



Episode 2: Terror in Bangkok, Then and Now

Script

Matthew Levitt

Former-Wexler Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy

October 4, 2023

Oded Ailam:

They climbed on this tanker and they saw inside something very, very strange. They saw all sorts of explosives, and they saw fertilizer that's used for explosives, they saw wires, and also a dissolved body of a person. And then they realized, this wasn't just a hit and run accident. This was an attempted terror plot to blow up the embassy.

Matthew Levitt:

Hi, I'm Matthew Levitt, and this is 'Breaking Hezbollah's Golden Rule,' a podcast that shines a bright spotlight on the criminal, militant, and terrorist activities of Lebanese Hezbollah. Hezbollah is an organization that engages in everything from overt social and political activities in Lebanon to covert militant, criminal, and terrorist activities around the world.

One Hezbollah operative was taught by his commander that the golden rule of the group's terrorist unit is this, quote: "The less you know, the better."

In this podcast, we set out to break this rule.

In our last episode, we dug into Hezbollah's use of front companies to finance and carry out operational activity in South America in the 1990s. What most people don't know is that at the same time Hezbollah operatives were planning attacks in South America, they were also planning an attack on the other side of the world, in Southeast Asia.

Southeast Asia is an unusual location for Hezbollah to focus on. It's far away from Lebanon, most of the region's Muslims are Sunni not Shia, and it doesn't have much of a Lebanese diaspora. So why would Hezbollah carry out operations there? Well, to understand the answer to this question, we first have to understand the relationship between Hezbollah and the Iranian regime.

In Season 1, we talked about Iran playing a key, hands-on role in Hezbollah's formation. After the Iranian revolution, a new regime proactively sought to export its version of Shia Islam around the world, including in places like Southeast Asia. So, it doesn't come as a surprise that two years after the revolution, Iran was already recruiting Islamist firebrands around the world. One of these recruits was Pandu Yudhawinata.

Ailam:

Pandu was not a Shia, he was a Sunni.

Levitt:

This is Oded Ailam. In the 1990s, he served as chief of Mossad's Counterterrorism Center.

Ailam:

But, he was very attracted to the Shia, and in fact, he traveled to Iran and studied in madrasa in Qom, and there he met a very charismatic Shia Imam who had a lot of influence on Pandu.

Levitt:

In 1981, Pandu – originally from Indonesia – traveled to Iran and became increasingly entranced with Islamic extremist groups there. From there, he was sent to Lebanon, where he met senior operatives from Hezbollah’s Islamic Jihad Organization, or IJO, like Talal Hamiyah and Abu al-Ful.

Ailam:

I think he was transformed in Qom, and then the MOIS realized that he has a very unique capabilities and sent him to Lebanon where he met Abu al-Ful, who was the right hand of Talal Hamiyah and in charge of those international operations. And there, he went under certain kind of exams and tests to see if he’s reliable, to see if he’s not double agent. And after they realized he will [sic], they started training him, and was very, very well trained in Lebanon. And then he was sent to different small missions just to see his capabilities and from there, he developed to be one of the most prominent member of the Jihad Islamic.

Levitt:

Pandu started off working as an agent for Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security, or MOIS, operating out of the Iranian embassy in Kuala Lumpur in the 1980s. Once his training was complete, he returned home to Indonesia, and formed a bomb squad with other members of an Iranian-trained Indonesian cell. According to Philippine intelligence reports, “the squad was involved in several attacks in 1985 and 1986.”

Ailam:

Now, Pandu is not the regular stereotype of terrorists that we see. He was very, very educated, self-educated, very curious. He knew at least four languages. And he was kind of an intellectual Muslim, and also a martial arts expert in Kung Fu, which later helped him to escape.

Levitt:

Pandu was personally recruited into Hezbollah by Imad Mughniyeh, the head of the IJO. And Abu al-Ful, the senior IJO officer that Pandu met in Lebanon, was assigned as his handler. Pandu and al-Ful developed a very close personal relationship.

Al-Ful oversaw Hezbollah’s Southeast Asian networks. Just like operatives in South America, he traveled around the region, especially to Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines, using a variety of names and passports. His preferred cover story was that of a traveling book salesman. That made it easy for him to travel around the region to meet and vet local recruits, serve as the handler for local operatives, carry out surveillance, and procure weapons and explosives.

