification regarding political sovereignty.¹⁶

ARTICLE 10—CULTURAL AND SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGES

Recognizing the difficulty of creating a so-called “warm peace” through legislation, the treaty seeks to transcend long-held prejudices through cultural and scientific exchange. The refusal of Jordan’s public and private institutions and associations to follow through on the opportunities provided by the treaty, however, has stymied the development of bilateral cultural relations. In response to the agreement, ten professional associations representing lawyers, doctors, dentists, pharmacists, veterinarians, engineers, nurses, geologists, and writers condemned the treaty and forbade their members to have contact with Israelis. In May 1995, for example, the Writers League expelled Hamadah Fara’aneh, a columnist for the well-respected daily *ad-Dustour*, for providing political commentary on Israeli television.¹⁷

The collective statement of Jordan’s professional associations indicates a deep-seated fear that peace will inflict economic, political, and cultural damage on Jordan. To prevent this impending catastrophe, the professional associations called for Arab unity to continue the struggle against Israel. The opposition’s resistance to the process of normalization with Israel raises the possibility of a “cold peace” on the Egyptian model, rather than genuine reconciliation. A previously reticent royal palace implicitly acknowledged this danger when it announced in early October 1995 that the government would investigate the legality of these opposition groups’ anti-peace efforts. The government’s action was prompted by the refusal of several committees representing doctors and engineers to participate in the Amman economic conference.

Israel and Jordan have participated in a number of programs designed to foster trust between young Jordanians and Israelis. In July 1995, Jordanian, Palestinian, Egyptian, and Israeli teachers traveled to Denmark to participate in a seminar called “Learning to Live Together in the Middle East: The Role of Educator.” The conference explored the possibility of establishing networks between organizations in the Middle East. Building on this progress, forty-nine Israeli children, both Jewish and Arab, attended a week-long summer camp in Jordan with their Jordanian counterparts the following month. The Israeli embassy in Amman also reports that dozens of Jordanian students have made inquiries about studying at Israel’s universities.¹⁸

¹³ Agence France Presse, October 27, 1994.

¹⁴ *Frankfurter Rundschau*, October 28, 1994.

¹⁵ *Jordan Times*, November 2, 1994.

¹⁶ *Kol Yisrael*, November 1, 1994.

¹⁷ Reuter, May 9, 1995.

¹⁸ *Israel Line*, August 3, 1995.

ARTICLE 11—MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS

Under the treaty, the parties are required to “repeal all adverse or discriminatory references and expressions of hostility in their respective legislations.” Toward this end, in July 1995 the Jordanian parliament rescinded a series of laws that prohibited economic activity between the two countries. Among these was Law 30 (1973), which prohibited under threat of death the sale of Jordanian land to Israelis. This issue was of great concern to Jordanian parliamentarians across the political spectrum who demanded that any new legislation contain a provision requiring reciprocity for all real-estate transactions with foreigners. Accordingly, Israeli citizens may purchase land in Jordan only if Israel, in turn, allows Jordanians to buy land in the Jewish state. At issue for the Jordanians is the extremely high percentage of Israeli territory—more than 90 percent—officially declared “state lands.”

The abolition of the kingdom’s anti-Israel legislation was not, however, without considerable controversy and caused no small measure of embarrassment for the Jordanian government. In February 1995, just before the parliament was to begin consideration of legislation to repeal the discriminatory laws, opposition parties initiated a boycott that left only fifty deputies in the chamber and thereby deprived the assembly of a quorum. Although the twenty-three opposition lawmakers were unable to prevent the required quorum of fifty-four in the eighty-seat Lower House by themselves, seven other deputies also failed to attend the session. Subsequently, these seven lawmakers confirmed their support for the pending legislation and insisted they were not part of the opposition parties’ scheme to obstruct parliamentary business.

In the intervening months between the opposition’s boycott and the ultimate repeal of the legislation in July 1995, the Jordanian government demonstrated its intention to prevent the dissemination of “hostile or discriminatory propaganda” against Israel. Although Article 5(b) stipulates respect for the “basic rights of freedom of expression and association,” the Jordanian government has sought to suppress internal opposition to peace. The police have arrested members of the most prominent Islamist party, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), and a leading leftist party, the Jordanian Popular Democratic Party, as they prepared to stage demonstrations against the treaty.

Similarly, the government prevented an “anti-normalization” conference from convening in May 1995 after learning that the participants were to call for a struggle against the implementation of the treaty and normalization in their final communiqué. The opposition managed, however, to stage the conference on September 29, 1995. The event attracted over 300 participants representing ten political parties and included members of Jordan’s legislature. The resolutions adopted at the close of the conference called for a pan-Arab effort to oppose normalization legislation, proclaimed solidarity with the Syrian and Lebanese governments in their resistance to “the Zionist-imperialist conditions for a settlement,” and urged the Arab people to challenge efforts to establish economic cooperation with Israel.¹⁹

Although the government has been relatively successful in toning down the media’s hostile propaganda, other areas of Jordanian society will require a massive undertaking to adapt to the new environment. For example, the kingdom’s education officials must re-write much of the history curricula for Jordanian schools and universities. This task is made even more difficult by the disproportionate role Islamists play in the Education Ministry bureaucracy. Despite official actions, many Jordanians are dismayed by the rapid turn of events that has brought them in close cooperation with a country so recently an ideological and military enemy. A University of Jordan poll conducted last September revealed that 40 percent of urban Jordanians reject the peace treaty and 55 percent oppose the Oslo accords.²⁰

¹⁹ *Jordan Times*, November 2, 1995.

²⁰ *Jerusalem Post*, September 15, 1995.

To a large extent, popular Jordanian misgivings about normalization derive from the cycle of rising and falling expectations that came with the conclusion of the treaty. Although the macroeconomic indicators suggest that Jordan has benefited greatly from the peace, with a projected 5.5-6.2 percent GDP growth rate in 1995, inflation stable at 4.5 percent, and impressive growth in export industries, individual Jordanians have yet to perceive the improved economic environment. This problem, coupled with the strong ties many Jordanians (and particularly those of Palestinian origin) maintain with the West Bank and the political fate of the Palestinians, complicates the issue.

Many Jordanians have opined that the kingdom's peace with Israel would be more appropriate after the Palestinian issue is fully resolved. Even Jordan's Ambassador to Israel Marwan Mu'asher, a stalwart supporter of peace, recognized the obstacles that prevent the full development of bilateral relations:

In short, the lag between peacemaking and the achievement of prosperity associated with stability, as well as hitherto unresolved political problems [i.e., the Palestinian issue], have prevented many Jordanians from viewing the future with confidence. The reluctance that many Jordanians exhibit toward full normalization with Israel is not necessarily an indication of opposition to the peace process or treaty, but rather a reaction to harsh realities that are still being encountered in their daily lives.²¹

For many Jordanians, the Palestinian issue and economic concerns, though seemingly unrelated at first glance, are organically linked with the effort to build a "warm peace." Although economic well-being may precede final disposition of the Palestinian problem, the almost existential concern that many Jordanians have toward developments on the West Bank will not allow economic progress alone to dictate the normalization process. Likewise, a comprehensive settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will not necessarily ease Jordanian anxieties about Israeli economic domination and allow relations to develop. Despite King Hussein's 1988 declaration severing Jordan's "legal and administrative ties" to the West Bank, the connection between the East and West Banks remains alive and strong in the minds of most Jordanians.

In contrast, Israelis from across the political spectrum embraced the peace with enthusiasm. While the Labor Party viewed peace with Jordan as fulfilling an historic objective, the Likud Party also supported peace, thereby forswearing any revisionist claims to land on both banks of the Jordan. Upon the announcement of the agreement, Moshe Katsav, a leading member of Likud declared, "There is no doubt that this is a happy, historic moment."²² Likud support was never seriously in question, particularly after Crown Prince Hassan met Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu at the Jordanian embassy in London in September 1994. Netanyahu emerged from that meeting emphasizing his party's commitment to peace with the Hashemite kingdom.

There is clearly a consensus among Israel's public on the issue of peace with Jordan. The opening of Jordan's Tel Aviv embassy in December 1994 brought Israelis into the streets to applaud. The Jordanian ambassador, uncomfortable with his rock star-like status, has tried in vain to keep a low profile. The sheer number of Israelis traveling to Jordan over the last year suggests widespread support for peace and relief that a neighboring Arab state accepts Israel's existence.

The anecdotal evidence is supported by empirical findings. An October 1995 opinion poll found that King Hussein is Israel's most popular politician, with 76.7 percent of Israelis declaring their satisfaction with his policies. (In contrast, only 33.9 percent were pleased with Yitzhak Rabin's policies.) Significantly, as Israel and Jordan moved toward peace during the summer and early autumn of 1994, popular support for the idea of peacemaking increased. An August 1994 poll conducted by the United States Information Agency (USIA) indicated that the termination

²¹ *Building on Peace: Toward Regional Security and Economic Development in the Middle East, Proceedings of an International Policy Conference* (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1995), p. 11.

