Policy Analysis

Tehran's commitment to surrounding, besieging, and eliminating the 'Zionist entity' has not changed, and countering this goal will require pushing back against Iranian advances in Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and elsewhere.

Beset by ISIS attacks, a war in Yemen, and growing worries over Iranian influence, the new Saudi leadership appears adrift.

The UAE and Saudi Arabia have made an impressive contribution to recapturing Aden from Houthi-Saleh forces, building a base for future operations to secure central Yemeni cities.

Although Iran cannot be counted out as the long-term popular champion of the Palestinian cause, a new poll indicates that the Palestinian street is up for grabs.

August 7, 2015 During his one week visit to the United States in early May, the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) president Masoud Barzani publicly and openly discussed the idea of independence for Kurdistan in Iraq. While President Barack Obama did not express support for this move, Barzani’s actions are still

The group produces much more than execution videos, and examining its propaganda on topics such as military affairs, governance, preaching, and moral policing is key to understanding why individuals spread its message or join its ranks.

Although ISL lost in Darnah, it has emerged even stronger in Sirte by building on existing jihadist networks in the area and ramping up its state-building activities.

Saudi Arabia's concern about Sunni terrorists at home suggests its toleration of al-Qaeda in Yemen and Syria is an unsavory, tactical move against Iran and its allies there.

The Institute's managing director testified before two Senate hearings to discuss the drawbacks of the current Iran agreement, the best means of addressing them, and the implications for U.S. policy if they are not fixed.

The Supreme Leader has remained noncommittal as usual while politicians argue about the approval process, but his hardline cadres are publicly insisting that the deal will threaten Iran's national security, damage its regional standing, and increase the risk of armed confrontation.

Iran has worked hard to chip away at the international consensus on sanctions, and if the current nuclear terms are not clarified and bolstered, it will meet that goal.

Since the announcement of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), members of The Washington Institute’s Iran Study Group have met to assess the agreement’s relationship to the parameters outlined in the study group’s June 24 policy statement. Members of the study group have also benefited from several hours of

While the administration's statements are largely framed as realistic optimism about containing the nuclear program, some allies may worry that its comments on improving U.S.-Iranian relations are too aspirational.

The Israeli-Hezbollah battlefield seems to be shifting east as both sides continue to take action along the Syrian border, increasing the risk of escalation.

In addition to Qods Force supervision of Shiite fighters from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other countries, the IRGC is deploying more of its own Ground Forces personnel to Syria in direct combat roles.

Erdogan seems intent on forcing early elections by goading the PKK into further violence, but the liberal-Kurdish HDP could trump that plan by remaining committed to peace.

Cairo and Washington both see the upcoming dialogue as a means of signaling that political disagreements will not torpedo the core relationship anytime soon.

A previously unpublished 're-engagement' proposal negotiated just before Israel's 2005 withdrawal from Gaza reveals some new twists in our understanding of the peace process.

While the agreement has a number of significant flaws, at least some can be rectified by various mitigation measures, provided the president is willing to commit to an effective implementation strategy.

The agreement does not clearly achieve its main objective of preventing a nuclear-armed Iran, nor does it complement America's broader strategies regarding the Middle East and global nonproliferation.