



## Episode 7: Operations and Illicit Finance in the Gulf

Script

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November 8, 2023

*Clip: I would like to tell you that we do not have followers of Hezbollah in the Gulf countries. After all, do you believe that a follower of Hezbollah may be allowed to live in the Gulf countries? There is not anything of this sort. We do not have projects in the Gulf or any other place.*

### Levitt:

That was Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary General of Hezbollah, denying that the group has activities, or “projects,” as he put it, in the Gulf.

He’s, um, not telling the truth.

### INTRO:

Hi, I’m Matthew Levitt, and this is ‘Breaking Hezbollah’s Golden Rule,’ a podcast that shines a bright spotlight on the criminal, militant, and terrorist activities of Lebanese Hezbollah. Hezbollah is an organization that engages in everything from overt social and political activities in Lebanon to covert militant, criminal, and terrorist activities around the world.

One Hezbollah operative was taught by his commander that the golden rule of the group’s terrorist unit is this, quote: “The less you know, the better.”

In this podcast, we set out to break this rule.

Hezbollah has a long history of financial, logistical, and operational activities in the Gulf, dating back to the December 1983 bombings in Kuwait City.

*Clip: The six blasts shattered Kuwait’s capital city, erupting within minutes of each other. The targets were plain: any building housing American or French personnel. The onslaught started when a booby-trapped truck crashed into the American embassy compound. Minutes later, a series of explosions went off throughout the city. Four people were killed. A further fifty were treated for injuries, mainly cuts from flying glass.*

### Levitt:

Days after the attacks, which were claimed by Hezbollah’s Islamic Jihad Organization, the IJO, CIA analysts predicted that quote: “these bombings may portend a proliferation of Iranian terrorist operations outside the areas (mainly in Lebanon) to which they have largely been limited to date.”

How right they were.

In January 1984, a Saudi consul was kidnapped in Beirut by Hezbollah operatives. A month later, a car bomb was stopped at the gate of a power station in Kuwait, which the CIA credited to Hezbollah.

In June of that same year, the Saudi embassy in Beirut was attacked twice: the first time by a small bomb, the second by a grenade fired from an RPG. An anonymous telephone caller in Beirut claimed that Hezbollah's IJO conducted these attacks and warned nationals of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE to leave Lebanon within two weeks or suffer the same fate.

Then, in August 1984, a Kuwaiti businessman was wounded and his driver killed in an attack in Spain. A year later, an explosives-filled car rammed into the royal motorcade of the Kuwaiti emir, killing two bodyguards and a pedestrian. This list doesn't even include the multiple Kuwait Airways hijackings we discussed in Season 1. All this is to say that Hezbollah and its Iranian allies have long posed a grave threat to Gulf countries and their citizens.

**Nathan Sales:**

When you ask our friends in the Gulf what their top security concern is, they give very different answers to what you hear in Washington.

**Levitt:**

That's Ambassador Nathan Sales, former Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the U.S. State Department.

**Sales:**

If you ask somebody in Washington, what are our top security priorities today? You hear about China. Your second answer is probably going to be China. Your third answer is probably going to be China, and then maybe Russia cracks the top five. If you're in Riyadh, if you're in Abu Dhabi, if you're in Manama, it's Iran, number one, Iran number two, Iran number three, and so on down the list.

**Levitt:**

This shouldn't come as a surprise. Iran has long wanted to push the U.S. out of the Gulf region, to mitigate Western power projection in the region, but also to punish the Saudis and other Gulf regimes for supporting Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War.

As a result, the Gulf became a ripe location for covert terror plots and criminal enterprises. Iran, however, saw benefits in using non-Iranian proxy groups to carry out its attacks. Doing so both provided access to strategic targets and a level of deniability. To this end, Hezbollah was the name used by several related terrorist groups operating not only in Lebanon, but also in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain, among other places. The "Hezbollah organizations" were all inspired, supported, and directed by elements of the Iranian government. Lebanese Hezbollah has long supported these other Shia militant groups in the region by training their operatives and sometimes providing operational support.

**Douglas London:**

When you think of Hezbollah's utility to the Iranians in training other Shia groups throughout the Muslim world, one thing that can't be lost is the fact that, you know, the Iranians are Persians, they're not Arabs. And the majority of these groups, they're reaching out to, be they in the Gulf, be they in Iraq, wherever they are, tend to be Arabs.

