All Policy Analysis by Matthew Levitt

On paper, removing the IRGC from just one of several U.S. designation lists would have few if any legal implications—but it's still a terrible idea.

Law enforcement actions and financial designations are appropriate but insufficient—the attacks will not stop without firm diplomatic isolation, travel and study bans on family members of Iranian leaders, and other direct consequences for regime decisionmakers.

Listen to a podcast series shining a bright light on the global terrorist and criminal activities that Lebanese Hezbollah would rather keep hidden from view.

Although domestic extremism has emerged as a bigger homeland terrorist threat, the threat of jihadi violence from abroad remains acute.

The Israeli evidence could reveal a troubling reality wherein groups publicly defend the human rights of some people while supporting acts of terrorism targeting others.

The international community stepped up to the ISIS challenge but has failed miserably to address the multifaceted problems presented by Assad, whose regime has worked with the terrorist group on and off for years.

Reinvesting in civilian capabilities, sharing the burden with other actors, and assessing the widening ideological scope of the extremist threat will be central to any effective program of action.

As Washington recalibrates its costly strategy against violent extremists, its goal should be to reduce terrorism to a low-level threat that law enforcement can handle.

Despite being a distinctly Lebanese actor, Hezbollah has been ideologically allied with Tehran from its founding, and this deep connection often dictates how it prioritizes competing goals.

Without years of tolerance and outright support from Damascus, the terrorist network could not have evolved into the powerful organization it became over the past decade.

Shifting away from a U.S.-led military posture will require Washington to repair its damaged credibility with allies abroad and disentangle counterterrorism budgets at home.

As in many other countries, the group has undertaken more than enough terrorist and criminal activity in Australia to justify an expanded listing.

For all the talk of shifting America’s national security posture, the reality is that conducting CT efforts and competing with Russia and China can be mutually reinforcing with a modicum of strategic planning.

The group plans to put numerous convicted terrorists on the ballot, and neither the PA nor the international community seems willing to talk about the potential legal, diplomatic, and budgetary consequences.

Recent maritime escalation between the two countries stems mainly from Iranian efforts to fund Hezbollah, underscoring the financial interdependency between the Lebanese militia, Tehran, and the Syrian regime.

Washington needs to revisit its traditional reluctance to share decisionmaking with European partners—who in turn need to reconsider their traditional discomfort over burden sharing.

After twenty years of investing in unique and powerful counterterrorism tools, the U.S. government now risks falling behind the times by allowing these tools to direct its strategy.

Three veteran counterterrorism practitioners from recent administrations take stock of America’s overall strategy, foreign posture, and domestic threats at the dawn of the Biden presidency.

The shift away from a U.S.-led military posture will require that Washington repair its damaged credibility with allies abroad. A major task at home will be disentangling counterterrorism budgets from the military budgets on which they have long been grafted.

The homeland has increasingly been a haven for far-right extremism during the president’s tenure, frustrating America’s allies and encouraging its enemies.