²² Associated Press, October 17, 1994.

of war between the two states provided the Rabin government with a 10-20 percent “bounce” on the most salient issues facing Israel, including withdrawal from the West Bank and Golan Heights. Evidently, the Israeli public supports peace with Jordan both for its own reward and for the role it plays in the establishment of a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

ARTICLE 12—COMBATING CRIME AND DRUGS

On October 24, 1995, in accordance with Article 12 and its attendant annex, Jordan and Israel signed a document that provides the basis for cooperation in law enforcement. The opening of relations between the two countries has raised particular concern about drug smuggling along their 320-kilometer border. The accord includes cooperation on the issues of illegal drugs, investigations, exchanges of information, assistance in formulating criminal indictments, and operational cooperation. Israel also agreed to share with Jordan its expertise in the area of forensic science, including DNA analysis.²³

ARTICLE 13—TRANSPORTATION AND ROADS²⁴

Israel and Jordan signed a transportation accord in early November 1995 after resolving differences regarding civil aviation (see Article 15) and regulations designed to control both commercial and passenger traffic across international boundaries. The absence of such an agreement had hindered fulfillment of other accords on tourism and trade. Although an interim arrangement allowed tour buses to cross the border in an effort to facilitate tourism, commerce was difficult so long as trucks and planes carrying goods were prohibited from crossing the borders. The transportation agreement envisions private cars crossing national frontiers and calls for the inauguration of direct bus service between Israeli and Jordanian cities by the end of 1995.

ARTICLE 14—FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND ACCESS TO PORTS

Although progress in maritime cooperation was slowed considerably by the absence of an overall transport agreement, Israeli Transport Minister Yisrael Kessar announced in November 1994 that Jordanian importers and exporters were free to use Israel’s ports. The same month, the parties initialed a shipping agreement permitting the passage of small vessels on both sides of the Gulf of Aqaba, recognizing shipping licenses between the two countries, and establishing permanent radio communication between the harbor authorities of Eilat and Aqaba.

ARTICLE 15—CIVIL AVIATION

After a trial period beginning in February 1995, Israel granted Jordan’s national carrier, Royal Jordanian Airlines (RJ), overflight rights through Israeli airspace. In May 1995, a one-year agreement confined RJ traffic to a 17,000-foot ceiling while traversing Israel in order to avoid Israeli Air Force (IAF) operations. The Jordanians originally demanded the right of free ascent and descent to save time and fuel, but agreed to a compromise that saves RJ sixteen minutes on all flights to Europe. RJ currently makes fifty flights a week through Israeli airspace.

²³ Israeli Ministry of Police, October 24, 1995.

²⁴ Implementation of Articles 13, 14, and 15 will be dealt with together in a single, comprehensive transport agreement.

A centerpiece of Israeli-Jordanian cooperation is the plan to combine and operate jointly the airports serving the twin cities of Eilat and Aqaba. The new "International Peace Airport" will operate from existing Jordanian runways in Aqaba, but will have terminals on both sides of the border. Air traffic control will fall primarily to the Jordanians with technical help from Israel, and the actual operation of the airport will be carried out by an international company. The U.S. company Lockheed-Martin is currently undertaking a feasibility study of the project.

Finally, RJ and Israel's El Al are expected to inaugurate five scheduled weekly passenger flights each between Tel Aviv and Amman in December 1995. Progress toward implementation had faltered on problems concerning security measures for aircraft landing in each country,²⁵ and may have been further delayed by opposition from tour bus interests, who currently enjoy a monopoly on cross-border travel and undoubtedly fear the negative impact of regular air service. For the same reasons, bus line owners have reportedly attempted to frustrate plans to allow private cars to cross national borders.

ARTICLE 16—POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS

Direct telephone links between Jordan and Israel were inaugurated on August 8, 1994 when Israeli President Ezer Weizman placed a call from his residence in Jerusalem to King Hussein at the Hashimiyeh Palace in Amman. The phone service is presently being upgraded as Jordan begins the installation of fiber-optic cable networks for the Amman-Tel Aviv telephone circuits.

The two countries launched mutual postal service between them on February 6, 1995. All mail is being transshipped through Cyprus until the implementation of the transport accord, slated for December 1995, permits direct service. The Israeli postal authority handled all mail service between the West Bank and Jordan until November 8, 1995, when the PA assumed responsibility for the West Bank's mail service.

ARTICLE 17—TOURISM

Peace has brought unprecedented numbers of tourists to Israel and Jordan. Since October 26, 1994, there has been a 36.6 percent increase in tourism to the kingdom. In the first five months of 1995, hotel occupancy rates were 90 percent and Jordan's five-star hotels were booked to 70 percent of capacity.²⁶ The number of new visitors coming from the United States increased by 82 percent, and European tourism is up by 41 percent. As a result, Jordanian travel executives are projecting a 50 percent rise in tourism-related income over 1994. These revenues are being re-invested to expand Jordan's tourist infrastructure and the construction of new hotels.²⁷ For example, the *Jordan Times* reported in June 1995 that the U.S. firm Imex International will begin construction of a \$35 million resort project on the Jordanian side of the Dead Sea. In mid-November 1995, the Jordanian government announced the construction of an additional four resorts on the Dead Sea. The total cost for the project, which will add 1,600 hotel rooms, is estimated at \$280 million. The Marriott corporation of the United States and Accor of France are investors in two of the proposed four hotels.

Israel has also experienced a sharp upturn in tourism despite a spate of bombings by militant Palestinians opposed to the Israel-PLO peace process. In the first seven months of 1995, 1.25 million tourists visited the Jewish state.²⁸ This represents a 19 percent increase over the same

²⁵ Reuter, August 31, 1995.

²⁶ *al-Aswaq*, July 3, 1995.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ Office of Public Affairs, Embassy of Israel, Washington, DC.

period in 1994. A 66 percent increase in the number of tourists arriving by land compared to the previous year demonstrated the dramatic effect peace has had on Israel's tourism industry. This influx has provided opportunities for new investment in Israel's already well-developed tourism sector. The Intercontinental hotel chain announced it will return to Jerusalem and has begun plans for a new five-star hotel in Tel Aviv.

The development and expansion of tourist services is of fundamental economic interest to both Jordan and Israel. The two countries signed a protocol in April 1995 encouraging cooperation between their tourist organizations and airlines. Prior to the signing of the accord, some 500 Israeli tour operators met with their Jordanian counterparts to establish cooperative relations in offering joint vacation packages.²⁹ To make travel between the two countries more convenient for American tourists, RJ and El Al have established a joint ticketing procedure allowing passengers traveling on a package to arrive on one airline and depart on the other using one ticket.³⁰ In July 1995, Jordanian and Israeli representatives met with experts from Asia, the United States, the EU, and other Arab countries to discuss the feasibility of a regional tourism association, which was formally established at the Amman economic summit. The association will enhance cooperation between countries and provide a framework for joint marketing and planning.

In addition to the dramatic increase in foreign tourism, there has been a rise in cross-border visits by Israelis and Jordanians themselves. In the first six months of 1995, 52,000 Israelis visited Jordan and the total for the year is projected to surpass 100,000. The lack of facilities to accommodate the influx forced Jordan's tourism ministry to limit the number of visas for Israelis to 900 daily, although on Israeli holidays this number is expanded. The requirement that Israelis travel only in guided tours accompanied by Jordanian and Israeli guides and an officer from Jordan's tourist police is expected to be lifted soon. In July 1995, Jordan agreed in principle to open a free tourism zone in Aqaba and Eilat for Israeli and Jordanian citizens. The zones allow Israelis and Jordanians to make day visits to the neighboring city. Special permits are available for these travelers that allow them free movement within the boundaries of the respective cities.³¹

On the Jordanian side, tourist traffic was sluggish at first with only 5,000 Jordanians visiting Israel in the first eight months of peace. During the summer months, however, the number of tourists skyrocketed, with approximately 30,000 crossing the border between June and October.³² With the passing of time, Jordanian tourists have also expanded their itineraries and are now touring Tel Aviv beaches and cafes in addition to visiting family in the West Bank and Galilee. The east-west traffic has not, however, been without problems. In September 1995, Israel's Interior Ministry announced its intention to increase surveillance of Jordanian tourists after finding a significant number had remained in the country to work in the Galilee and West Bank. The Interior Ministry also established new regulations for tour operators requiring detailed itineraries of all tours and the exact number of Jordanian tourists entering the country.

ARTICLE 18—ENVIRONMENT

Jordan and Israel signed an environmental accord on September 7, 1995 pledging to cooperate in "environmental protection . . . and that which affects people, natural resources and environmental assets in both countries." The agreement places heavy emphasis on alleviating marine pollution in the Gulf of Aqaba, joint environmental planning and management, and exchanging data on projects that could be deleterious to the other country's environment. Other

²⁹ *Jordan Times*, December 22, 1994.

³⁰ *Mideast Mirror*, February 6, 1995.

³¹ *Israel Line*, July 27, 1995.

³² Embassy of Israel, Washington, DC.

items covered include cooperation in air quality control, pest control and combating desertification.³³

ARTICLE 19—ENERGY

Jordan and Israel completed an ambitious energy accord in August 1995. The agreement outlines cooperation in oil and gas exploration and development of alternative and renewable energy. As is the case with many aspects of Jordanian-Israeli normalization, the Eilat-Aqaba region was the first area to see tangible results from the cooperation in energy. That same month, the Jordan Electric Company began to integrate the twin cities' electrical grids.

