All Policy Analysis by Olli Heinonen

Two proliferation experts discuss the risk of other regional states pursuing nuclear capabilities of their own to counter Iran, and whether they have the necessary funds, technical capability, outside help, and political will.

The final deal needs to specify the total enrichment capacity of Iran's installed centrifuges, mandate a robust verification regime, and include other restrictions to the nuclear program's size and content.

Click to download high-resolution map [PDF] This map adapted from information contained in Nuclear Iran: A Glossary.

With reports that Washington and its partners may reach a nuclear accord with Iran in the coming days, a former senior IAEA safeguards official answers the most pressing questions about Tehran's program and how the agreement might affect its capabilities.

Understand the details of debates over Iran's nuclear program and the international response with this interactive glossary that translates technical jargon into language comprehensible even to the layperson.

While the purpose of multilateral negotiations with Iran is to reduce proliferation concerns, successful talks may in fact accelerate nuclear plans in the Gulf states and Jordan.

Will Iran be able to build nuclear weapons? The answer could be determined by the November 24 deadline for talks between Iran and the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and Germany (P5+1). The outcome has profound consequences for America and the Middle East. Over the years, Washington

Ongoing close ties between Tehran and senior North Korean officials are raising concerns about potential transfer of nuclear and missile technology.

Although Iran's nuclear potential will likely dominate talks between President Obama and King Abdullah on March 29, Riyadh's own nuclear plans should also be part of the discussion.

A full explanation of Tehran's past and current nuclear activities should be a vital part of any interim agreement.

Dennis Ross, former senior Middle East advisor to President Obama, Olli Heinonen, former deputy director-general of the IAEA, and Robert Satloff debate the terms of an emerging interim nuclear deal with Iran and the implications for U.S. allies in the region.

Talks with Iran are gaining momentum, but its centrifuges are still enriching uranium, and its Arak facility may soon be capable of producing plutonium.

Stopping Iran's increasingly rapid progress toward becoming a de facto nuclear weapons state requires significant diplomatic progress, and quickly.

Iran's new president will soon be tested on his ability and willingness to address international concerns about his country's nuclear program.

A letter to the editors of the Economist regarding how close Tehran has come to achieving nuclear breakout capability.

Talks with Iran in Turkey next week and in Kazakhstan next month are important, but Tehran still needs to clarify the details of its controversial nuclear program.

Although both Washington and Tehran deny reports that they have agreed to bilateral nuclear negotiations, the rumors will prompt fresh debate about what concessions the United States can or should make.

The regime's most secure uranium-enrichment site has doubled capacity since May, and its suspected top bomb-maker is back on the case.

On August 29, 2012, Simon Henderson and Olli Heinonen addressed a Policy Forum at The Washington Institute. Mr. Henderson is the Baker fellow and director of the Gulf and Energy Policy Program at The Washington Institute. Mr. Heinonen, a senior fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center, previously served