**Levitt:**

That's Douglas London, a thirty-four-year veteran of CIA's Clandestine Service and author of *The Recruiter: Spying and the Lost Art of American Intelligence*. We heard from him earlier this season.

**London:**

And Hezbollah provides utility in terms of – they're also able to communicate with fellow Arabs in a way that the Persians can't, right. They share this Shia ideology, which is what, I believe, the Iranian regime has been trying to propagate to overcome nationalism, right, and we've seen that happen within Lebanese Hezbollah itself.

**Levitt:**

In 1985, the CIA reported that Hezbollah was running a training camp near Janta, Lebanon, for over 2,000 Shia militants, including about sixty from Saudi Arabia and Bahrain who were trained at the facility before being sent back to the Gulf to conduct operations there. Hezbollah also periodically participated in terrorist attacks with members of other militant groups at the behest of Iran. Hezbollah and the Iraqi Dawa Party collaborated on multiple operations, including the six bombings in Kuwait in 1983 and the brazen attempt to assassinate the Kuwaiti emir two years later. Other operations were led entirely by Hezbollah branches in the Gulf.

In 1986, Bahrain began to crack down on Bahraini Hezbollah; a year later, it arrested and tried fifty-nine of the group's members. Yet the group was far from beaten. In fact, over a decade later, the Kuwaiti State Security Service arrested thirteen Bahrainis and two Iraqis that appeared to have ties to Saudi and Kuwaiti Hezbollah. They were operating under the name "Hezbollah Gulf" for years. Several top leaders in Bahraini Hezbollah managed to evade these arrests, and were reportedly living in Kuwait. One of them was living in Kuwait City, running a safehouse that served as a key transit point between Bahrain and Lebanon. This cell was engaged in weapons smuggling and possibly terrorist-related activities.

A January 1997 cable sent from the FBI Director to the CIA and White House warned that Hezbollah was funding "Saudi opposition elements in Kuwait for possible support of terrorist operations." The warning was set against information that a Hezbollah spiritual leader had produced a videotape for distribution to opposition party members in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait. It reportedly called for "Hezbollah-supported suicide operations in defense of the [tenets] of Islam in the Gulf region."

Saudi Hezbollah carried out its first attack on a petroleum facility inside the kingdom in May 1987. Hezbollah then threatened to carry out additional attacks targeting Saudi officials and U.S. and Saudi interests abroad. Within a year, Saudi Hezbollah made good on its threat by conducting a series of attacks targeting the Saudi petrochemical industry, which employed many Americans. A year later, the group claimed responsibility for an explosion at a petrochemical plant in Jubail.

In July 1989, a group of Kuwaiti and Saudi Hezbollah operatives were caught smuggling explosives into Saudi Arabia and placing them in the vicinity of Mecca's Grand Mosque. Sixteen Kuwaitis and four Saudis were beheaded for their roles in the plot, prompting Saudi and Kuwaiti Hezbollah to issue a call for vengeance. However, the most well-known and destructive Saudi Hezbollah attack was the Khobar Towers bombing.

*Clip: At the White House, the American flag flies at half-staff, as the nation mourns the loss of nineteen lives in a bombing at a U.S. Air Force base in Saudi Arabia.*

**Levitt:**

On June 25, 1996, a tanker truck carrying at least 5000 pounds of plastic explosives detonated next to Building 131 of the Khobar Towers base. The blast was later determined to have been the largest nonnuclear explosion on record. The bomb left a crater eighty-five-feet wide and thirty-five-feet deep, damaging buildings across the compound, and was even felt twenty miles away in Bahrain.

Over the next five years, the FBI led a massive, politically-sensitive investigation that would ultimately prompt the indictment of thirteen members of Saudi Hezbollah and an unidentified Lebanese Hezbollah operative. One of these men was Ahmad al-Mughassil, the leader of Saudi Hezbollah's military wing. He was the direct supervisor of the Khobar operation.

Three years prior, Mughassil instructed Saudi Hezbollah operatives to surveil Americans in Saudi Arabia and determine the best targets. Once they settled on Khobar Towers, the operational preparations were underway. Months before the attack, Mughassil traveled to Qatif, not far from Khobar Towers, under the cover of a pilgrim on the Hajj. He assembled a hit squad and instructed one of his operatives to find places to stockpile and hide their explosives. But at one point during the preparations, four of his operatives were arrested for smuggling explosives. Undeterred, Mughassil jumped in and assumed a hands-on role to see the operation through, and the plot continued apace.