Philippine and Israeli authorities were very concerned that Hezbollah was “set to carry out terrorist attacks in the region.” And they were right.

In the summer of 1993, Pandu and Abu al-Ful traveled to Zamboanga City in the Philippines. There, they obtained two fake Filipino passports from their most reliable document procurer. Pandu’s passport was under the name Abraham Buenaventura. After picking up their documents, Pandu and al-Ful flew to Bangkok, where they found and rented a safe house just outside of town.

This is where Pandu met the other operatives: Mouhandedes – the engineer and explosives expert, Musa – the welding expert, and Tony – the surveillance guy. At least, those are the names they were using at the time.

The cell members acquired the chemicals they needed to make explosives in small batches from a variety of stores over a period of time to avoid scrutiny. And they covered the windows of the safe house with newspapers to conceal their activity.

Over the next few months, Pandu oversaw the cell’s progress in Bangkok and even did much of the legwork himself, including renting the truck for the attack. In February 1994, Abu al-Ful met Pandu in Kuala Lumpur and gave him “a bag filled with what seemed like candy bars.” It wasn’t until after the meeting that Pandu realized that the “candy bars” were actually high-grade C4 explosives. Pandu returned to the safe house, and the cell set the final preparations for the attack.

On March 11th, 1994, the truck full of explosives was on its way to its target: the Israeli embassy in Bangkok.

Oded – the Israeli counterterrorism official you heard from earlier in the episode – was on the ground in Bangkok that day.

Ailam:

11 of March 1994, I was in Thailand, in Bangkok. And I just was going on my way to the embassy when I heard a loud noise, and I saw a crash. And I reached the place, and I saw a lot of people gathering around, looking at something, and I realized it's some sort of a hit and run. And I saw a truck – a container that ran over a motorcyclist. The motorcyclist was eventually wounded, and the truck driver disappeared. And it almost happened in front of my eyes about a few minutes before that. And there was a crowd of people gathering, you know looking at it and the police started to evacuate everyone from there. And I was standing there, and there was a guy coming and he was standing near me, and he wasn't a local. I couldn't realize from where he was but I didn't even pay attention to him, and he looked at me and he asked me, "What happened?" And I said "A hit and run." And he said in a very, very good English, he said "A hit and run? It's not an accident. It's a crime, and the guy who did it has to be punished." And I said, "Yeah sure," and he disappeared. And the next time I saw this guy was in 1999. And this guy was Pandu.

Levitt:

It took authorities nearly a week to discover that this wasn't a simple accident.

Ailam:

This actually was a hit and run that looked very innocent, you know, a truck driver ran over a motorcyclist, ran away, no big deal, you know. And so the police came, and they towed away the truck into the police station, and they parked it just underneath the headquarters of the Thai police, because that was the parking lot. And the truck stayed there for about five days, and after five days, they started smelling some sort of an odor, and they didn't know what it is. So they brought a pest team just to check all the air conditioning stuff, and things like this, to try to realize where this smell comes from. And then they realized, it's not from the building, it's coming from the outside. So they went outside and they climbed on this tanker, and they saw inside something very, very strange. They saw all sorts of explosives, and they saw fertilizer that's used for explosives, they saw wires that are leading towards the cabin. And what they saw also was a dissolved body of a person. And then they realized, this wasn't just a hit and run accident. This was an attempted terror plot to blow up the embassy.

Levitt:

The dead body was a truck driver. He had been sent by the rental company to drive the truck since Pandu insisted on paying without paperwork. Concerned about the driver seeing the safe house, Mouhanded – the explosives expert – decided to strangle him. The cell replaced the truck driver with the suicide bomber, an Iranian, who was later arrested but eventually acquitted on appeal.

Officials had clearly suspected Hezbollah was up to something. Oded was already in-country when the Israeli embassy was nearly blown up, but this was the moment when intelligence agencies started to realize just how sophisticated a network Hezbollah had developed in Thailand.

The first tangible lead came when investigators found that someone using a Filipino passport under the name Abraham Buenaventura purchased the metal drum, rented the safe house, and bought the chemicals. Buenaventura was Pandu's fake identity, but investigators didn't know that yet.

Despite the failed bomb plot, and even as investigators were on their trail, Abu al-Ful and Pandu continued to plan additional attacks in the region and established an expansive recruitment and logistics hub in Southeast Asia.

