All Policy Analysis by David Makovsky

A hostage ultimatum from Washington seemed to provide Netanyahu with the freedom of action he wanted, but Israeli domestic realities may not allow him to break the ceasefire just yet.

Israeli and U.S. experts discuss the agenda for the prime minister’s latest U.S. trip and the regional fallout from President Trump’s highly controversial ideas on “relocating” Gaza’s population.

Very close allied coordination will be needed to strike the right balance between pursuing viable nuclear diplomacy and giving Israel the weapons and support it needs to use force against Iran if necessary.

Rather than using the months since the passage of new laws as an opportunity to agree on a more gradual implementation plan and identify alternatives to the controversial relief agency, the parties have simply dug in their heels.

Netanyahu likely wanted to start off on a good foot with Trump—not just out of fear, but because Israel has its eyes on a much wider allied agenda in the region.

In addition to assuaging public fears about the agreement, officials will need to reach a shared understanding with Washington about how to enforce its terms and respond to Hezbollah violations.

The United States has a short window to advance crucial goals in Gaza and Lebanon, including efforts to draw in Gulf support, establish a legitimate post-Hamas entity, and urge Beirut to start reasserting its sovereignty.

Despite massive failures leading up to the Gaza war and numerous controversies since then, Israel has made important achievements—now it must connect them to a clearly stated set of realistic strategic goals.

The impasse in negotiations boils down to a choice between getting the hostages out or staying in Gaza—and Netanyahu has seemingly picked the latter.

Four Washington Institute experts assess Israel’s calculus behind launching such high-profile attacks at this juncture, the likely effects on the Gaza hostage talks, Iran’s possible need for a face-saving military response, and more.

The coming months still hold hope for the president’s dream of Israeli-Saudi normalization, but only if Netanyahu stands up to his far-right coalition partners.

In this season of Decision Points, Institute Senior Fellow David Makovsky will examine the Hamas-Israel war and its long-term implications for Israeli society, U.S.-Israel relations, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and more.

Given the tense U.S. election cycle, Biden and Netanyahu will likely keep their policy disagreements within careful bounds, but the visit is unlikely to see immediate progress on the hostage deal or other key issues.

If Netanyahu’s definition of victory is too broad, Biden’s is too narrow—Gaza must be measurably and permanently demilitarized.

U.S. officials are wary of Israel’s expanding political minefield and prefer to avoid direct intervention on domestically sensitive issues, but the policy implications of Gantz’s resignation—particularly the strengthening of the far right—will make it difficult to avoid weighing in.

The two allies are unlikely to agree on everything, but they need to iron out their differences given how much is at stake.

Doing so could turn the tables on Hamas and Iran while simultaneously advancing normalization with Saudi Arabia and other regional governments.

Alliance management in wartime is never easy, but bilateral disagreements over how to address humanitarian and postwar issues risk becoming an enduring feature of the relationship if left unresolved.

Most Israelis would support a deal if they were sure it would bring them security, but their current skepticism is based on real and urgent concerns about demilitarization given their past experience with Gaza and Lebanon.

The Israeli cabinet’s internal differences over war priorities, the PA’s role, and Arab diplomacy are affecting relations with the White House.