Policy Analysis

A viable comprehensive solution will need to resolve concerns about possible military dimensions, eliminate an automatic sunset clause, and define clear-cut incentives for compliance and disincentives for noncompliance.

Aaron Lund interviews the Institute's Richard Borow Fellow regarding the number, nature, and affiliations of the various foreigners who have joined Syria's conflict on one side or the other.

The latest umbrella organization for key rebel factions in Syria may not include U.S.-designated terrorist groups, but it does oppose many U.S. objectives.

Given Egypt's brewing power struggles, the current state of relative calm should not be mistaken for progress, let alone stability.

From my standpoint as U.S. ambassador in Iraq when we had to operate post-2011 without the presence of U.S. troops, I know that the Nov. 27 editorial " Getting to 'yes' with Afghanistan," on the need for a post-2014 U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan, was on target. The editorial accurately

David Pollock reviews Shibley Telhami's book "The World through Arab Eyes: Arab Public Opinion and the Reshaping of the Middle East."

The United Nations recently announced that international talks will resume in January in an effort to end the bitter and brutal conflict now in its third year. In this video briefing backgrounder to the talks, Washington Institute Syria expert Andrew J. Tabler addresses five key questions about the conflict in

Gulan Media spoke with Washington Institute fellow Michael Knights about Turkey's outreach to Iraqi Kurdistan and other Kurdish issues in the region.

The problem lies not in the accord's substance, but rather in the lack of trust that the Obama administration is willing and able to run a regional security system requiring potential use of force.

The agreement is neither a "breakthrough" nor an "abject surrender" but rather "a cap for a cap," with a limited rollback on each side for the next six months.

Arab responses to the nuclear agreement with Iran suggest that the United States must work harder to allay the fears of allies and friends -- and be especially mindful of the deal's nonnuclear implications.

Given the complexities and dynamics of the Syrian conflict, it is distinctly possible that Israel could be drawn into the fighting. Perhaps more important, the risk of spillover will likely extend years into the future, since the war's aftermath will not include near-term peace between Syria and Israel. How can

BICOM Senior Visiting Fellow Brig. Gen. (res.) Michael Herzog gave his assessment of the Iran deal and its implications in a BICOM phone briefing on November 25. The following is a summary of his assessment, covering the positives and negatives of the interim deal, concerns around the endgame, and Israel's

Ankara would view an Iran nuclear deal and a negotiated settlement in Syria as Washington turning a blind eye to the emerging Shiite axis along Turkey's southern border.

The Saudis are frustrated by their inability to block what they regard as Iran's return to diplomatic respectability and Washington's conciliatory approach to Tehran.

Now that an Iran nuclear deal has been signed, the next challenge is implementation. This step will entail at least two major challenges: interpreting the agreement and progressing toward what the deal calls "the final step of a comprehensive solution."

While the Supreme Leader has expressed cautious support for Iran's nuclear negotiating team, conservative media outlets and officials are emphasizing that the new deal is only partial and that Tehran could readily back out.

Only time and U.S. actions will tell whether the recent agreement is a step toward Iran's denuclearization or its rise as a nuclear power.

Israel may feel compelled to act if the Obama administration does not follow the Geneva deal with robust implementation, strict sanctions enforcement, and speedy negotiation of an even stronger final arrangement with Iran.

Download the text of the Joint Plan of Action agreed in Geneva on November 24, 2013, between the P5+1 nations (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and Iran.