In the longer term, the pact also obliges the signatories to undertake three joint energy-related studies. The first will examine the potential for exploiting Jordan's considerable oil shale deposits, the second will explore the feasibility of oil and gas pipeline development in the region, and the third study will involve a series of geo-physical and seismological tests in the Jordan Rift Valley.³⁴ And, in an unprecedented gesture, Israel agreed to allow Jordan to monitor radiation levels at its Dimona nuclear facility in the Negev Desert after Jordanian officials expressed concern over potential health and environmental hazards.³⁵

ARTICLE 20—RIFT VALLEY DEVELOPMENT

In addition to the Eilat-Aqaba area, the long and barren valley that separates the two countries (known as the Jordan Rift Valley or JRV) also provides ample opportunities for the cooperative development ideas that underpin the Jordan-Israel peace treaty. Currently, the two countries are seeking \$3 billion to finance a canal linking the land-locked Dead Sea to the Red Sea. The two countries presented their plan for funding and development of the canal at the Amman summit. Italy has already signed a contract to conduct a \$3 million study on the integrated development of the JRV and a feasibility study of the Red Sea-Dead Sea canal. In addition, an Israeli-Jordanian partnership awaits government approval to begin running a ferry service across the Dead Sea between Kibbutz Ein Gedi and the Ma'in hot springs in Jordan.

ARTICLE 21—HEALTH

Jordanian-Israeli cooperation in the field of health actually preceded the conclusion of the health accord on August 28, 1995. A month earlier, Jordanian, Israeli, and Palestinian doctors participated in a conference examining the problem of AIDS in the Middle East. The health agreement establishes cooperation in medical licensing and technology as well as joint efforts to eradicate animal-borne diseases.³⁶

Despite the official commitment to cooperate in the medical field, Jordan's professional health care associations announced their refusal to collaborate with their Israeli counterparts. (The physicians union, however, apparently draws a distinction between cooperation and care. Individual Israelis seeking medical assistance in Jordan will not be denied treatment. Jordanian dentists, however, will only treat Israelis on an emergency basis.) Jordanian Minister of Health 'Arif al-Batayinah expressed regret over the physicians' position but said that the government

³³ Reuter, September 7, 1995.

³⁴ *Jordan Times*, August 21, 1995, and Reuter, August 20, 1995.

³⁵ *Jordan Times*, August 21, 1995.

³⁶ Reuter, July 27, 1995.

would not interfere in the matter. This situation could change, however, as the royal palace begins to exert pressure on the professional unions to soften their opposition to normalization with their Israeli counterparts.

ARTICLE 22—AGRICULTURE

The Jordanian-Israeli agricultural accord, signed on October 26, 1995, outlines extensive cooperation in all areas of agricultural affairs ranging from production and protection of crops to animal hygiene to marine agriculture.³⁷ Israel's Ministry of Finance recently prepared a study that also explores the potential for free-trade zones for agriculture and produce transportation. The Israelis are also interested in agro-business joint ventures.

Agricultural technology provides one of the best opportunities for cooperation between the two countries. The Jordanians are eager to capitalize on their new relationship with Israel to boost agricultural productivity and prevent desertification of farmland. The Ministry of Finance study also encourages Israel's participation in the development of an independent Jordanian agricultural research and development program.

Agricultural cooperation between Israel and Jordan is not, however, unprecedented. Mutual interest concerning the West Bank fostered extensive agricultural collaboration for nearly three decades. Beginning with the "Open Bridges" policy established by Moshe Dayan after the June 1967 War, West Bankers were permitted to engage in agricultural trade with their East Bank counterparts. In the immediate aftermath of the war, however, both the Israeli and Jordanian governments were sensitive to the potentially deleterious effect West Bank farming could have on their own agricultural sectors.³⁸ Consequently, the Israeli civil administration in the occupied territories cooperated with Arab-owned companies and representatives of Jordan's Agriculture Ministry to maintain a quota on West Bank exports to the kingdom. In turn, Israel facilitated the export of agricultural technology to Jordan that has contributed significantly to the development of Jordan's agro-industry.³⁹ Until the outbreak of the *intifada* in December 1987, the arrangement worked well. In the three years before the *intifada*, for example, the West Bank and Gaza exported \$1 billion of agricultural goods to Jordan.⁴⁰

ARTICLE 23—AQABA AND EILAT

The joint development of Aqaba and Eilat not only embodies the cooperative attributes of the Jordanian-Israeli treaty but presents significant economic potential for the parties and serves as a test-site for many aspects of normalization and bilateral relations, including transportation, tourism, agriculture, and security. The result of the projects inaugurated in these sister cities may set the overall tone for future Jordan-Israel relations.

The committee for Aqaba and Eilat, which has met frequently since the conclusion of the peace treaty, has proposed the establishment of an Aqaba-Eilat free-trade zone, the International Peace Airport, procedures to facilitate transit between the twin cities, the integration of their power grids, and joint programs to promote tourism and protect the environment. Of these proposals, only the power project has begun to be implemented.

In addition, the EU has convened another series of talks focused on the development of not only Eilat and Aqaba, but also the Sinai resort area of Taba and at a later date Saudi Arabia's Red

³⁷ Israeli Ministry of Finance.

³⁸ Adam Garfinkle, *Israel and Jordan in the Shadow of War* (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), p. 61.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

Sea coast. Unlike the Jordan-Israel bilateral effort, the Taba-Eilat-Aqaba Macro (TEAM) program, meeting under the auspices of the EU, has focused its efforts on proposals that are oriented strictly toward the private sector.

ARTICLE 24—CLAIMS

Jordan and Israel have yet to establish a bilateral commission to settle financial claims. This is an extremely sensitive area due to competing Arab and Jewish claims to land and property in Israel and Jordan, respectively, arising out of the founding of Israel in 1948. The total value of these claims is difficult to determine. The Jordanians are particularly concerned by the passage in November 1994 of Law 5755, which prevents Jordanian citizens (including Palestinian refugees) who acquire property in Israel *after* ratification of the peace treaty from claiming it as “absentee” property abandoned during the 1948 war. Under the Absentees’ Property Law (APL, 1950), these assets are administered by an Israeli government-appointed custodian who enjoys all of the rights of a property owner, including the right to sell or lease land. All income from these transactions (minus legal and administrative expenses) is held in a trust intended to compensate the absentee owners when their claims are eventually settled.⁴¹

Although the new regulations will not affect the prior claims of Palestinian refugees who became Jordanian citizens after the 1948 war, the Jordanian government is critical of what it perceives to be discriminatory laws against Jordanians. In recent statements, the Jordanian ambassador has criticized Israel’s reluctance to reveal the amount of absentee property it holds and argued that the mere existence of a custodian is recognition that Israel holds property to which it has no legal claim.⁴² In the absence of a bilateral mechanism to resolve these issues, Jordan and Israel will likely deal with them in a regional framework as part of the multilateral talks on refugee issues.

ARTICLE 25—RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS

Neither Israel nor Jordan claims that the other has failed to “undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under” the peace treaty. They are currently implementing agreements in sixteen areas and negotiating the remaining two: refugees/displaced persons and financial claims. The most important aspect of Article 25 lies in Subsection 5, which obligates the parties “not to enter into any obligation in conflict with” the treaty. Although Jordan remains a party to a number of commitments, such as the Arab League Defense Pact, that may in fact conflict with its obligations under the treaty, Jordanian diplomats confirm publicly that the Jordan-Israel agreement supersedes the kingdom’s commitments to its Arab treaty partners.

ARTICLE 26—LEGISLATION

In July 1995, Jordan repealed all legislation inconsistent with its peace treaty with Israel. There was considerable opposition to this in parliament from seventeen IAF delegates and six other delegates from leftist and Arab nationalist parties. The invalidation of the three discriminatory laws (see Article 11) was both a confidence-building measure and a step toward economic cooperation.

⁴¹ *The Jerusalem Report*, November 2, 1995.

⁴² *Ibid.*

ARTICLE 27—RATIFICATION

On October 25, 1994, Israel's Knesset approved the peace treaty by an overwhelming margin of 105-3. Two weeks later, Jordan's Chamber of Deputies also ratified the treaty by a closer vote of 55-23. The two sides exchanged the instruments of ratification during King Hussein's first official visit to Israel on November 10, 1994.

APPENDIX

TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN

PREAMBLE

The Government of the State of Israel and the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan:

Bearing in mind the Washington Declaration, signed by them on 25th July, 1994, and which they are both committed to honor;

Aiming at the achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 in all their aspects;

Bearing in mind the importance of maintaining and strengthening peace based on freedom, equality, justice and respect for fundamental human rights, thereby overcoming psychological barriers and promoting human dignity;

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and recognizing their right and obligation to live in peace with each other as well as with all states, within secure and recognized boundaries;

Desiring to develop friendly relations and cooperation between them in accordance with the principles of international law governing international relations in times of peace;

Desiring as well to ensure lasting security for both their States and in particular to avoid threats and the use of force between them;

Bearing in mind that in their Washington Declaration of 25th July, 1994, they declared the termination of the state of belligerency between them;

Deciding to establish peace between them in accordance with this treaty of peace;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1—ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE

Peace is hereby established between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (the "parties") effective from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this treaty.

ARTICLE 2—GENERAL PRINCIPLES

The parties will apply between them the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law governing relations among states in times of peace. In particular:

1. They recognize and will respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence;
2. They recognize and will respect each other's right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries;
3. They will develop good neighborly relations of cooperation between them to ensure lasting security, will refrain from the threat or use of force against each other and will settle all disputes between them by peaceful means;
4. They respect and recognize the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the region;
5. They respect and recognize the pivotal role of human development and dignity in regional and bilateral relationships;
6. They further believe that within their control, involuntary movements of persons in such a way as to adversely prejudice the security of either party should not be permitted.

