Policy Analysis

On June 7, Russian president Vladimir Putin signed controversial anti-terrorism legislation known in Russia as the "Yarovaya law," named after its leading co-author, prominent member of Putin's United Russia party Irina Yarovaya. The law is reminiscent of Soviet-era surveillance. It will also likely contribute to crippling the Russian economy. According

While recent battlefield successes against the group's Libyan stronghold are encouraging, the threat persists, and political dysfunction remains a significant obstacle to stabilizing the country.

The new report indicates that settlement growth is slowing and that most of it is occurring near the security barrier, but not having a declared policy in this regard may open Israel up to more internationalization drives.

The Islamic Republic's terror sponsorship has hardly abated since the nuclear deal was reached, giving the Obama administration another opportunity to reassess these menacing behaviors and hold Tehran accountable.

As the kingdom attempts to counter the Islamic State's narrative by consolidating a common identity for those most prone to radicalization, it is simultaneously alienating others.

If Ankara wants to intervene against the Islamic State in Syria, block Kurdish advances, and defeat the PKK at home, it may decide to do whatever is necessary to placate Moscow, perhaps even cutting off support for certain anti-Assad rebel groups.

Moscow only agreed to the nuclear deal out of self-interest, and the JCPOA has allowed Russia to expand ties with Iran while positioning itself as a regional counterweight to the West.

Not enough is being done to convince Tehran that seeking nuclear weapons down the road will lead to forceful consequences, so the next administration will need to put forth a tougher declaratory policy on the issue while bolstering the deal's near-term benefits.

A former senior State Department advisor discusses the concrete steps Washington and other actors can take to improve conditions on the ground, setting the stage for future peacemaking even if more ambitious initiatives are not currently in the cards.

Assess how the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the nuclear agreement with Iran, has affected various U.S. interests one year after its announcement on July 14, 2015.

Deeply entrenched interests are impeding reform in Iran, limiting the economy to only modest progress even with sanctions relief.

In addition to ideological concerns, the group can't afford to lose access to Syria's northern border, so it has responded to Turkish-backed rebel offensives there with multiple terrorist attacks.

Left to their own devices and faced with an Iran on the march in multiple theaters, regional states have responded to the deal in an incoherent and dangerous fashion.

The appointment of one of the IRGC's youngest generals can be seen as a sign of the Guards' growing primacy in future Iranian military thinking, and perhaps an urgent push toward improving interoperability between often-competing armed services.

A law passed in late 2015, known as HIFPA, has successfully intensified pressure against the Lebanon-based militant group.

Despite much progress on the ground against the Islamic State, missteps by the Iraqi government, political parties, and security forces could breathe new life into the group.

During nuclear negotiations with the West, the behavior of various Iranian state institutions demonstrated the success of Iranian coalition efforts, notably the “House of the Leader” and the Revolutionary Guards institutions, to reengineer the internal political scene in preparation for the negotiations. This alliance demonstrated its influence through tight control

The Kurdistan Region is often praised as an anchor of stability in the Middle East; its military forces in particular are considered a major bulwark against the Islamic State (ISIS). Nonetheless, it faces potential balkanization as provincial voices begin advocating for autonomy from the Kurdish core. Both political parties and

Helping Russia target the jihadist group will only benefit the Assad regime unless Washington ensures that such efforts are carefully targeted, strictly conditioned, and accompanied by additional reinforcement of the moderate opposition.

While the agreement is unlikely to reset relations between two leaders who have profoundly different worldviews, it may catalyze economic and security initiatives that benefit mutual Israeli, Turkish, Palestinian, and U.S. interests.