Pandu's expertise was in recruitment. He preferred to scope out new recruits in mosques in Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia. He would meet with prospects personally to "check their suitability." Meanwhile, Abu al-Ful focused on the procurement of forged travel documents and weapons.

By 1997, al-Ful's networks were itching to attempt another round of attacks in Southeast Asia. In Singapore, operatives collected intelligence for a maritime bombing that would target U.S. Navy and Israeli merchant ships, as well as an attack on a local synagogue. In Indonesia, Pandu collected intelligence and followed U.S. diplomats residing in Jakarta. In the Philippines, operatives collected intelligence on a synagogue and procured weapons in Manila. These preparations were part of what came to be known as the "Five Contingency Plans."

Ailam:

We learned that they have five contingency plan which were on a very, very large scale, which included sinking civilian cruise ships in the Malacca Straits, attacking embassies in India, and in the Philippines, and in Singapore – Israeli and American. And all those plans were ready-made on the shelf to be initiated by an order of the Supreme Leader at the right time. But they actually had all those operatives and the infrastructure and the explosives. Everything was ready.

Now, it was supposed to be carried out simultaneously, much like the al-Qaeda style, at the same day, at the same hour in five different places. And the effect would be about ten-times bigger than the 9/11.

Levitt:

Authorities managed to stop Hezbollah's "Five Contingency Plans" before they came to fruition. It's unclear if these were notional plots or thwarted by authorities, or some combination of the two.

Another plan Pandu and al-Ful concocted was to send operatives to Australia, where they could stay for a while and acquire legitimate Australian passports. Then, the operatives could fly to Israel and appear less suspicious.

By the summer of 1999, Pandu worked frantically to see his plans through. He traveled to the Philippines to acquire more "clean" passports for new Hezbollah recruits from his contacts in Zamboanga. Meanwhile, Oded and his team were making progress in their investigation into the failed Bangkok bombing, and they were getting close to understanding the full scope of the Hezbollah threat in Southeast Asia.

Ailam:

I'm talking about November 1999. We are talking about Thursday night. I'm about to go home from my work, and one of my colleagues who was an analyst of the Hezbollah called me and provided me some sort of info that indicates that there is something strange regarding a communication between two people. One of them is in Lebanon, and the other one is in a place which I never heard before. It's called Zamboanga in the Philippines. I thought it's the name of a disease or something. And the next thing, we found ourselves on an airplane going to the Philippines.

Levitt:

This was critical lead information, but they still didn't know what it all meant.

Ailam:

We had no smoking gun at all. We didn't know who are those people, we didn't know is Pandu. We didn't know nothing. We just went upon instinct.

We joined the Philippine counterterrorism, or special branch, and we traced the location of this peculiar person in Zamboanga. We managed to trace his location, and we started to shadow him, together. My team and I were using a cover of something like freelancers for National Geographic, and we started together with them to shadow to try to see what he is doing there.

And we managed to realize that he was purchasing some sort of passports, and the passports were actually genuine, because they bribed something in the ministry to get real passports. And we really wanted to arrest this guy because we understood at that time that he is involved in something. And so, I was pushing my counterparts to arrest them but they said, "No, we can't arrest him, on what?" And I said, "forged passports." He said "Come on, forged passports is a respectable business in the Philippines, I mean we need something much more than that." I said, "Come on, we just let him go?" He said, "yeah." And so that's what happened. He took a flight, internal flight from Zamboanga to Manila and he was on his way to the Middle East. We had nothing on him.

Levitt:

It seemed like Pandu had slipped away.

Ailam:

And then, for some very unexpected reason, the sniffing dogs in the airport in Manila started to bark like crazy, and they started to search his luggage and they found some drugs. And, this is how we managed to arrest him and bring him to interrogation.

Levitt:

On November 4, 1999, Filipino police arrested Pandu on drug charges as he landed in Manila, and confiscated several fake passports.

Ailam:

We managed to crack the codes he was using. Some codes that we found in his suitcase. By deciphering those codes, we realized his true identity and his true name, and that made a major breakthrough in the investigation where we actually told him, "Listen, we know who you are." Then, he realized that he is in life danger, and he asked for immunity. And the way to give him immunity is by helping us.

