Uli al-Baas, Part Two: Key Analytic Findings

As the first part of this two-parter noted, the Islamic Resistance Front in Syria – Possessors of Might (Uli al-Baas or UAB for short) emerged as the first major new muqawama militant group in post-Assad Syria. Part one traced their adoption of Hezbollah-type iconography and new names between mid-December 2024 and mid-January 2025, followed by apparent kinetic operations against Israeli forces and later the de facto Syrian government in March. This piece will draw out some tentative analytical findings about the group’s likely role in the Iran Threat Network. 

Iconography of UAB

From January 9-11, 2025, the group, initially known as Jabhat Tahrir al-Janoub (JTJ) or Southern Liberation Front, changed its name to UAB and updated its logo. The original logo featured a map of Syria with the name "Southern Liberation Front" written in Arabic, while the new version resembled those used by military organizations and militias aligned with the "Axis of Resistance." Both logos retained the color order of the Syrian flag used under Assad, with black at the bottom, followed by green, and red at the top.

The new logo feature a long arm holding an AK-47 - similar to Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) emblem which has been adopted by most IRGC-linked militias such as Hezbollah in Lebanon or Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba in Iraq (Figure 1).

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IRGC online support from late January 2025

UAB has also received support from Farsi-speaking IRGC-linked Telegram channels. These channels began actively promoting the group in late January and early February. For example, on February 1, a channel called IRGC Cyber Corps, which had over 419,000 followers (as of early March 2025), posted a message titled "Official announcement of the Syrian Resistance Front Uli al-Baas against the occupiers." The message stated, "A Syrian group called Uli al-Baas is carrying out direct attacks on Israeli forces infiltrating the village of Taranja in the Quneitra countryside, resulting in casualties among the Zionist army" (Figure 2).

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Evidence supporting attack claims

Thus far, quite limited evidence has been presented of any attack by UAB against Israeli forces or the forces of the new Syrian regime. There has also been no supporting evidence of the deaths of martyrs, while one would normally expect accompanying evidence of funerals and social commemoration. We also note that UAB poured cold water on some of its own early attack claims in January by posting contradictory statements. For example, on January 31, the group claimed to have attacked an Israeli force in the village of Taranja (see Part One). However, on February 14, the UAB Telegram channel shared a quote from one of its commanders, referred to as “Colonel N.B.” who effectively refuted any claims of kinetic operations up to that point. He stated, “Not starting our operations is due to preparation and readiness, as military science requires taking the correct steps” (Figure 3).

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Geographic role of UAB

If February 21 communique read by a masked man introduced as Miqdad Fatiha and shared by UAB's Telegram channel (see Part One) is to be given credence, there may be an emerging geographic laydown for muqawama groups currently emerging.

• The west. This area is serviced by Liwa Dir al-Saḥil (Coastal Shield Brigade), commanded by Miqdad Fatiha, an army officer loyal to Bashar al-Asad regime.
• The south. According to the February 21 statement, UAB covers the south.
• The east. Again according to the February 21 statement, Quwwat Ashbah Rouh al-Muqawama (the Ghosts of the Spirit of Resistance Forces), commanded by Dr. Abdulhamid al-Shamali, covers the “eastern region”, which may refer to Deir al-Zor.

Early impressions

While UAB’s kinetic capabilities remain unproven, its emergence could signal the early stages of new Iran-backed militia formation in Syria, an outcome that was always likely. Whether through the trio of above groups or at some future juncture, it is a useful analytic exercise to think through how an Iranian-backed unconventional warfare project would unfold in Syria. Iran has been a gamekeeper in Syria for over a decade, but it could just as easily be a poacher. In January, Brigadier General. Behrooz Esbati, a high-ranking Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander and one of the last commanders to flee Syria, confirmed that Iran was already working with Syrian elements to establish these factions. 

Iran faces significant challenges in re-establishing its influence, especially in the south and west of Syria, where logistical obstacles complicate efforts. However, Tehran has demonstrated both the intent and the capability to reach remote and strategically difficult areas, as seen in its long-standing support for militias such as Ansar Allah in Yemen. As the Washington Institute noted months ago, Iran has a lot of experience running a supply line through closely monitored waterways and across hundreds of miles of hostile land territory. Supporting a new insurgency in Syria is eminently doable for Iran.