ARTICLE 3—INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY

1. The international boundary between Israel and Jordan is delimited with reference to the boundary definition under the Mandate.
2. The boundary, as set out in Annex I(a), is the permanent, secure and recognized international boundary between Israel and Jordan, without prejudice to the status of any territories that came under Israeli military government control in 1967.
3. The parties recognize the international boundary, as well as each other's territory, territorial waters and airspace, as inviolable, and will respect and comply with them.
4. The demarcation of the boundary will take place as set forth in Appendix (I) to Annex I and will be concluded not later than nine months after the signing of the treaty.
5. It is agreed that where the boundary follows a river, in the event of natural changes in the course of the flow of the river as described in Annex I(a), the boundary shall follow the new course of the flow. In the event of any other changes the boundary shall not be affected unless otherwise agreed.
6. Immediately upon the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this treaty, each party will deploy on its side of the international boundary as defined in Annex I(a).
7. The parties shall, upon the signature of the treaty, enter into negotiations to conclude, within nine months, an agreement on the delimitation of their maritime boundary in the Gulf of Aqaba.

8. Taking into account the special circumstances of the Naharayim/Baqura area, which is under Jordanian sovereignty, with Israeli private ownership rights, the parties agreed to apply the provisions set out in Annex I(b).
9. With respect to the Tsofar/Al-Ghamr area, the provisions set out in Annex I(c) will apply.

ARTICLE 4—SECURITY

1. (a) Both parties, acknowledging that mutual understanding and cooperation in security-related matters will form a significant part of their relations and will further enhance the security of the region, take upon themselves to base their security relations on mutual trust, advancement of joint interests and cooperation, and to aim towards a regional framework of partnership in peace.
(b) Towards that goal the parties recognize the achievements of the European Community and European Union in the development of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and commit themselves to the creation, in the Middle East, of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (CSCME).
This commitment entails the adoption of regional models of security successfully implemented in the post-World War era (along the lines of the Helsinki process) culminating in a regional zone of security and stability.
2. The obligations referred to in this Article are without prejudice to the inherent right of self-defense in accordance with the United Nations Charter.
3. The parties undertake, in accordance with the provisions of this Article, the following:
 - (a) to refrain from the threat or use of force or weapons, conventional, non-conventional or of any other kind, against each other, or of other actions or activities that adversely affect the security of the other party;
 - (b) to refrain from organizing, instigating, inciting, assisting or participating in acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, subversion or violence against the other party;
 - (c) to take necessary and effective measures to ensure that acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, subversion or violence against the other party do not originate from, and are not committed within, through or over their territory (hereinafter the term “territory” includes the airspace and territorial waters).
4. Consistent with the era of peace and with the efforts to build regional security and to avoid and prevent aggression and violence; the parties further agree to refrain from the following:
 - (a) joining or in any way assisting, promoting or cooperating with any coalition, organization or alliance with a military or security character with a third party, the objectives or activities of which include launching aggression or other acts of military hostility against the other party, in contravention of the provisions of the present treaty;
 - (b) allowing the entry, stationing and operating on their territory, or through it, of military forces, personnel or materiel of a third party, in circumstances which may adversely prejudice the security of the other party.
5. Both parties will take necessary and effective measures, and will cooperate in combating terrorism of all kinds. The parties undertake:

(a) to take necessary and effective measures to prevent acts of terrorism, subversion or violence from being carried out from their territory or through it and to take necessary and effective measures to combat such activities and all their perpetrators;

(b) without prejudice to the basic rights of freedom of expression and association, to take necessary and effective measures to prevent the entry, presence and cooperation in their territory of any group or organization, and their infrastructure, which threatens the security of the other party by the use of or incitement to the use of violent means;

(c) to cooperate in preventing and combating cross-boundary infiltrations.

6. Any question as to the implementation of this article will be dealt with through a mechanism of consultations which will include a liaison system, verification, supervision, and where necessary, other mechanisms, and higher level consultations. The details of the mechanism of consultations will be contained in an agreement to be concluded by the parties within three months of the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this treaty.

7. The parties undertake to work as a matter of priority, and as soon as possible in the context of the Multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security, and jointly, towards the following:

(a) the creation in the Middle East of a region free from hostile alliances and coalitions;

(b) the creation of a Middle East free from weapons of mass destruction, both conventional and non-conventional, in the context of a comprehensive, lasting and stable peace, characterized by the renunciation of the use of force, reconciliation and goodwill.

ARTICLE 5—DIPLOMATIC AND OTHER BILATERAL RELATIONS

1. The parties agree to establish full diplomatic and consular relations and to exchange resident ambassadors within one month of the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this treaty.

2. The parties agree that the normal relationship between them will further include economic and cultural relations.

ARTICLE 6—WATER

With the view to achieving a comprehensive and lasting settlement of all the water problems between them:

1. The parties agree mutually to recognize the rightful allocations of both of them in Jordan River and Yarmouk River waters and Araba/Arava ground water in accordance with the agreed acceptable principles, quantities and quality as set out in Annex II, which shall be fully respected and complied with.

2. The parties, recognizing the necessity to find a practical, just and agreed solution to their water problems and with the view that the subject of water can form the basis for the advancement of cooperation between them, jointly undertake to ensure that the management and development of their water resources do not, in any way, harm the water resources of the other party.

3. The parties recognize that their water resources are not sufficient to meet their needs. More water should be supplied for their use through various methods, including projects of regional and international cooperation.

4. In light of paragraph three of this Article, with the understanding that cooperation in water-related subjects would be to the benefit of both parties, and will help alleviate their water shortages, and that water issues along their entire boundary must be dealt with in their totality, including the possibility of transboundary water transfers, the parties agree to search for ways to alleviate water shortages and to cooperate in the following fields:

(a) development of existing and new water resources, increasing the water availability, including cooperation on a regional basis as appropriate, and minimizing wastage of water resources through the chain of their uses;

(b) prevention of contamination of water resources;

(c) mutual assistance in the alleviation of water shortages;

(d) transfer of information and joint research and development in water-related subjects, and review of the potentials for enhancement of water resources development and use.

ARTICLE 7—ECONOMIC RELATIONS

1. Viewing economic development and prosperity as pillars of peace, security and harmonious relations between states, peoples and individual human beings, the parties, taking note of understandings reached between them, affirm their mutual desire to promote economic cooperation between them, as well as within the framework of wider regional economic cooperation.

2. In order to accomplish this goal, the parties agree to the following:

(a) to remove all discriminatory barriers to normal economic relations, to terminate economic boycotts directed at each other, and to cooperate in terminating boycotts against either party by third parties;

(b) recognizing that the principle of free and unimpeded flow of goods and services should guide their relations, the parties will enter into negotiations with a view to concluding agreements on economic cooperation, including trade and the establishment of a free-trade area or areas, investment, banking, industrial cooperation and labor, for the purpose of promoting beneficial economic relations, based on principles to be agreed upon, as well as on human development considerations on a regional basis. These negotiations will be concluded no later than six months from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this treaty;

(c) to cooperate bilaterally, as well as in multilateral forums, towards the promotion of their respective economies and of their neighborly economic relations with other regional parties.

ARTICLE 8—REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

1. Recognizing the massive human problems caused to both parties by the conflict in the Middle East, as well as the contribution made by them towards the alleviation of human suffering, the parties will seek to further alleviate those problems arising on a bilateral level.

2. Recognizing that the above human problems caused by the conflict in the Middle East cannot be fully resolved on the bilateral level, the parties will seek to resolve them in appropriate forums, in accordance with international law, including the following:

- (a) in the case of displaced persons, in a quadripartite committee together with Egypt and the Palestinians;
- (b) in the case of refugees,
 - (i) in the framework of the Multilateral Working Group on Refugees;
 - (ii) in negotiations, in a framework to be agreed, bilateral or otherwise, in conjunction with and at the same time as the permanent status negotiations pertaining to the territories referred to in Article 3 of this treaty;
- (c) through the implementation of agreed United Nations programs and other agreed international economic programs concerning refugees and displaced persons, including assistance to their settlement.

ARTICLE 9—PLACES OF HISTORICAL AND RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE AND INTERFAITH RELATIONS

1. Each party will provide freedom of access to places of religious and historical significance.
2. In this regard, in accordance with the Washington Declaration, Israel respects the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in Muslim holy shrines in Jerusalem. When negotiations on the permanent status will take place, Israel will give high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these shrines.
3. The parties will act together to promote interfaith relations among the three monotheistic religions, with the aim of working towards religious understanding, moral commitment, freedom of religious worship, and tolerance and peace.

ARTICLE 10—CULTURAL AND SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE

The parties, wishing to remove biases developed through periods of conflict, recognize the desirability of cultural and scientific exchanges in all fields, and agree to establish normal cultural relations between them. Thus, they shall, as soon as possible and not later than nine months from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this treaty, conclude the negotiations on cultural and scientific agreements.

ARTICLE 11—MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS

1. The parties will seek to foster mutual understanding and tolerance based on shared historic values, and accordingly undertake:
 - (a) to abstain from hostile or discriminatory propaganda against each other, and to take all possible legal and administrative measures to prevent the dissemination of such propaganda by any organization or individual present in the territory of either party;
 - (b) as soon as possible, and not later than three months from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this treaty, to repeal all adverse or discriminatory references and expressions of hostility in their respective legislation;
 - (c) to refrain in all government publications from any such references or expressions;
 - (d) to ensure mutual enjoyment by each other's citizens of due process of law within their respective legal systems and before their courts.

