Policy Analysis

A unique militia that is closer to Lebanese Hezbollah than other Iran-backed Iraqi groups, yet widely resented for prioritizing commercial success over kinetic operations.

Most forces could likely be withdrawn or moved to the Kurdistan Region without harming U.S. interests—in fact, Washington might have more leverage in Baghdad without a troop presence.

While Qatar mediates with Hamas over Gaza, Oman’s facilitation efforts with the Houthis appear to be in abeyance pending recognition that a broader settlement is needed to secure regional stability.

Roumieh’s drug networks have been an ongoing and pervasive challenge for Lebanon.

Even if an incursion into Rafah occurs without sparking a clash between Israeli and Egyptian forces, Israel will be facing two key challenges in its relationship with Egypt: the eventual status of the Philadelphi corridor and the rapid rise of support for Hamas inside Egypt itself.

The Washington Institute’s executive director reflects on the feasibility of the Biden administration’s current diplomatic plans in the region, based in part on what local officials said during his recent group trip to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, and the PA.

The Badr Organization leader has suffered bruising blows from other Iran-backed militias seeking to exploit the group's internal dysfunction and divisions.

The United States, in recognizing the limits of its traditional “bloc-building” approach, faces the imperative to adapt to a multipolar reality. Embracing multipolarity as a fundamental principle of its foreign policy could pave the way for more flexible and effective international engagements.

Once Washington comes to grips with Erdogan’s “Anatolian” foreign policy, it will have a better chance of steering the relationship in ways that support U.S. interests without unduly boosting Russia and other adversaries.

By outlining a strategy in the north of Iraq, a vision regarding reconciliation and a constructive settlement of differences between the Kurdistan Regional Government and the Federal Government of Iraq in relation to the management of energy resources in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq can emerge.

The operation is a sign of Europe’s willingness to take action against the current instability, though significant work is needed to coordinate with existing initiatives and convince regional officials of the mission’s usefulness.

Most Israelis would support a deal if they were sure it would bring them security, but their current skepticism is based on real and urgent concerns about demilitarization given their past experience with Gaza and Lebanon.

Because the government ceded too much authority to local militias and tribal intermediaries, no one can dismantle them without risking their lives.

​​​​​​​The administration has reversed its reversals on certain issues, signaling a more comprehensive approach toward the Houthis, Iraqi militias, Iran sanctions, and more.

A militia figure implicated in the 2007 murder-kidnapping of five Americans in Karbala is now the governor of an Iraqi province.

While Rome is attempting to position itself to serve as a gateway into European markets for natural gas from Africa, the “Mattei Plan” is opaque about what Africa would gain from this plan.

The Islamic State’s response to October 7 has centered on shifting their messaging to argue that attacks on targets within IS’ pre-existing areas of operation are relevant.

The long-term political struggle against Hamas will be just as challenging for Israel as the current military campaign.

Only a comprehensive initiative aimed at curbing Hezbollah’s influence both within Lebanon and in the region stands a chance of delivering peace for the long term.

The Kataib Hezbollah leader killed on February 7 in Baghdad was (until now) a living nexus of Kataib Hezbollah, the Popular Mobilization Forces, and the facade group Alwiyat al-Waad al-Haq.