Using stolen identification, the cell purchased a tanker from a Saudi car dealership for about \$20,000, then spent the next two weeks leading up to the attack converting the tanker into a truck bomb at a farm in the Qatif area. That unidentified Lebanese Hezbollah operative helped assemble the bomb. On the night of the attack, the cell met to review final preparations.

*Clip: The night of the bombing, June 25, 1996, they gathered at the farm and then departed in three vehicles: the bomb truck, a scout vehicle, and then a getaway car.*

**Levitt:**

Jim Comey, the prosecutor in the FBI case against the bombers.

*Clip: The scout vehicle entered the parking lot right next to the building where most of the Air Force personnel were going to sleep, and parked in the corner and then signaled the bomb truck and the getaway car that it was safe to enter by blinking its lights. The bomb truck then entered. Driven by two men, they backed it up. About three minutes later the blast went off.*

**Levitt:**

Mughassil himself drove the truck bomb. Following the explosion, two of the operatives returned home to Qatif, while the others made their way out of Saudi Arabia to neighboring countries. In the years that followed, operatives were slowly captured by various governments and returned to Saudi Arabia to stand trial for the attack.

Saudi authorities were the first to round up six of the bombers and obtain confessions. According to FBI Director at the time, Louis Freeh, “the bombers admitted they had been trained by the IRGC in the Bekaa Valley, and received their passports at the Iranian embassy in Damascus, along with \$250,000 in cash for the operation.” Other Khobar operatives roamed free for years. Many were suspected to be hiding in Iran. That is, until August 2015.

*Clip: He was on the FBI's Most Wanted list of suspected terrorists and on the run for almost 20 years. Ahmed al-Mughassil, now forty-eight years old, has reportedly been captured in Lebanon and transferred to Saudi Arabia.*

**Levitt:**

On August 18, 2015, Ahmed al-Mughassil was arrested in Beirut, where he had lived for years under Lebanese Hezbollah protection, and was reportedly extradited to Saudi Arabia. Hezbollah also has a presence in Iraq. In 2003, the group established a dedicated unit, Unit 3800, to support and train Iraqi Shia militias targeting Coalition forces during the Iraq war. According to U.S. intelligence, Unit 3800 sent a small number of personnel to Iraq to train hundreds of fighters in-country, while others were brought to Lebanon for more advanced training. Hezbollah also provided funds and weapons to Iraqi Shia militias. But its most dangerous contribution was in the realm of the special operations.

According to a 2010 Pentagon report, Unit 3800 provided Iraqi militias “the training, tactics, and technology to conduct kidnappings [and] small unit tactical operations.” Unit 3800 trainers taught militants how to “employ sophisticated improvised explosive devices,” or IEDs, by incorporating the lessons they learned from their own operations in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah even sent master trainer and Special Operations Commander Ali Mussa Daqduq al-Musawi to oversee the unit’s training program in Iraq.

Douglas London again, the former CIA case officer.

**London:**

Daqduq had a management portfolio of sorts, but also seemed to have been involved. And we saw Iran’s use of Hezbollah trainers to extend its development of explosive form projectiles, which they used against Israeli armor so well in their own conflicts that they then transferred that technology to Iraq.

**Levitt:**

While in Iraq, Daqduq dealt directly with IRGC Quds Force personnel on certain occasions – further evidence of the high level of coordination between Hezbollah and Iran.

Since 2011, when U.S. and U.S.-led Coalition forces withdrew from Iraq, Unit 3800 has been put to work elsewhere in the region, primarily in Yemen. There, Hezbollah and Quds Force personnel have aided the Houthis, an insurgent group funded by Iran, to fight the Yemeni government. According to U.S. Treasury Department reports, Hezbollah is in charge of sending funds and training to Houthi fighters in Yemen, while Quds Force personnel transfer advanced weapons such as anti-aircraft missiles.

