Policy Analysis

Much of the Middle East is reacting with anxiety and confusion to President Bush's proposal for top level talks between the United States and Iraq. Whatever rationales Washington has for taking this step, many in the region perceive it as the beginning of U.S. concessions to Saddam Hussein. As soon

Executive Summary Jerusalem's transcendent characteristic is its uniqueness -- different from that of any other city or community. It remains, after 4,000 years, a magnetic focus of mystic, historical, emotional, religious, cultural, political and strategic attention. The city retains undimmed significance for adherents of the world's three great monotheistic religions

The Gulf crisis has set into motion several fundamental strategic changes along Israel's eastern front that, taken together, could dramatically alter Israel's security requirements in the West Bank. The Israeli government would then find it even more ddifficult to offer far-reaching concessions in negotiations with the Palestinians. Three major changes

As yesterday's vote in the Security Council again demonstrates, the cohesion of the anti-Iraq coalition is far stronger than most observers had originally predicted. Even Libyan dictator Muammar Qadhafi, the most maverick, anti-Western Arab leader, has been cooperating with the coalition, respecting the UN sanctions against Iraq and calling for

President Bush and other senior administration officials have focused attention on the threat posed by a nuclear Iraq to America's interests in the Middle East. It is generally agreed that Iraq can develop a sizeable nuclear military capability within the next decade. But the significance of this program in both

Thursday's UN Security Council vote authorizing the use of force to effect Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait constitutes a major step toward war in the Gulf. The effect of the resolution is to deliver an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein: "leave Kuwait by January 15 or else you will soon be forced

The threat to Jordan's stability is the hidden crisis within the current Gulf conflict. King Hussein's regime is likely to survive, but its fall would bring dire consequences to the region. Jordan's role as a buffer amid powerful, quarreling neighbors has made it a keystone of regional stability. But the

U.S. Policy President Bush has made important strides in tackling the Gulf crisis during the past two weeks, consolidating his coalition and preparing the groundwork for Security Council approval of the use of force. He has begun to create an offensive option that will support coercive diplomacy or ensure military

If it comes to war in the Gulf, Israel may well be dragged in. Saddam Hussein has repeatedly threatened that his first missiles would be aimed at Israel. By involving Israel in this way, Saddam Hussein might hope to unite the Arab coalition behind him. Unlike all other forces confronting

President Bush's decision to double U.S. force deployments in the Persian Gulf was designed to scare Saddam Hussein. Instead, it has frightened the American people and threatened his coercive diplomacy strategy. The President faces a difficult dilemma. He cannot persuade Saddam Hussein of American resolve without a credible threat of

With war in the Gulf increasingly probable the time has come to consider war goals with a long-term focus. Realization of such near-term objectives as military victory, decapitation of Iraq's military, restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty and creation of a new security structure may actually accelerate radical processes in the Middle

As the dramatic transformation of the Soviet political system unfolds, the link between domestic politics and foreign policy grows tighter. Already, the impact on policy toward the Gulf crisis has been profound; the public's aversion to foreign involvement after Afghanistan, and the rebelliousness of its own Muslim population are imposing

How to respond to the growing threat of war emanating from the United States presents Saddam Hussein with one of the major decisions of his career. It seems logical, but not inevitable, that he will now try to stall for time by offering to negotiate about a possible Iraqi withdrawal

U.S. Policy The United States will either go to war or will have to begin withdrawing ground forces from the Gulf by next spring. This is the most likely conclusion available from an analysis of the U.S. decision to double ground force deployments in the Persian Gulf. President Bush's decision

Secretary of State James Baker visited Turkey today, the last stop on his regional tour, to thank that country for its "steadfast" support and warn that the United States "cannot rule out the possible use of force." Turkish officials said there had been no talk about Turkey's opening a second

This week the United States assumes the presidency of the UN Security Council. The first priority on its agenda will be a resolution authorizing force if necessary to reverse Saddam Hussein's aggression. But the Security Council's attention is likely to be diverted by a PLO-led effort to launch a debate

Secretary of State James Baker's Middle East trip is designed to firm up and define an anti- Iraq coalition held together by U.S. power, Saudi money, and Egyptian management of inter- Arab politics, while Israeli and Turkish power constrain Iraq. Recently, Syria has been the alignment's weak link, but political

The Bush administration's reported decision to send 100,000 more U.S. troops is a turning point in the Gulf crisis. When they arc in position -- in two to three months -- the United States and its allies will be able, for the first time, not only to defend Saudi Arabia

American strategy in the Gulf crisis has now entered a new phase of "coercive diplomacy." Sanctions backed by force have a better chance to coerce Saddam Hussein to leave Kuwait than the alternative of a long-range, sanctions-only strategy. For the strategy to work, however, three basic and difficult requirements will

With the prospect of 100,000 more U.S. troops in the Gulf and a heightened chance of war, some argue that the anti-Iraq embargo will reduce Baghdad's fighting ability. Unfortunately, this is wishful thinking. Any loss is likely to be far smaller than expected. In addition to stopping Iraq from acquiring