All Policy Analysis by Michael Knights

This PolicyWatch is the second in a three-part series written to coincide with the Madrid Donors Conference on Iraq, which begins on October 24, 2003. Read Part I (also by Knights) and Part III (by Patrick Clawson). Expanding the size of Iraqi government security forces will be key to reducing

This PolicyWatch is the first in a three-part series written to coincide with the Madrid Donors Conference on Iraq, which begins on October 24, 2003. Read Part II (also by Knights) and Part III (by Patrick Clawson). A recent series of violent riots has underlined the close relationship between employment

The attacks against the United Nations headquarters yesterday and against Iraq's oil pipeline to Turkey last weekend illustrate how political and economic security are closely entwined. Ba'athist diehards know that the continuing hardships stemming from economic collapse is what will raise the political temperature among ordinary Iraqis. The lack of

If Iraq is to rebuild its infrastructure and restore its economy at the pace forecast by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), it will need to bridge a major near-term financing gap by increasing capital inflows from outside the country and simultaneously improving its ability to absorb aid and investment. Oil

Counterproliferation strikes on nuclear sites are uncommon but by no means unprecedented. Germany's embryonic nuclear program was attacked during World War II, Iraq's Osiraq nuclear plant was bombed by Iran in 1980 and by Israel in 1981, and Iran's Bushehr reactor site was attacked by Iraq throughout 1984-1988. During the

Successfully shaping Iraqi public perceptions is vitally important, particularly since other well-known means of influencing the public -- creating stability and reestablishing water, power, and other public welfare services -- are taking longer than expected. Yet, the coalition has arguably been slower to shape the Iraqi media environment than either

Although military operations have passed the "tipping point" in Iraq, U.S. Central Command spokesmen continue to stress that their primary focus remains the completion of high-intensity operations against remaining pockets of resistance. Moreover, in contrast to previous statements that advocated allowing looting to burn itself out, recent statements suggest that

With Saudi Arabian, Turkish, and Jordanian host-nation restrictions limiting coalition ground and air operations, the United States has begun to develop a range of Iraqi airfields as forward operating bases for combat aircraft. This is ironic considering that successive U.S. governments spent billions of dollars to develop an unparalleled basing

Coalition ground forces entered Iraq on the first day of Operation Iraqi Freedom, in contrast to Operation Desert Storm in 1991, when the ground assault followed forty-three days of air strikes involving an average of 2,500 sorties per day. This difference was due in large part to the fact that

Using new operational concepts in concert with rapidly maturing strike technologies, the U.S. military will attempt to seamlessly dovetail the destructive process of warfare with the reconstructive effort of nation building in any future air operations against Iraq. Lessons learned from air campaigns conducted in Iraq during the 1990s have