In November 2017, Hezbollah operatives fired an Iranian ballistic missile toward Riyadh International Airport, which was intercepted by Saudi forces. According to Saudi Arabia's foreign minister, it was a Hezbollah operative who fired the Iranian missile at the airport from territory occupied by the Houthis in Yemen. That was an exceptional case. Most Hezbollah support to the Houthis focuses on training and financing.

Nathan Sales again.

**Sales:**

I don't think it's really surprising in the least that Hezbollah would have its tentacles into Yemen and would be involved in fundraising for the Houthis. Look, the Iranians see Hezbollah and what it has done to Lebanon as a proof of concept and as a model to be emulated elsewhere. And we see across the region efforts by Iran to seed similar Shia militia that will act as destabilizing forces in their countries of origin and proxies.

**Levitt:**

Khalil Harb, a former Hezbollah special operations commander and a close adviser to Nasrallah, was appointed to head Unit 3800 and oversee the group's activities in Yemen. He managed the transfer of large amounts of currency to Hezbollah and its political allies in Yemen, and he frequently traveled to Tehran to coordinate Hezbollah activities with Iranian officials. The U.S. Treasury Department designated Harb in 2013, highlighting his activities in Yemen. In the spring of 2015, Hezbollah sent a senior Hezbollah special forces commander formerly stationed in Syria to upgrade the group's training program for the Houthi rebels.

Since then, the Israeli Defense Forces have accused Harb of operating a drug and weapons smuggling operation over the border between Israel and Lebanon. In the case of one operation run by Harb, the IDF seized pistols, hashish, and ammunition valued at about \$550,000 U.S. dollars. But even as the group expanded the scope of its activities in Yemen, Hezbollah operations continued elsewhere in the Gulf as well.

*Clip: Two people died after five bombs exploded in Bahrain on Monday, according to government officials. The Interior Ministry said the people who were killed were Asian street cleaners and that a third worker was injured in the attacks, which were described as acts of terrorism.*

**Levitt:**

On November 5, 2012, five bombs exploded in Manama, Bahrain. The police found a sixth bomb before it detonated. Authorities suggested the bombs bore the hallmarks of Hezbollah, and that the terrorists were operating under the encouragement of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Soon after, in March 2013, Bahrain designated Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. But only four years later, authorities arrested six members of another Bahraini Hezbollah cell for plotting "a series of dangerous bombings" in the country. Three cell members even met with Hassan Nasrallah himself in Beirut in 2012 and received \$20,000 for the operation.

In 2013, Emirati authorities dismantled their own Hezbollah cell. The cell reportedly provided Hezbollah with sensitive information about the UAE's vital facilities, including details about Abu Dhabi's oil output and the major oil and gas fields in the country. During the ensuing trial, one of the suspects revealed that the Hezbollah cell used sexual blackmail in order to recruit new UAE citizens. They documented the people it targeted in intimate situations to coerce them to collect vital information about the state.

A few years later, in November 2021, Kuwait detained sixteen suspects accused of having links to Hezbollah. The suspects were questioned by the Kuwaiti State Security Service on charges including money laundering and encouraging young Kuwaitis to collaborate with the group, carry out terror attacks, and smuggle drugs into Syria and Yemen. Investigations revealed the cell had collected money in support of Hezbollah.

To carry out its operational objectives, Hezbollah relies on a worldwide network of supporters and sympathizers to provide financial, logistical, and operational support. These include both informal networks of supporters and centrally-run enterprises that effectively operate like organized criminal organizations. In particular, the group has developed networks of financial facilitators and front companies in the Arabian Peninsula, generating income to fund Hezbollah operations.

Consider the Gulf financial network run by Ali al-Banai and Ali Lari, two long-standing Qatar-based supporters of Hezbollah exposed by the U.S. Treasury Department in September 2021. These two secretly raised and transferred tens of millions of dollars for Hezbollah through banks and cash couriers. This network spanned the Gulf region, with operatives active in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE. Al-Banai, who is based in Qatar, initially began contributing to Hezbollah via another Kuwait-based Hezbollah donor.

**Marshall Billingslea:**

It's not at all surprising to see that they are continuing to solicit donations and conduct financial operations in other Gulf countries like Kuwait.

**Levitt:**

That's Marshall Billingslea, the former Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing at the U.S. Treasury Department.

Ali Lari, on the other hand, has been providing financial support to Hezbollah since 2000 when he would deliver cash to the group during his frequent trips to Lebanon. Both al-Banai and Lari have utilized family members to expand their financial presence in the region.

