All Policy Analysis by Oula A. Alrifai

The historic role of Sufism, an inclination toward the secular left, and recent repression under extremists have all driven the Kurds away from religiously informed ideology.

The actions of Moscow and Tehran’s local forces say much about each country’s true intentions in the area, and the most immediate result could be more ethnic cleansing.

By redeploying their military and proxy forces, boosting Assad’s political campaigns, and resorting to various local intimidation tactics, the two countries are increasingly working together on establishing full control in Deir al-Zour.

In addition to undermining the Biden administration’s promised focus on human rights, allowing Assad to regain legitimacy abroad would constitute a strategic blunder that cannot be explained away.

Recent protests in Daraa demonstrate that Assad’s hold over regime-controlled areas are not as total as they appear.

Three scholars explore the stunning breadth of Iranian dominance over Damascus and what this means for any U.S. plans to foster stability in Syria or reopen negotiations with Tehran.

The dalliance between the Assad family and Iran’s Shia clerics began in the 1970s. Back then, before the Islamic Revolution, the Syrian leader held leverage. Now the tables have been turned.

A Syrian scholar and expatriate lays out the legacy of terror under the Assads and urges the Biden administration to prioritize the country’s sundry crises.

Even if the growing regional and geopolitical stakes were not sufficient on their own, the regime’s domestic negligence, illegitimacy, and criminality provide ample reason to shake up Washington’s approach.

To prevent the two rivals from expanding their influence in east Syria, the coalition needs to exploit their simmering disunity, empower its partners on the ground, and establish stronger ties with select tribal and community leaders.

A State Department official explains the latest sanctions against entities that do business with Assad, while two experts assess the regime’s current status and its susceptibility to foreign pressure.

The Syrian leader’s dramatic war of words with his massively wealthy cousin may seem like a major fracture inside the regime, but the dynamics of past and present family disputes paint a different picture.

The rebel administration in Idlib and the Kurdish-led government in the northeast have been more proactive and transparent than the Assad regime, but their populations still need urgent, direct international aid—without the UN’s imprimatur if necessary.

Washington needs to cooperate with Europe on forcing Damascus into serious political negotiations, help Turkey create a no-fly zone, and stop Russia and China from using their veto power at the UN.

Besides highlighting Assad’s financial mismanagement, the recent unrest gives the international community a genuine opportunity to push for transition while bolstering the more prosperous local administration in the northeast.

The Caesar Act will not put an end to the Syrian catastrophe so long as Washington keeps ceding political and military leverage to adversaries who do not care about human rights.

Tehran and its proxies have been exerting hard and soft power in northeast Syria, combining military consolidation with economic, social, and religious outreach in order to cement their long-term influence.

This year’s show provides a window into Tehran’s strategy for cementing its soft power, and may point to potential sanctions violations by companies from U.S. partner countries.

At this current juncture there is not a viable path for either Syrian rebel forces nor for the opposition to win the war on their own. Saving Syria requires international cooperation by executing an effective plan to end the crisis. The best way forward is for the United States to