All Policy Analysis by Jacob Olidort

The group's public executions of gay men are part of a deliberate moral policing campaign, one aimed at showing supporters and enemies alike that it means to enforce its narrow, atavistic view of Islamic law wherever it can.

The Islamic State (IS or ISIS) is often identified as the world’s leading proponent of Salafism, or fundamentalist Sunni Islam. The IS-affiliated perpetrators of the 2016 Brussels terrorist attacks had close ties with local Salafist groups. In their textbooks, the Islamic State promises to revive a Salafi understanding of Islam

What makes someone become a violent Salafi rather than a non-violent Salafi depends on how they answer a basic question -- what makes someone Muslim?

Until ISIS declared its so-called caliphate in 2014, this Islamic theological term barely raised flags for the West.

To curb the power of Salafi ideas, the West must help Middle Eastern countries rebuild even as they fight ISIS, so that the group's destructive, exploitative project is perceived for what it is.

Policymakers and scholars need to tread carefully when describing how Islamist groups relate to and influence one another in their ambitions and priorities.

An exclusively hard-power approach to stopping ISIS could embolden its followers, while soft power alone is no match for the group's theological pull, so the U.S. government will need to look more closely at how its strategies are interpreted abroad.

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Understanding how Salafi leaders balance ideological robustness and personal risk as they are validated or threatened by local circumstances might be a good place to start in assessing their future approach to political engagement.

Western policy must be precise and consistent in its use of terms, objectives, and methods in order to account for differing local perceptions.

Explore the roles of Salafism, jihadism, nationalism, and other movements as drivers of conflict and alliance post-Arab Spring.

Washington lacks the voice and vocabulary to rhetorically challenge the group's theology, so it should focus on making better use of other potent tools that can actually stop jihadist goals from becoming a reality.

Rather than postulating alternatives to centuries-old sectarian doctrines, Washington should focus on preventing exploitative actors from institutionalizing their violent vision through schools and bureaucracies.

For now, the handful of Nour candidates who won seats are seemingly content to continue endorsing the Sisi government, but political opposition and violence outside parliament may prove much more significant to how Egypt's Salafis divide in the future.

Efforts to defeat the Islamic State cannot succeed without making clear to the group's adepts that their vision for society has no chance of remaining an effective battle cry in the long term, much less becoming a functioning state.

Washington has an abundance of information about the group's ideology, targets, and media campaigns, but the challenge lies in figuring out what to do with all the data, both strategically and militarily.

ISIS and other groups have appropriated an inherently nonpolitical ideology to suit their political ambitions.

Experts weigh in on key questions regarding the perpetrators of the Paris attacks and the proper response, including counterterror and military measures in Syria and Iraq.

Despite a poor showing in the first round, Salafi parties may simply be trying to convince the government and public that they are a part of Egyptian society rather than a threat to it.