**Billingslea:**

Both with the Iranians and particularly with Hezbollah, the family relationships are of fundamental importance to how the terror group both recruits individuals, engages in operations, and in this case, engages in fundraising. We've seen this time and again that family members, particularly the sons in the organization—and sometimes daughters—step in and take on increasingly important roles, as do nephews and sometimes nieces.

**Levitt:**

For this network, Hezbollah illicit financing was a family business. Al-Banai and his brother held joint accounts in several banks, transferred funds to Hezbollah as recently as 2020, and maintained ties to senior Hezbollah associates. Ali's nephew coordinated the development of two real estate projects in Bahrain. Another relative managed al-Banai's business and financial activity in Qatar.

Here's Ambassador Nathan Sales again, the former U.S. State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism.

**Sales:**

This network was not limited to one or even two countries. It really was a regional phenomenon with assets and personnel really spread across the entire Gulf region. When you confront a network of that sophistication and size, you know, the most effective way to take it down is by working with as many partners as possible. Obviously, in this case, it was the United States and Qatar, rather than the entire region.

**Levitt:**

In September 2021, the United States and Qatar jointly designated the al-Banai network and its associates.

Marshall Billingslea again.

**Billingslea:**

The action that the Department of the Treasury took in September of 2021 signifies a major disruption of a Hezbollah-related network that stretched across the Gulf, and into Turkey, and was generating tens of millions of dollars in revenue for the terror group.

Specifically, what the United States, together with the governments of Qatar and Bahrain did, was target a real estate magnate who owned a wide range of both commercial and residential properties in Saudi, Bahrain, the UAE, and investments in Turkey, and was using these properties to generate funds, which he then transferred to Hezbollah both via bank transfers as well as by cash, bulk cash smuggling. So this was a long developing, closely coordinated action and a very, very significant measure striking a blow against the terror group's finances.

**Levitt:**

In response to these countermeasures, Hezbollah and Iran have continued to diversify their money making activities in the Gulf. One network facilitated the movement and sale of tens of millions of dollars' worth of gold, electronics, and foreign currency.

**Billingslea:**

The gold trade is something that we picked up on in 2018-2019 as Hezbollah directly, and as Iran also, began engaging the Maduro regime in Venezuela. Because of Treasury actions against the Venezuelan central bank and its development bank, we significantly deprived the Maduro regime of access to physical U.S. banknotes to dollars. And so what Maduro then did is started really going full bore on the strip mining of gold in the rainforests and Hezbollah took a great interest in that. There were numerous meetings between Maduro regime officials and senior Hezbollah officials, including in Lebanon itself.

And one only assumes that in exchange for gold, we're talking about the provision of weapons and training, which is also a typical modus operandi between the Quds Force and Hezbollah, where Iran will provide the weapons, and Hezbollah often provides the senior trainers. And we've seen that time and again, for instance, in Yemen with the Houthis. So therefore, it stands to reason that you would see both the Quds Force and Hezbollah looking to convert gold obtained, in all probability from Venezuela, into hard currency, into cash, in places like Turkey, and I think that specifically, what this particular Treasury designation was striking at.

**Levitt:**

And that cash is then sent to places like the UAE for conversion into U.S. dollars. Something you might not expect is that Chinese nationals were also involved in this exchange network, laundering vast sums of money for the IRGC and Hezbollah through front companies based out of Hong Kong and mainland China.

**Billingslea:**

We've seen repeated use of Hong Kong by Iranian networks in particular, not just to access the global financial system through bank accounts they set up there, often using Chinese nationals as fronts for their activities, but Hong Kong has long featured as a export control evasion jurisdiction for the Iranians as they try to source dual use goods which are shipped to Hong Kong and then re-shipped back to Iran. We've seen that time and again.

**Levitt:**

The Treasury Department designated the gold currency exchange network in September 2021 and revealed that "these networks have laundered tens of millions of dollars through regional financial systems and conducted currency exchange operations and trades in gold and electronics for the benefit of both Hezbollah and the IRGC-Quds Force."