Levitt:

Even worse for Hezbollah, as Pandu was in interrogation, he broke their golden rule. He began to talk.

Ailam:

When he started cooperating, he was like a river of intelligence. Because he had such a great memory and Abu al-Ful trusted him completely, that in fact Abu al-Ful breached some sort of a no-no which is always to know very limited things. Abu al-Ful shared with him so much information that didn't even regard his activities, okay, and this information Pandu shared with the investigators. And we learned a few things. First of all, we learned his involvement in 1994 attempted plot to bomb our embassy. He was actually there. He was in charge of this operation, and we didn't know that. And we learned they have five contingency plan which were on a very large scale.

Levitt:

At this time, the CIA was also aggressively combating the group's activities in the region and quietly arrested forty-five Hezbollah members in Southeast Asia in the fall of 1999.

The arrests disrupted some of Hezbollah's activities in the region, but it didn't stop all of them. In March 2000, a Philippine report revealed that Hezbollah "terrorist activities [were] being planned to be carried out...in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, and Australia." The group considered sending three Indonesian members to Australia for an attack during the 2000 Olympics, according to the report.

Intelligence agencies also suspected the group of continuing to plot maritime attacks against Western military or merchant vessels traveling through the Singapore Strait and the Strait of Malacca. Even further, authorities believed the group had plans to attack the El Al Airlines office in Thailand along with vacation spots frequented by Americans and Israelis.

Thankfully, these plans never came to fruition, in part because Pandu's handler, Abu al-Ful, was arrested in 2001 – not in Southeast Asia, but in Jordan. Hezbollah engages in multiple, often overlapping operations around the world. In this case, Abu al-Ful was juggling oversight of attack operations in Southeast Asia and a weapons smuggling operation in Jordan.

But this latest disruption wasn't the end of Hezbollah operations in the region. Fast forward to 2011 when Thai police received a tip from the Israelis that Hezbollah operatives were in town preparing to carry out an attack in Bangkok, again.

Clip: A Swedish man of Lebanese origin has pleaded not guilty in a Thai court of planning to bomb Bangkok.

Hussein was arrested in January 2012 at a Bangkok airport just one month after Israeli operatives tipped off the Thai authorities regarding a possible terror threat from suspects with Swedish passports.

Levitt:

On January 12th, 2012, Thai police tracked down and arrested Hussein Atris, a Lebanese-Swedish Hezbollah operative in Bangkok's international airport as he attempted to flee the country. When authorities searched his belongings, they found a crucial piece of evidence: a key to a three-story warehouse. Atris had been renting it for the past year in Samut Sakhon Province, located along the northern outskirts of Bangkok, under the guise of running an import-export business.

On the first floor of the warehouse, authorities found goods you might expect – electric fans, mattresses, paper, brooms. But as they searched more of the warehouse, they uncovered more than just an import-export business. Once again, a Hezbollah investigation leads authorities to uncover a front company used to hide the group's illicit activities.

Smanbut:

If you go up to the second floor, on the second floor, they have two small rooms and they have the entry space in front of the two small rooms.

Levitt:

This is Thai Police Colonel Sakdawut Smanbut, who goes by Josh because he finds Western colleagues have a hard time saying his name. I hope I did it justice, but I'll call him Josh from here on. At any rate, Josh was involved in the arrest and investigation of Hussein Atris, including the warehouse raid.

Smanbut:

The first room is just the bedroom. The second room when you go inside, you found a lot of thing: like the plastic gallons, plastic box, inside had their liquid – is the clear liquid, like a pink colors, clear yellow colors, the plastic filled machines, refrigerators, that we found out later they used that equipment to try to repack the ammonium nitrate.

Clip: In a warehouse just outside the Thai capital Bangkok, materials were stored to make bombs. Police raided the building and took away containers of fertilizer and liquid ammonium nitrate.

Levitt:

On the second floor of the warehouse, Atris and his roommate stockpiled some 6,200 pounds of liquid ammonium nitrate and 8,800 pounds of urea fertilizer – both chemicals used to make explosives. The materials were already distilled into crystal form, a key step in building bombs. But Atris had to hide these explosive materials to disguise his operation and facilitate their shipment abroad.

