Policy Analysis

The Islamic State’s response to October 7 has centered on shifting their messaging to argue that attacks on targets within IS’ pre-existing areas of operation are relevant.

While Rome is attempting to position itself to serve as a gateway into European markets for natural gas from Africa, the “Mattei Plan” is opaque about what Africa would gain from this plan.

The relationship between Human Rights Watch and Moroccan state institutions has been notably tense recently, likely due to HRW’s assessments of the human rights situation in Morocco, which do not necessarily align with those of the government.

While Hamas has experienced a surge of popular support in Egypt, these views have not impacted those who say that they have a positive view of the Muslim Brotherhood. Iran’s proxies, namely Hezbollah and the Houthis, remained deeply unpopular among Egyptians.

With regard to Sudani’s visit to America, we need to see what the Iraqi PM can achieve before confirming this important invitation. Sudani can be a real prime minister of a real sovereign state if he wants to be, but that will require taking risk.

The Gaza war’s impact on Jordan has been significant and at times uncontrolled, with a primary focus on demands to halt all forms of “bilateral cooperation” with Israel. However, the implementation of the energy for water project is likely only a matter of time, although contingent on cessation of hostilities.

Given the ways in which Iranian influence has grown elsewhere in the region, there are fears that the Sudanese army, with its Islamist orientation, will morph into a militia group similar to the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces, ultimately exerting Iran’s will in exchange for funding and military support.

Until Twitter’s moderation policies are strictly enforced and moderation loopholes addressed, coordinated efforts will continue to target independent anti-Hezbollah and anti-Hamas voices on X/Twitter while effectively sharing their own messaging, thus ensuring that in the Middle East, Iran-backed actors maintain their grip on the site.

Despite economic losses, Egypt is still hesitant to participate in any direct military operations to deter the Houthis. Cairo believes that it is more appropriate to work towards ending the military operations in the Gaza Strip and launching a political process, rather than opening a new front to expand the conflict in the Middle East.

The group’s success on the battlefield against the Sudanese armed forces is riven by Hemedti’s personal aspirations bolstered by regional players that see him as a new ally in a future Sudanese state.

International cooperation and support—with appropriate safeguarding measures to prevent the misappropriation of funds—are crucial for Lebanon to effectively combat environmental degradation and work toward a more sustainable future.

There is no question that promoting economic growth and improving the ability of Yemenis to make a living is one approach to breaking the cycle of poverty and violence in the country, but progress should also be tied to Yemeni culture and to environmental challenges to make it more sustainable.

As the February 2024 elections approach, the quest for a new political era in Iraqi Kurdistan is encountering formidable challenges.

The question of Hezbollah’s role in the conflict—or relative lack thereof—is a matter of interpretation within Lebanon. In contrast, support for Hamas is more widespread across Lebanese society, although very positive views are especially concentrated in the Shia community.

In the last two months, China has continued its regional economic expansion, making concentrated progress with energy and development deals. Though less pervasive, Russia, too, has added to its economic portfolio in the region.

The multinational security operation Prosperity Guardian—of which Bahrain is a member—has the potential to protect trade in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, curb piracy and armed robbery on commercial ships, preserve supply and energy chains, and enhance regional security and prosperity.

Political results are clearly divided along identity politics, yet intra-communal political rifts are also evident. Despite their growing influence in the area, Shia parties—like other political groups—will need to forge alliances with other factions in order to effectively exert influence and manage the city.

Turkmens in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) are very apprehensive about the Federal Supreme Court decision, to be handed down on December 27, on the question of abolishing the eleven seats reserved for minorities in the 111-member parliament of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), which currently includes five seats set aside for Turkmens.

Amman worries that the war in Gaza will increase Hamas’s domestic popularity and embolden the group’s supporters—especially with Jordan’s upcoming parliamentary elections in August 2024.

Positive views of Hamas receive a jump while remaining the minority opinion among Saudi citizens; most agree that Israel is “weak and divided.”