2. Paragraph 1(a) of this Article is without prejudice to the right to freedom of expression as contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
3. A joint committee shall be formed to examine incidents where one party claims there has been a violation of this Article.

ARTICLE 12—COMBATING CRIME AND DRUGS

The parties will cooperate in combating crime, with an emphasis on smuggling, and will take all necessary measures to combat and prevent such activities as the production of, as well as the trafficking in illicit drugs, and will bring to trial perpetrators of such acts. In this regard, they take note of the understandings reached between them in the above spheres, in accordance with Annex III and undertake to conclude all relevant agreements not later than nine months from the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this treaty.

ARTICLE 13—TRANSPORTATION

Taking note of the progress already made in the area of transportation, the parties recognize the mutuality of interest in good neighborly relations in the area of transportation and agree to the following means to promote relations between them in this sphere:

1. Each party will permit the free movement of nationals and vehicles of the other into and within its territory according to the general rules applicable to nationals and vehicles of other states. Neither party will impose discriminatory taxes or restrictions on the free movement of persons and vehicles from its territory to the territory of the other.
2. The parties will open and maintain roads and border-crossings between their countries and will consider further road and rail links between them.
3. The parties will continue their negotiations concerning mutual transportation agreements in the above and other areas, such as joint projects, traffic safety, transport standards and norms, licensing of vehicles, land passages, shipment of goods and cargo, and meteorology, to be concluded not later than six months from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this treaty.
4. The parties agree to continue their negotiations for a highway to be constructed and maintained between Egypt, Israel and Jordan near Eilat.

ARTICLE 14—FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND ACCESS TO PORTS

1. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph three, each party recognizes the right of the vessels of the other party to innocent passage through its territorial waters in accordance with the rules of international law.
2. Each party will grant normal access to its ports for vessels and cargoes of the other, as well as vessels and cargoes destined for or coming from the other party. Such access will be granted on the same conditions as is generally applicable to vessels and cargoes of other nations.

3. The parties consider the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba to be international waterways open to all nations for unimpeded and non-suspendable freedom of navigation and overflight. The parties will respect each other's right to navigation and overflight for access to either party through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.

ARTICLE 15—CIVIL AVIATION

1. The parties recognize as applicable to each other the rights, privileges and obligations provided for by the multilateral aviation agreements to which they are both party, particularly by the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation (The Chicago Convention) and the 1944 International Air Services Transit Agreement.

2. Any declaration of national emergency by a party under Article 89 of the Chicago Convention will not be applied to the other party on a discriminatory basis.

3. The parties take note of the negotiations on the international air corridor to be opened between them in accordance with the Washington Declaration. In addition, the parties shall, upon ratification of this treaty, enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding a Civil Aviation Agreement. All the above negotiations are to be concluded not later than six months from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this treaty.

ARTICLE 16—POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS

The parties take note of the opening between them, in accordance with the Washington Declaration, of direct telephone and facsimile lines. Postal links, the negotiations on which having been concluded, will be activated upon the signature of this treaty. The parties further agree that normal wireless and cable communications and television relay, services by cable, radio and satellite, will be established between them, in accordance with all relevant international conventions and regulations. The negotiations on these subjects will be concluded not later than nine months from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this treaty.

ARTICLE 17—TOURISM

The parties affirm their mutual desire to promote cooperation between them in the field of tourism. In order to accomplish this goal, the parties taking note of the understandings reached between them concerning tourism agree to negotiate, as soon as possible, and to conclude not later than three months from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this treaty, an agreement to facilitate and encourage mutual tourism and tourism from third countries.

ARTICLE 18—ENVIRONMENT

The parties will cooperate in matters relating to the environment, a sphere to which they attach great importance, including conservation of nature and prevention of pollution, as set forth in Annex IV. They will negotiate an agreement on the above, to be concluded not later than six months from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this treaty.

ARTICLE 19—ENERGY

1. The parties will cooperate in the development of energy resources, including the development of energy-related projects such as the utilization of solar energy.
2. The parties, having concluded their negotiations on the interconnecting of their electric grids in the Eilat-Aqaba area, will implement the interconnecting upon the signature of this treaty. The parties view this step as a part of a wider binational and regional concept. They agree to continue their negotiations as soon as possible to widen the scope of their interconnected grids.
3. The parties will conclude the relevant agreements in the field of energy within six months from the date of exchange of the instruments of ratification of this treaty.

ARTICLE 20—RIFT VALLEY DEVELOPMENT

The parties attach great importance to the integrated development of the Jordan Rift Valley area, including joint projects in the economic, environmental, energy-related and tourism fields. Taking note of the terms of reference developed in the framework of the Trilateral Israel-Jordan-U.S. Economic Committee towards the Jordan Rift Valley Development Master Plan, they will vigorously continue their efforts towards the completion of planning and towards implementation.

ARTICLE 21—HEALTH

The parties will cooperate in the area of health and shall negotiate with a view to the conclusion of an agreement within nine months from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this treaty.

ARTICLE 22—AGRICULTURE

The parties will cooperate in the areas of agriculture, including veterinary services, plant protection, biotechnology and marketing, and shall negotiate with a view to the conclusion of an agreement within six months from the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification of this treaty.

ARTICLE 23—AQABA AND EILAT

The parties agree to enter into negotiations, as soon as possible, and not later than one month from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this treaty, on arrangements that would enable the joint development of the towns of Aqaba and Eilat with regard to such matters, *inter alia*, as joint tourism development, joint customs posts, free trade zone, cooperation in aviation, prevention of pollution, maritime matters, police, customs and health cooperation. The parties will conclude all relevant agreements within nine months from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of the treaty.

ARTICLE 24—CLAIMS

The parties agree to establish a claims commission for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.

ARTICLE 25—RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS

1. This treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way, the rights and obligations of the parties under the Charter of the United Nations.
2. The parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under this treaty without regard to action or inaction of any other party and independently of any instrument inconsistent with this treaty. For the purposes of this paragraph each party represents to the other that in its opinion and interpretation there is no inconsistency between their existing treaty obligations and this treaty.
3. They further undertake to take all the necessary measures for the application in their relations of the provisions of the multilateral conventions to which they are parties, including the submission of appropriate notification to the Secretary General of the United Nations and other depositories of such conventions.
4. Both parties will also take all the necessary steps to abolish all pejorative references to the other party, in multilateral conventions to which they are parties, to the extent that such references exist.
5. The parties undertake not to enter into any obligation in conflict with this treaty.
6. Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the parties under the present treaty and any of their other obligations, the obligations under this treaty will be binding and implemented.

ARTICLE 26—LEGISLATION

Within three months of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty the parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary in order to implement the treaty, and to terminate any international commitments and to repeal any legislation that is inconsistent with the treaty.

ARTICLE 27—RATIFICATION

1. This treaty shall be ratified by both parties in conformity with their respective national procedures. It shall enter into force on the exchange of the instruments of ratification.
2. The annexes, appendices, and other attachments to this treaty shall be considered integral parts thereof.

ARTICLE 28—INTERIM MEASURES

The parties will apply, in certain spheres, to be agreed upon, interim measures pending the conclusion of the relevant agreements in accordance with this treaty, as stipulated in Annex V.

ARTICLE 29—SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this treaty shall be resolved by negotiations.
2. Any such disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations shall be resolved by conciliation or submitted to arbitration.

ARTICLE 30—REGISTRATION

This treaty shall be transmitted to the Secretary General of the United Nations for registration in accordance with the provisions of Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done at the Arava/Araba crossing point this day, Heshvan 21, 5755/Jumada Al-Ula 21, 1415, which corresponds to October 26, 1994, in the Hebrew, English and Arabic languages, all texts being equally authentic. In case of divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.

For the State of Israel:
Yitzhak Rabin
Prime Minister

For the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan:
Abdul Salam Majali
Prime Minister

Witnessed by:
William J. Clinton
President of the United States of America

ANNEX I(A)

**ISRAEL-JORDAN INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
DELIMITATION AND DEMARCATION**

I. It is agreed that, in accordance with Article 3 of the treaty, the international boundary between the two states consists of the following sectors:

- A. The Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers
- B. The Dead Sea
- C. The Emek Ha'arava/Wadi Araba
- D. The Gulf of Aqaba

II. The boundary is delimited as follows:

A. JORDAN AND YARMOUK RIVERS

1. The boundary line shall follow the middle of the main course of the flow of the Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers.

2. The boundary line shall follow natural changes (accretion or erosion) in the course of the rivers unless otherwise agreed. Artificial changes in or of the course of the rivers shall not affect the location of the boundary unless otherwise agreed. No artificial changes may be made except by agreement between both parties.

3. In the event of a future sudden natural change in or of the course of the rivers (avulsion or cutting of new bed) the Joint Boundary Commission (Article 3 below) shall meet as soon as possible, to decide on necessary measures, which may include physical restoration of the prior location of the river course.

4. The boundary line in the two rivers is shown on the 1:10,000 orthophoto maps dated 1994.

5. Adjustment to the boundary line in any of the rivers due to natural changes (accretion or erosion) shall be carried out whenever it is deemed necessary by the Joint Boundary Commission or once every five years.