And there was more, much more. Consider, for example, the Hezbollah illicit finance network that used shipping corporations, shell companies, and storage units in the Port of Sharjah in the UAE. They secretly exported Iranian oil in support of Hezbollah and the Quds Force. Hezbollah has certainly taken advantage of this system. Remember Nazem Ahmad, the Hezbollah financier who laundered money through art and diamond sales that we discussed in an earlier episode this season? Well, one of his corporate entities operates through the UAE to evade sanctions and fund Hezbollah activities as well.

Another financial network, based in Iran, focuses on aiding both Hezbollah and the Houthis by smuggling Iranian fuel and petroleum to customers throughout the Middle East. Generating tens of millions of dollars, most of the revenue from sales is directed through intermediaries and exchange houses to the Houthis and Hezbollah. The financial support facilitates Hezbollah operations around the world and the Houthis' deplorable attacks against civilians and critical infrastructure in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. The U.S. Treasury Department designated the Iran-Houthi financial network in June 2021.

Hezbollah's reach continues to extend beyond Lebanon's borders. In 2015, a Hezbollah commander explained, quote: "We shouldn't be called Party of God. We're not a party now, we're international. We're in Syria, we're in Palestine, we're in Iraq, and we're in Yemen. We are wherever the oppressed need us. Hezbollah is the school where every freedom-seeking man wants to learn."

Today, Hezbollah acts as the managing partner for Iran's network of militant proxies. And in the wake of Qasem Soleimani's death—the head of the Quds Force—in 2020, the group has taken on still more leadership responsibilities. Looking ahead, Iranian proxies may operate in an even more coordinated fashion, with operations carried out by Shia militants of varying nationalities at Iran's behest and Hezbollah's direction. To counter the growing regional threat posed by Hezbollah and Iran's proxy militant network, Western powers will have to work closely with regional allies to contain and disrupt their terrorist activities.

*Clip: Gulf Arab states have declared Lebanon's Hezbollah a terrorist organization. The six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council says Hezbollah was recruiting young people for terrorism.*

**Levitt:**

In March 2016, the Gulf Cooperation Council designated Hezbollah a terrorist organization. According to the GCC secretary general, the decision was prompted by hostile Hezbollah acts within the council's member states. That includes recruitment, weapons smuggling, and incitement of terrorism. The designation applies to Hezbollah, its leaders, factions, and affiliates.

And two years later, the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center—a joint mechanism between the United States and the six Persian Gulf States to counter regional money laundering and terrorist financing networks—designated fourteen senior Hezbollah leaders and affiliate entities.

Ambassador Nathan Sales again.

**Sales:**

I think Gulf countries have been willing to designate or sanction Hezbollah, in part because they know that it's important to the United States, but also for self-interested reasons. They recognize that these financial networks are a threat to them, to their own stability, to their own peace and security.

And I think that shared understanding of the threat and the shared willingness to do something about it really helped explain why so many of our Gulf partners were prepared to act in concert with us and impose sanctions on Hassan Nasrallah or other Hezbollah figures, or more generally, to take seriously U.S. requests when we would come to them and say, look, here's this financial network, it's a Hezbollah network, or it's otherwise affiliated with Iran. It's a threat to us, it's a threat to you. Let's do something about it. You know, we really had a shared understanding of threat and a shared resolve to address it that really opened the door for all kinds of collective actions.

**Levitt:**

More importantly, Hezbollah poses a threat to its own people. The group has long played a dominant role in Lebanon, extending its influence through political and social activism, as well as terrorism, military strength, and political assassinations.

In our final episode of Season 2, we'll return to Lebanon, and examine how Hezbollah's assassination unit undermines the country's fragile political system and impacts the Lebanese people.

**OUTRO:**

Thanks for listening to 'Breaking Hezbollah's Golden Rule,' brought to you by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and hosted by me, Matthew Levitt.



This podcast is produced by Anouk Millet for Earshot Strategies, and written by myself, Lauren von Thaden, and Camille Jablonski, research assistants at the Washington Institute. Dubbing for this episode was provided by Faris Almaari.

The audio clips used in this episode are from Associated Press, KREM 2 News, MSNBC, Euro News, and TRT World.

To learn more about Hezbollah's criminal, militant, and terrorist activities, check out my book, *The Global Footprint of Lebanon's Party of God*.

You can also visit the Washington Institute's website at [washingtoninstitute.org](http://washingtoninstitute.org) and explore our map and timeline of [Hezbollah Worldwide activities](#).

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