Smanbut:

When you go outside to the clear space in front of the two small rooms, you're going to find a huge number of paper box. When you open the box, in fact, they have the cat litter bag. But when you open and you cut it off, is nothing for the cat. But it's the ammonium nitrate. The cat litter was repacked, put the new ammonium nitrate inside the cat litter, try to hide for the police.

Levitt:

If you remember from last season, Hezbollah uses the now-well-established modus operandi of extracting ammonium nitrate, a chemical found in disposable ice packs, to make explosives. Josh and the rest of the Thai authorities that raided the warehouse concluded that Atris and the operatives he was working with bought a large amount of disposable ice packs, produced ammonium nitrate, and then repacked the chemical precursor to make explosives into the bags marked as “cat litter.”

Shipping labels found at the scene indicated that some of the explosives marked as “cat litter” were intended to be, or were already, shipped abroad. Documents seized at the warehouse suggested that some boxes had already been shipped to South America, though that was never confirmed. The conclusion was that Hezbollah had been using Thailand as a hub to stockpile explosives and decided to deploy its on-hand operatives and material to target Israeli tourists.

Atris maintained his innocence in the case, denied any links to Hezbollah, and accused the Mossad of planting the explosive materials found at the warehouse he was renting. A Bangkok criminal court judge sentenced Atris to two years and eight months for illegal possession of ammonium nitrate, a substance banned under Thailand's Weapons Act. He was released in September 2014 after receiving credit for time served before his conviction, and is believed to have returned to Lebanon after he was released from prison.

To add insult to injury, Thai police uncovered another bomb plot less than a month later in February 2012, a case Thai authorities call the “Valentine's Day bomb.” This time, the Iranian regime was directing the plot, but with sloppy operatives.

Clip: A man thought to be Iranian has had his legs blown off in Bangkok after a bomb he was carrying exploded. Earlier a blast rocked a house he was reportedly renting with other Iranians in the Thai capital. Two men escaped as police moved in, a third threw an explosive device at a taxi after it failed to stop. Then, aiming a bomb at police, he caused himself serious injuries.

On February 14, 2012, a large explosion shook a central Bangkok villa that three Iranian men rented for the month. They were storing a cache of C-4 explosives and remote-control detonators intended to target Israeli diplomats. Following the accidental explosion, two of the suspects managed to escape, while the third, wounded and bleeding, tried to hail a taxi. When several taxis refused to stop, the man threw one of his sticky bombs at a cab. Shortly after, he lobbed another bomb at an approaching policeman but the device hit a tree and bounced back, blowing off the Iranian's legs and injuring three Thai civilians.

The suspect was taken to a local hospital in critical condition. One of his accomplices was arrested at the Bangkok airport waiting to board a flight, and the third was found and arrested in Malaysia. The men were tried and jailed, but were all released in 2020 as part of a prisoner swap with a British-American scholar.

Josh's team in Thailand found no connection between the January and February plots, which begs the question – how much coordination, if any, was there between Hussein Atris' Hezbollah cell and the Iranians? Was there any thought given to the suspicions it might arouse by having these cells operating in Thailand at the same time?

About five months before Atris was released from prison in 2014, the Israelis notified Thai authorities that Hezbollah was yet again plotting attacks in Thailand, this time in six locations across the country during its annual New Year's, or Songkran, Water Festival in mid-April. The 2014 Water Festival coincided with the Passover holiday, a period of time when Israeli tourists are known to travel to places like Thailand.

One of the targeted locations was the bustling Khao San Road in central Bangkok, frequently visited by Israeli tourists. Hezbollah operatives Youssef Ayad, a Lebanese-Filipino dual national, and Daoud Farhat, a Lebanese-French dual national, were tasked with executing this attack.

According to Josh, Youssef Ayad came to Thailand a few weeks before the Water Festival to plan the operation. He used the cover of attending flower arrangement classes so as not to arouse suspicion about why he was there.

Smanbut:

Sometimes they attend the class of the flower arrangement. But lastly he didn't know anything about a flower. And they told they have their flower shop, small flower shop, in the Philippines. When I have the chance to talk with the Filipino friends who work in the same area with me, he told me like is not true. And he came here for the class, but he always skip the class.

Levitt:

Skipping flower arrangement classes was not the only odd thing Ayad was up to.

Smanbut:

Sometime when they walk through the main road you stop at the, what you call, convenience store. They buy some stuff like a, what you call nail polish.