6. The lines defining the special Naharayim/Baqura area are shown on the 1:10,000 orthophoto map.

7. The orthophoto maps and image maps showing the line separating Jordan from the territory that came under Israeli military government control in 1967 shall have that line indicated in a different presentation and the legend shall carry on it the following disclaimer: "This line is the administrative boundary between Jordan and the territory which came under Israeli military government control in 1967. Any treatment of this line shall be without prejudice to the status of the territory."

B. DEAD SEA AND SALT PANS

The boundary line is shown on the 1:50,000 image maps. The list of geographic and Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) coordinates of this boundary line shall be based on Israel-Jordan Boundary Datum (IJBD 1994) and, when completed and agreed upon by both parties, this list of coordinates shall be binding and take precedence over the maps as to the location of the boundary line in the Dead Sea and the salt pans.

C. EMEK HA'ARAVA/WADI ARABA

1. The boundary line is shown on 1:20,000 orthophoto maps.

2. The land boundary shall be demarcated, under a joint boundary demarcation procedure, by boundary pillars which will be jointly located, erected, measured and documented on the basis of the boundary shown in the 1:20,000 orthophoto maps referred to in Article 2-C-(1) above. Between each two adjacent boundary pillars the boundary line shall follow a straight line.

3. The boundary pillars shall be defined in a list of geographic and UTM coordinates based on a joint boundary datum (IJBD 94) to be agreed upon by the Joint Team of Experts appointed by the two parties (hereinafter the JTE) using joint Global Positioning System (GPS) Measurements. The list of coordinates shall be prepared, signed and approved by both parties as soon as possible and not later than nine months after this treaty enters into force and shall become part of this annex. This list of geographic and UTM coordinates when completed and agreed upon by both parties shall be binding and shall take precedence over the maps as to the location of the boundary line of this sector.

4. The boundary pillars shall be maintained by both parties in accordance with a procedure to be agreed upon. The coordinates in article 2-C-(3) above shall be used to reconstruct boundary pillars in case they are damaged, destroyed or displaced.

5. The line defining the Tsofar/al-Ghamr area is shown on the 1:20,000 Emek Ha'Arava/Wadi Araba orthophoto map.

D. THE GULF OF AQABA

The parties shall act in accordance with article 3.7 of the treaty.

III. Joint Boundary Commission

A. For the purpose of the implementation of this annex, the parties will establish a Joint Boundary Commission comprised of three members of each country.

B. The commission will, with the approval of the respective governments, specify its work procedures, the frequency of its meetings, and the details of its scope of work. The Commission may invite experts and/or advisors as may be required.

C. The commission may form, as it deems necessary, specialized teams or committees and assign them to technical tasks.

ANNEX I(B)**THE NAHARAYIM/BAQURA AREA**

1. The two parties agree that a special regime will apply to the Naharayim/Baqura area ("the area") on a temporary basis, as set out in this annex. For the purpose of this annex the area is detailed in Appendix IV.
2. Recognizing that in the area which is under Jordan's sovereignty with Israeli private land ownership rights and property interests ("land-owners") in the land comprising the area ("the land") Jordan undertakes:
 - (a) to grant without charge unimpeded freedom of entry to, exit from, land usage and movement within the area to the land-owners and to their invitees or employees and to allow the land-owners freely to dispose of their land in accordance with applicable Jordanian law;
 - (b) not to apply its customs or immigration legislation to land-owners, their invitees or employees crossing from Israel directly to the area for the purpose of gaining access to the land for agricultural or any agreed purposes;
 - (c) not to impose discriminatory taxes or charges with regard to the land or activities within the area;
 - (d) to take all necessary measures to protect and prevent harassment of or harm to any person entering the area under this annex;
 - (e) to permit with the minimum of formality, uniformed officers of the Israeli police force access to the area for the purpose of investigating crime or dealing with other incidents solely involving the land-owners, their invitees or employees.
3. Recognizing Jordanian sovereignty over the area, Israel undertakes:
 - (a) not to carry out or allow to be carried out in the area activities prejudicial to the peace or security of Jordan;
 - (b) not to allow any person entering the area under this annex (other than the uniformed officers referred to in paragraph 2(e) of this Annex) to carry weapons of any kind in the area; unless authorized by the licensing authorities in Jordan after being processed by the liaison committee referred to in Article 8 of this annex;
 - (c) not to allow the dumping of wastes from outside the area into the area.
4.
 - (a) Subject to this annex, Jordanian law will apply to this area;
 - (b) Israeli law applying to the extra-territorial activities of Israelis may be applied to Israelis and their activities in the area, and Israel may take measures in the area to enforce such laws;
 - (c) Having regard to this annex, Jordan will not apply its criminal laws to activities in the area which involve only Israeli nationals.
5. In the event of any joint projects to be agreed and developed by the parties in the area, the terms of this annex may be altered for the purpose of the joint project by agreement between the parties at any time. One of the options to be discussed in the context of the joint projects would be the establishment of a free-trade zone.
6. Without prejudice to private rights of ownership of land within the area, this annex will remain in force for twenty-five years, and shall be renewed automatically for the same periods, unless one year prior notice of termination is given by either party, in which case, at the request of either party, consultations shall be renewed automatically for the same periods, unless one year

prior notice of termination is given by either party, in which case, at the request of either party, consultations shall be entered into.

7. In addition to the requirement referred to in Article 4(a) of this annex, the acquisition of land in the area by persons who are not Israeli citizens shall take place only with the prior approval of Jordan.

8. An Israeli-Jordanian Liaison Committee is hereby established in order to deal with all matters arising under this annex.

ANNEX I(C)

THE TSO FAR/AL-GHAMR AREA

1. The two parties agree that a special regime will apply to the Tsofar/al-Ghamr area ("the area") on a temporary basis, as set out in this annex. For the purpose of this annex the area is detailed in Appendix V.

2. Recognizing that in the area which is under Jordan's sovereignty with Israeli private land use rights ("land-users") in the land comprising the area ("the land"), Jordan undertakes:

(a) to grant without charge unimpeded freedom of entry to, exit from, land usage and movement within the area to the land users and to their invitees or employees and to allow the land-users freely to dispose of their land in accordance with applicable Jordanian law;

(b) not to apply its customs or immigration legislation to land-users, their invitees or employees crossing from Israel directly to the area for the purpose of gaining access to the land for agricultural or any agreed purposes;

(c) not to impose discriminatory taxes or charges with regard to the land or activities within the area;

(d) to take all necessary measures to protect and prevent harassment of or harm to any person entering the area under this annex;

(e) to permit with the minimum of formality, uniformed officers of the Israeli police force, access to the area for the purpose of investigating crime or dealing with other incidents solely involving the land-users, their invitees or employees.

3. Recognizing Jordanian sovereignty over the area Israel undertakes:

(a) not to carry out or allow to be carried out in the area activities prejudicial to the peace or security of Jordan;

(b) not to allow any person entering the area under this annex (other than the uniformed officers referred to in paragraph 2(e) of this annex) to carry weapons of any kind in the area, unless authorized by the licensing authorities in Jordan after being processed by the liaison committee referred to in Article 8 of this annex;

(c) not to allow the dumping of wastes from outside the area into the area.

4. (a) Subject to this annex, Jordanian law will apply to this area.

(b) Israeli law applying to the extra-territorial activities of Israel may be applied to Israelis and their activities in the area, and Israel may take measures in the area to enforce such laws.

(c) Having regard to this annex, Jordan will not apply its criminal laws to activities in the area which involve only Israeli nationals.

5. In the event of any joint projects to be agreed and developed by the parties in the area, the terms of this annex may be altered for the purpose of the joint project by agreement between the parties at any time.
6. Without prejudice to private rights of use of land within the area, this annex will remain in force for twenty-five years, and shall be renewed automatically for the same periods, unless one year prior notice of termination is given by either party, in which case, at the request of either party, consultations shall be entered into.
7. In addition to the requirement referred to in Article 4(a) of this annex, the acquisition of land in the area by persons who are not Israeli citizens shall take place only with the prior approval of Jordan.
8. An Israeli-Jordanian Liaison Committee is hereby established in order to deal with all matters arising under this annex.

ANNEX II

WATER-RELATED MATTERS

ARTICLE 1—ALLOCATION

1. Water from the Yarmouk River

(a) Summer period—15th May to 15th October of each year. Israel pumps twelve metric cubic meters (MCM) and Jordan gets the rest of the flow.

(b) Winter period—16th October to 14th May of each year. Israel pumps thirteen MCM and Jordan is entitled to the rest of the flow subject to provisions outlined hereinbelow: Jordan concedes to Israel pumping an additional twenty MCM from the Yarmouk in winter in return for Israel conceding to transferring to Jordan during the summer period the quantity specified in paragraph 2(a) below from the Jordan River.

(c) In order that waste of water will be minimized, Israel and Jordan may use, downstream of point 121/Adassiya Diversion, excess flood water that is not usable and will evidently go to waste.

2. Water from the Jordan River

(a) Summer period—15th May to 15th October of each year. In return for the additional water that Jordan concedes to Israel in winter in accordance with paragraph 1(b) above, Israel concedes to transfer to Jordan in the summer period twenty MCM from the Jordan River directly upstream from the Deganya gates on the river. Jordan shall pay the operation and maintenance cost of such transfer through existing systems (not including capital cost) and shall bear the total cost of any new transmission system. A separate protocol shall regulate this transfer.

