All Policy Analysis by Omer Carmi

The vote is more interesting for its long-term implications than its immediate results.

Upcoming votes pose a dilemma for the Supreme Leader: should he aggressively disqualify candidates and further alienate the public, or risk a Majlis dominated by his political rivals?

In line with his tendency to keep all options open when discussing nuclear negotiations, his latest speech gave only a yellow light to a potential deal.

Despite facing unprecedented protests and other deep challenges, the Supreme Leader delivered upbeat New Year’s messages and argued that simply controlling runaway inflation would solve most of Iran’s ills.

In an attempt to rally Iranians around the flag, his latest speech fixated on “Western plots,” indicating that he has no imminent plans to make significant concessions to protesters.

Instead of attracting tourists, boosting the economy, and rallying Iranians around the flag, this year’s tournament could turn into a Pyrrhic victory for the regime given its dire political situation at home.

Although it is still unclear if the Supreme Leader will approve the necessary compromises, regime officials are maximizing their room for maneuver by preparing the country either way—assuming the economy doesn’t force their hand.

His Nowruz speech largely sidestepped foreign policy and the nuclear negotiations, instead focusing on his vision for making the country more self-reliant via a knowledge-based economy.

After months of publicly ignoring the issue, the Supreme Leader reminded negotiators to follow his guidelines but refrained from explicitly supporting or rejecting the state of play in Vienna.

Despite its iron grip at home, the regime generally seeks to build domestic support for its policies—so what outcome has it been prepping the public for during the nuclear talks?

Tehran has maintained its stringent line of insisting that Washington lift all sanctions, verify their removal, and provide future guarantees before it will lift a finger on resuming compliance with the JCPOA.

The Supreme Leader’s rhetoric in recent months indicates that Iran's experience under the nuclear deal has made him gun-shy about returning to that framework.

With Ebrahim Raisi’s road to the presidency seemingly paved, the regime has been working to prevent low voter turnout and give him a vote of confidence through a landslide win.

The regime is seemingly removing any obstacle that might prevent Ebrahim Raisi from winning the presidency and, perhaps, succeeding Khamenei down the road, but the risk of further eroding its internal legitimacy is high.

The upcoming campaign will likely focus on a three-way race between conservative Raisi, conservative-turned-pragmatist Larijani, and reformist-affiliated Jahangiri.

Far from compromising his nuclear position, the Supreme Leader keeps asserting that Iran can neutralize sanctions and solve its economic challenges on its own, both by leveraging domestic capabilities and demonstrating the people’s supposed electoral support for the regime.

By steadily implementing parliament’s anti-JCPOA law and making public statements about “cornered cats” and “closing windows,” Tehran has sought to give Washington a sense of urgency, but this approach could be a double-edged sword.

Although the Supreme Leader left room for Biden to return to the nuclear deal and dialed down the vengeful rhetoric, his main message was that Iran cannot trust Washington when it comes to economic matters, security issues, or even coronavirus vaccines.

In his first major address since Joe Biden’s election, the Supreme Leader downplayed the prospect of negotiating an end to U.S. sanctions, instead urging Iranian officials to focus on increasing the country’s self-reliance and solving its deep economic problems.

Rather than explicitly addressing Washington’s reactivation of sanctions, the Supreme Leader sought to convince domestic listeners that Iran can ‘resist’ external pressures and the latest COVID-19 wave on its own.