And some, like acid water.

Levitt:

It turns out you can make TATP, a powerful, cheap explosive using just a few, easy-to-find materials: nail polish remover, hydrogen peroxide, and acid. TATP is also known as "Mother of Satan" by some terrorist groups due to its devastating effects and instability. Terrorists used TATP in the November 2015 Paris attacks, the March 2016 Brussels bombings, and exploded a bomb factory in Alcanar, Spain in August 2017.

However, Thai police could not find probable cause to arrest Ayad on terrorism charges just for buying dozens of bottles of nail polish remover and acid water, and they were primarily focused on securing the Water Festival which had already begun.

Lacking the evidence to detain him for prosecution, Thai authorities instead revoked Ayad's visa and arrested him for illegal immigration using the powers of Thailand's Immigration Act. Ayad admitted that he entered the country to carry out a bomb attack. On the day of the Water Festival, while Ayad was detained in the immigration center, authorities got word that the other Hezbollah operative involved in this plot, Daoud Farhat, was staying in a guest house near Khao San Road. Next thing you know, they're calling in the explosive ordnance disposal unit, or EOD.

Smanbut:

Very lucky for us, our colleague saw Dauoud Farhat walk nearby the Khao San Road. I don't know what happened, but he found Dauoud Farhat, and Dauoud walk back to his guesthouse. That's why we know where he stay. And we call the police, we call the intel to the scene. And waiting for him, especially, we call the EOD as well, because we don't know the material that Ayad collected.

And we wait for EOD, we wait for the response team. Because of that day, is the long holiday, the big holiday for Thai people, not many police work at that day. That's why after that, just around noon, Dauoud Farhat went down to the counter of that guesthouse and did check out. And he walked straight to the main road, caught the cab to go somewhere. That's why the police and military officers in the plain clothes make decision to arrest him at that time, and put the rucksack down, and make sure nothing like explosive in his rucksack, and bring him to the detention center to interview.

Levitt:

Thai authorities were ultimately unable to convict Ayad or Farhat on terrorism-related charges, despite Ayad's confession. Both men were deported to Lebanon after questioning. Two years later, the U.S. Treasury Department designated Ayad for his membership in Hezbollah's Islamic Jihad Organization and his surveillance in Thailand, but the operatives are still at large.

Smanbut:

We learn a lot from the history. Right now, we share the experience, the lesson learned, about a Hezbollah case, two cases that we mentioned, to the relevant police officers, the national security officers, intelligence officers, and we put every interesting people on our database, like a immigration database.

Levitt:

Thai police continue to probe for possible Hezbollah activities in their country to this day.

Smanbut:

We think that Thailand still has the possibility Hezbollah gonna use us to be the ground to take their revenge, to attack the enemy of him. Or maybe they use Thailand as the transit point, or the place to store something like ammonium nitrate, a chemical, before exporting to the third country or the area that he interest in.

But I think you all know like for the chemicals stockpile, is not happened only in my country, but it still happen in another country as well. Is the same thing. That's why for Thai people, or the Thai intelligence agency, before getting on talk with our colleague, more than in the past. We try to exchange about possibility of the threat or the movement of Hezbollah.

Levitt:

Hezbollah operatives employed similar modus operandi when they plotted another bombing in 2008, this time in Baku, Azerbaijan. In our next episode, we'll dig into the first of what would become a string of Hezbollah terrorist plots around the world aiming to avenge the assassination of Hezbollah's infamous external operations leader, Imad Mughniyeh.

OUTRO:

Thanks for listening to 'Breaking Hezbollah's Golden Rule,' brought to you by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and hosted by me, Matthew Levitt.

This podcast is produced by Anouk Millet for Earshot Strategies, and written by myself, Lauren von Thaden, and Camille Jablonski, research assistants at the Washington Institute.

The audio clips used in this episode are from Jewish News One, Al Jazeera, and Euro News.

To learn more about Hezbollah's criminal, militant and terrorist activities, check out my book, *The Global Footprint of Lebanon's Party of God*.

You can also visit the Washington Institute's website at washingttoninstitute.org and explore our map and timeline of [Hezbollah Worldwide activities](#).

If you liked what you've heard, leave us a review wherever you get your podcasts and subscribe so you don't miss any future episodes.