(b) Winter period—16th October to 14th May of each year. Jordan is entitled to store for its use a minimum average of twenty MCM of the floods in the Jordan River south of its confluence with the Yarmouk (as outlined in Article 11 below). Excess floods that are not usable and that will otherwise be wasted can be utilized for the benefit of the two parties including pumped storage off the course of the river.

(c) In addition to the above, Israel is entitled to maintain its current uses of the Jordan River waters between its confluence with the Yarmouk and its confluence with Tirat Zvi/Wadi Yabis.

Jordan is entitled to an annual quantity equivalent to that of Israel, provided, however, that Jordan's use will not harm the quantity or quality of the above Israeli uses. The Joint Water Committee (outlined in Article 7 below) will survey existing uses for documentation and prevention of appreciable harm.

(d) Jordan is entitled to an annual quantity of ten MCM of desalinated water from the desalination of about twenty MCM of saline springs now diverted to the Jordan River. Israel will explore the possibility of financing the operation and maintenance cost of the supply to Jordan of this desalinated water (not including capital cost). Until the desalination facilities are operational, and upon the entry into force of the treaty, Israel will supply Jordan ten MCM of Jordan River water from the same location as in 2(a) above, outside the summer period and during dates Jordan selects, subject to the maximum capacity of transmission.

3. Additional Water

Israel and Jordan shall cooperate in finding sources for the supply to Jordan of an additional quantity of fifty MCM/year of water of drinkable standards. To this end, the Joint Water Committee will develop, within one year from the entry into force of the treaty, a plan for the supply to Jordan of the above-mentioned additional water. This plan will be forwarded to the respective governments for discussion and decision.

4. Operation and Maintenance

(a) Operation and maintenance of the systems on Israeli territory that supply Jordan with water, and their electricity supply, shall be Israel's responsibility. The operation and maintenance of the new systems that serve only Jordan will be contracted at Jordan's expense to authorities or companies selected by Jordan.

(b) Israel will guarantee easy unhindered access of personnel and equipment to such new systems for operation and maintenance. This subject will be further detailed in the agreements to be signed between Israel and the authorities or companies selected by Jordan.

ARTICLE 2—STORAGE

1. Israel and Jordan shall cooperate to build a diversion/storage dam on the Yarmouk River directly downstream of the point 121/Adassiya Diversion. The purpose is to improve the diversion efficiency into the King Abdullah Canal of the water allocation of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and possibly for the diversion of Israel's allocation of the river water. Other purposes can be mutually agreed.

2. Israel and Jordan shall cooperate to build a system of water storage on the Jordan River, along their common boundary, between its confluence with the Yarmouk River and its confluence with Tirat Zvi/Wadi Yabis, in order to implement the provision of paragraph 2(b) of Article 1 above. The system can also be made to accommodate more floods; Israel may use up to three MCM/year of added storage capacity.

3. Other storage reservoirs can be discussed and agreed upon mutually.

ARTICLE 3—WATER QUALITY AND PROTECTION

1. Israel and Jordan each undertake to protect, within their own jurisdiction, the shared waters of the Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers, and Arava/Araba groundwater, against any pollution, contamination, harm or unauthorized withdrawals of each other's allocations.

2. For this purpose, Israel and Jordan will jointly monitor the quality of water along their boundary, by use of jointly established monitoring stations to be operated under the guidance of the Joint Water Committee.
3. Israel and Jordan will each prohibit the disposal of municipal and industrial wastewater into the course of the Yarmouk or the Jordan Rivers before they are treated to standards allowing their unrestricted agricultural use. Implementation of this prohibition shall be completed within three years from the entry into force of the treaty.
4. The quality of water supplied from one country to the other at any given location shall be equivalent to the quality of the water used from the same location by the supplying country.
5. Saline springs currently diverted to the Jordan River are earmarked for desalination within four years. Both countries shall cooperate to ensure that the resulting brine will not be disposed of in the Jordan River or in any of its tributaries.
6. Israel and Jordan will each protect water systems in its own territory, supplying water to the other, against any pollution, contamination, harm or unauthorized withdrawal of each other's allocations.

ARTICLE 4—GROUNDWATER IN EMEK HA'ARAVA/WADI ARABA

1. In accordance with the provisions of this treaty, some wells drilled and used by Israel along with their associated systems fall on the Jordanian side of the borders. These wells and systems are under Jordan's sovereignty. Israel shall retain the use of these wells and systems in the quantity and quality detailed in an Appendix to this annex, that shall be jointly prepared by 31st December, 1994. Neither country shall take, nor cause to be taken, any measure that may appreciably reduce the yields or quality of these wells and systems.
2. Throughout the period of Israel's use of these wells and systems, replacement of any well that may fail among them shall be licensed by Jordan in accordance with the laws and regulations then in effect. For this purpose, the failed well shall be treated as though it was drilled under license from the competent Jordanian authority at the time of its drilling. Israel shall supply Jordan with the log of each of the wells and the technical information about it to be kept on record. The replacement well shall be connected to the Israeli electricity and water systems.
3. Israel may increase the abstraction rate from wells and systems in Jordan by up to ten MCM/year above the yields referred to in paragraph 1 above, subject to a determination by the Joint Water Committee that this undertaking is hydrogeologically feasible and does not harm existing Jordanian uses. Such increase is to be carried out within five years from the entry into force of the treaty.
4. Operation and Maintenance
 - (a) Operation and maintenance of the wells and systems on Jordanian territory that supply Israel with water, and their electricity supply shall be Jordan's responsibility. The operation and maintenance of these wells and systems will be contracted at Israel's expense to authorities or companies selected by Israel.

(b) Jordan will guarantee easy unhindered access of personnel and equipment to such wells and systems for operation and maintenance. This subject will be further detailed in the agreements to be signed between Jordan and the authorities or companies selected by Israel.

ARTICLE 5—NOTIFICATION AND AGREEMENT

1. Artificial changes in or of the course of the Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers can only be made by mutual agreement.
2. Each country undertakes to notify the other, six months ahead of time, of any intended projects which are likely to change the flow of either of the above rivers along their common boundary, or the quality of such flow. The subject will be discussed in the Joint Water Committee with the aim of preventing harm and mitigating adverse impacts such projects may cause.

ARTICLE 6—COOPERATION

1. Israel and Jordan undertake to exchange relevant data on water resources through the Joint Water Committee.
2. Israel and Jordan shall cooperate in developing plans for purposes of increasing water supplies and improving water use efficiency, within the context of bilateral, regional, or international cooperation.

ARTICLE 7—JOINT WATER COMMITTEE

1. For the purpose of the implementation of this annex, the parties will establish a Joint Water Committee comprised of three members from each country.
2. The Joint Water Committee will, with the approval of the respective governments specify its work procedures, the frequency of its meetings, and the details of its scope of work. The committee may invite experts and/or advisors as may be required.
3. The committee may form, as it deems necessary, a number of specialized subcommittees and assign them technical tasks. In this context, it is agreed that these sub-committees will include a northern sub-committee and a southern sub-committee, for the management on the ground of the mutual water resources in these sectors.

ANNEX III

COMBATING CRIME AND DRUGS

Pursuant to Article 12 of the Treaty of Peace, Israel and Jordan have decided to cooperate in the following fields:

A. Cooperation on Combating Dangerous Drugs

1. The two parties shall cooperate in fighting illicit drugs according to the legal system of their countries.

2. The two parties shall take all necessary measures to prevent drug smuggling between the two countries.

3. The two parties shall exchange information regarding drug trafficking and dealers' activities concerning the two countries.

4. Information given by one of the parties may not be shared with a third party without the consent of the party which provided the information.

5. The two parties shall exchange and share the experience of fighting against drugs, including anti-drug education, prevention, treatment, rehabilitation programs, technical means, and methods of concealment.

6. In order to identify the persons involved in drug archives, the two parties shall facilitate controlled deliveries of drugs between the two countries according to their law.

7. Drug law enforcement officers from both sides shall meet periodically to coordinate efforts pertaining to drug problems concerning the two countries.

8. The two parties shall maintain open channels of communication such as fax, telephone, and telex for liaison purposes in drug matters concerning the two countries.

9. The two parties shall cooperate with the multilateral forums which deal with drug issues in the area.

10. The two parties shall cooperate in investigating procedures necessary for collecting evidence and indictment in cases against drug dealers which concern either or both countries.

11. The two parties shall exchange information regarding statistics on the type and number of drug crimes committed in each country including detailed information regarding suspected and convicted persons involved in these cases.

12. The two parties shall exchange all relevant information regarding the narcotic drug producing laboratories if revealed in either of the two countries, including structure, working methods, and technical features of the laboratory as well as the type and mark of the product.

13. The cooperation described in this document will be carried out in accordance with the legal systems of the two countries.

B. Crime

The parties have agreed that the Agreements to be negotiated pursuant to Article 12 of the treaty shall cover the following issues:

1. Crime

- Exchange of information concerning all aspects of smuggling, theft (including art objects, vehicles, national treasures, antiquities, and documents), etc.;
- Apprehension of criminals and exchange of information including transmission of evidence in order to carry out judicial procedures in each of the two countries, subject to the relevant treaties and regulations.

2. General Cooperation

- Exchange of information regarding technical matters;
- Exchange of information regarding training and research;
- Joint police research projects on topics of mutual interest to both countries.

3. Additional Issues

- Rescue;
- Unintentional border crossing, fugitives from justice;
- Notification of detention of nationals of the other country;
- Establishment of a liaison mechanism between the sides.

