All Policy Analysis by Crispin Smith

Sabereen News appears to have added cyberattacks to its normal activities of spreading militia propaganda and disinformation, claiming operations against Israeli, Turkish, and Saudi targets.

Sabereen News has seemingly broadened its capabilities to include simple hacking tactics like DDoS attacks, and it might quickly proceed to more complex exploits.

The network was closed down almost entirely from March 28 to April 8, albeit with one apparent effort by rebellious members to refuse the suspension and blame Iran.

The network's hiatus may have been ordered in response to its recent lean toward Russia, or perhaps its role in enabling a controversial arson attack on a political office.

Militia groups appear to be increasingly exercising their different kinetic capabilities in Iraq and Syria, but why now?

Alongside an apparent technical uplift, the militia network's coverage of the crisis has gone far beyond that of even the most pro-Russian outlets in Iraq.

The unmasking of Abu Hussein and his brothers puts the deposed Kataib Hezbollah official on the receiving end of his favorite tactic: leaking the faces and names of rivals.

With probable links to Kataib Hezbollah, this minor facade group claimed a major rocket attack on al-Asad Air Base, but mainly limits itself to claimed bombings against U.S. supply convoys.

A minor sub-group took credit for recent airport strikes, indicating a return to the "facade" strategy and a role for AAH in the latest escalation.

The process of assuaging the militia support base was carefully stage-managed in the first week of the new year, with Iran and Nujaba setting the ground rules.

Iran-backed groups seem to be directing their more dangerous attacks against coalition forces in Syria, not Iraq, and the trend could accelerate in early 2022.

Both outlets are openly advocating the murder of Iraqi security forces at a time of escalated shootings and bombings.

Desperate militias are now killing Shia civilians in mass-casualty bombings as they try to assassinate Iraqi investigators and intelligence personnel.

Kaabi has long been Iran's chosen man in the self-styled Iraqi "resistance," and his latest remarks seemed like an attempt to seize control of militia public messaging.

Militia attacks on supply convoys are experiencing a (likely temporary) lull, and the sub-group Ashab al-Kahf appears to have taken the lead.

Elements of Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Hezbollah are seemingly trying to extract domestic and Iranian support for more forceful pushback against their recent political isolation.

In the wake of their failed election campaigns and other recent setbacks, militias sought to deepen their claims of victimhood and politically damage Prime Minister Kadhimi with protests.

Militias followed up Qais al-Khazali's threats against Kadhimi by attacking his residence, shattering the narrative of victimhood they had been building through protests.

Iraqi militia actors appear to have had forewarning of the attack, reflecting an increasing focus on anti-coalition operations in Syria.

Hardline groups are struggling to satisfy demands for action against American forces while simultaneously de-escalating U.S.-Iran tensions and evolving their non-kinetic wings.