C. Cooperation on Forensic Science

1. The two parties shall cooperate on the subjects of criminal identification and forensic science.

2. The two parties shall share and exchange professional experience and training programs:

- (a) Use of field kits for preliminary examinations;
- (b) Analysis of illicit drugs;
- (c) Analysis of poisons and toxic materials;
- (d) Forensic biology and DNA examinations;
- (e) Toolmarks and materials examinations;
- (f) Questionable documents examinations;
- (g) Analysis of voice prints;
- (h) Analysis of fire arms;
- (i) Detection of latent fingerprints;
- (j) Analysis of explosive traces;
- (k) Examination for arson in laboratories;
- (l) Identification of victims in mass disasters;
- (m) Research and development in forensic science.

ANNEX IV

ENVIRONMENT

Israel and Jordan acknowledge the importance of the ecology of the region, its high environmental sensitivity, and the need to protect the environment and prevent danger and risks for the health and well-being of the region's population. They both recognize the need for conservation of natural resources, protection of biodiversity and the imperative of attaining economic growth based on sustainable development principles.

In light of the above, both parties agree to cooperate in matters relating to environmental protection in general and to those that may mutually affect them. Areas of such cooperation are detailed as follows:

A. Taking the necessary steps both jointly and individually to prevent damage and risks to the environment in general, and in particular those that may affect people, natural resources, and environmental assets in the two countries respectively.

B. Taking the necessary steps by both countries to cooperate in the following areas:

- Environmental planning and management including conducting Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and exchanging of data on projects possessing potential impact on their respective environments;
- Environmental legislation, regulations, standards and enforcement thereof;
- Research and applied technology;
- Emergency response, monitoring, related notification procedures, and control of damages;
- Code of conduct through regional charters.

This may be achieved through the establishment of joint modalities and mechanisms of cooperation to ensure exchange of information, communication, and coordination regarding matters and activities of mutual environmental concern between their environmental administrations and experts.

C. Environmental subjects to be addressed:

1. Protection of nature, natural resources, and biodiversity including cooperation in planning and management of adjacent protected areas along the common border, and protection of endangered species and migratory birds.

2. Air quality control, including general standards, criteria and all types of man-made hazardous radiations, fumes and gases.

3. Marine environment and coastal resources management.

4. Waste management including hazardous waste.

5. Pest control including house flies and mosquitoes, and prevention of diseases transferred by pests, such as malaria and leishmaniosis.

6. Abatement and control of pollution contamination and other man-made hazards to the environment.

7. Desertification: combating desertification, exchange of information and research knowledge, and the implementation of suitable technologies.

8. Public awareness and environmental education, encouraging the exchange of knowledge, information, study materials, education programs, and training through public actions and awareness campaigns.

9. Noise: reducing noise pollution through regulation, licensing, and enforcement based on agreed standards.

10. Potential cooperation in case of natural disasters.

D. In accordance with the above the two parties agree to cooperate in activities and projects in the following geographical areas:

1. The Gulf of Aqaba

1.1 The Marine Environment

- Natural resources;
- Coastal reef protection;
- Marine pollution;
- Marine sources: such as oil spills, littering and waste disposal and others;
- Land-based sources: such as liquid waste, solid waste, and littering;
- Abatement, including monitoring and emergency response actions.

1.2 Coastal Zone Management—The Littoral

- Nature reserves and protected areas;
- Environmental protection of water resources;
- Liquid waste;
- Solid waste;
- Tourism and recreational activities;
- Ports;
- Transport;
- Industry and power generation;
- Air quality;
- Hazardous materials;
- Environmental assessments.

2. The Rift Valley

2.1 The Jordan River

- Ecological rehabilitation of the Jordan River;
- Environmental protection of water resources to ensure optimal water quality, at reasonably usable standards;
- Agricultural pollution control;
- Liquid waste;
- Pest control;
- Nature reserves and protected areas;
- Tourism and historical heritage.

2.2 The Dead Sea

- Nature reserves and protected areas;
- Pest control;
- Environmental protection of water resources;
- Industrial pollution control;
- Tourism and historical heritage.

2.3 Emek Ha'arava/Wadi Araba

- Environmental protection of water resources;
- Nature reserves and protected areas;
- Pest control;
- Tourism and historical heritage;
- Agricultural pollution control.

ANNEX V**BORDER CROSSING POINTS PROCEDURE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN**

In pursuance of Article 28 of the Treaty of Peace, the parties have agreed as follows:

1. The crossing points between Israel and Jordan shall be opened in both directions for Jordanians, Israelis, and third country nationals.
2. Procedures of crossing shall be in accordance with the regulations in both countries.
3. Both parties shall recognize passports of the other, and the stamps and visas affixed by the other party on passports. The stamps on Israel and Jordan agree to cooperate along the common boundaries in the following aspects: Hebrew/Arabic, and will include the date of the crossing, the name of the country which stamps the document, and the name of the crossing point.
4. The crossing points shall be opened five days a week, from Sunday to Thursday, during all the year, except for Yom Kippur and the first day of the Al Hijrah calendar. The dates of these two holy days shall be communicated to the other side beforehand.
5. The crossing points shall be opened from 08:00 to 18:30.
6. Each party has the right to refuse entry to a person, in accordance with its regulations. In this case, each party undertakes to accept this person back into the country, without delay, according to international practices.
7. Each party shall apply its customs regulations.
8. Each party shall provide the passengers with the A.17 international immigration form of the other party, before crossing.
9. Direct links, both telephonic and fax, shall be established between the authorities of both sides of the crossing points, in order to provide solutions to any problem.
10. The passenger's passport should be valid for at least six months after the date of the crossing, in accordance with the international practices.
11. Each party shall provide the other with a list of the countries whose citizens are exempted from visa requirements.

12. These arrangements shall go into effect as from the day following the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this treaty.

13. Within a period of up to three months from the date stated in paragraph 12 above, interim arrangements regulating passage of persons through the crossing points, and visa procedures shall be applied. Both parties may shorten this period by mutual agreement.

14. During the interim period mentioned in paragraph 13 above, visas to Israeli and Jordanian citizens shall be granted as agreed between the parties.

15. Pending the mutual opening of the embassies in the two countries, Israeli and Jordanian nationals shall be granted the necessary visas through the following procedures:

(a) The tourist should apply for the visa through a travel agent in his country, who shall convey the application to his counterpart travel agent in the other country. This correspondent travel agent shall apply for the visa to the Ministry of Interior in his country. The visa shall then be collected at the crossing point with a copy to be sent to the travel agent, and another one shall be delivered to the terminals on each side. Upon the opening of the embassies in both countries, the parties will adjust the above procedures as necessary.

(b) Visitors such as businessmen, scientists, officials and journalists, shall contact the respective counterpart who in turn shall apply on their behalf to the Ministry of Interior as above. The visa shall then be collected at the crossing point, and a copy shall be delivered to the terminals on each side. Upon the opening of the embassies in both countries, these persons will apply for visas through the respective embassies.

16. Visa fees shall be collected on a reciprocal basis. Terminal fees shall be collected in accordance with applicable regulations in both countries.

17. This system shall be revised after two months and a half from the date mentioned in Paragraph 12 above, in accordance with any relevant bilateral agreements to be signed as an outcome of this treaty.

18. The existing arrangements for Muslim Israeli nationals who cross into Jordan in transit to Saudi Arabia for Muslim pilgrimage, shall continue to be applicable.

19. Transportation for Israeli and Jordanian tourists between the terminals of each of the crossing points shall be by shuttle bus, and the tourist vehicles provided by travel agents of the visited country shall carry them from its terminal to their final destination.

20. The parties agreed that matters relating to persons entering one of the two countries by one crossing point, harbors or airports, and wishing to exit that country also through other border crossing points, harbors or airports shall be discussed during the interim period mentioned in Paragraph 13 above.

21. The parties agreed that matters relating to the passage of vehicles through the crossing points shall be discussed during the interim period mentioned in Paragraph 13 above, taking into account the transportation, tourism and any other relevant bilateral agreements, to be concluded by the parties.

22. Teams of the two parties shall monitor the implementation of this annex.

AGREED MINUTES

A. Concerning Article 3(f) stating that:

“Immediately upon the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this treaty, each party will deploy on each side of the international boundary as defined in Annex 1(a).”

The parties recognize the practical questions connected with the deployment (such as demarcation, minefields, fences), and therefore would interpret the language to mean that the deployment would start immediately, continue uninterruptedly and expeditiously, and conclude no later than three months after the exchange of the instruments of ratification.

B. With regard to economic and monetary matters pertaining specifically to the territories under Israeli military control, the two governments shall consult with each other with the aim of:

1. Eliminating or mitigating adverse effects on their economies;
2. Giving each other enough time to make the necessary adjustments.

The above is without prejudice to activities which are the result of relations with other states or to former obligations with regard to the territories referred to above, except to the extent that the implementation of such obligations may have adverse effects and to the extent that the implementation is within their control.

C. In the spirit of peace, the two parties attach high priority to the planned recreation joint venture project in the Naharayim/Baqura area, they favorably consider the partnership in peace to be created there, and will endeavor together to promote its implementation as soon as possible.

D. The parties will, upon the signature of this treaty, establish a joint committee headed by senior officials to monitor the implementation of this treaty and the conclusion of relevant agreements, in accordance with the treaty provisions.

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