Policy Analysis

Iran has worked hard to chip away at the international consensus on sanctions, and if the current nuclear terms are not clarified and bolstered, it will meet that goal.

The Institute's managing director testified before two Senate hearings to discuss the drawbacks of the current Iran agreement, the best means of addressing them, and the implications for U.S. policy if they are not fixed.

Since the announcement of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), members of The Washington Institute’s Iran Study Group have met to assess the agreement’s relationship to the parameters outlined in the study group’s June 24 policy statement. Members of the study group have also benefited from several hours of

While the administration's statements are largely framed as realistic optimism about containing the nuclear program, some allies may worry that its comments on improving U.S.-Iranian relations are too aspirational.

Erdogan seems intent on forcing early elections by goading the PKK into further violence, but the liberal-Kurdish HDP could trump that plan by remaining committed to peace.

The Israeli-Hezbollah battlefield seems to be shifting east as both sides continue to take action along the Syrian border, increasing the risk of escalation.

In addition to Qods Force supervision of Shiite fighters from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other countries, the IRGC is deploying more of its own Ground Forces personnel to Syria in direct combat roles.

Cairo and Washington both see the upcoming dialogue as a means of signaling that political disagreements will not torpedo the core relationship anytime soon.

A previously unpublished 're-engagement' proposal negotiated just before Israel's 2005 withdrawal from Gaza reveals some new twists in our understanding of the peace process.

While the agreement has a number of significant flaws, at least some can be rectified by various mitigation measures, provided the president is willing to commit to an effective implementation strategy.

The agreement does not clearly achieve its main objective of preventing a nuclear-armed Iran, nor does it complement America's broader strategies regarding the Middle East and global nonproliferation.

A post-sanctions windfall would give Tehran ample capacity to rescue the Syrian regime, reshape Iraq's political environment, expand its terrorist proxy activities in various theaters, and otherwise amplify the effects of its destabilizing regional posture.

Given the current state of the region, close U.S.-Israeli security and intelligence cooperation is more vital than ever, but repairing the rift between the two governments will require much more than symbolic gestures.

President Anastasiades will likely use this week's summit to build momentum toward the development of offshore gas reserves, with Iran and other issues making the agenda as well.

Israelis fear that the deal will legitimize Iran as a nuclear threshold state, embolden its highly destabilizing role in a volatile Middle East, and trigger nuclear proliferation and a conventional arms race in the region.

Outside advocates and political figures would do better to stray from their well-traveled hard line and follow the relatively pragmatic lead of the Palestinian people instead.

Given the depth of its involvement in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, Hezbollah will likely continue to head an emerging Shiite foreign legion bent on expanding Iranian influence across the region.

Despite the risk of instability posed by ongoing violence, the government's anti-Brotherhood focus is still a political winner and will likely remain so for some time.

Favorable poll numbers aside, Hezbollah's adventure in Syria is raising concerns among the group's Lebanese Shiite constituency.

Tehran's longstanding arms trafficking and missile research efforts highlight the problem with wholesale removal of weapons restrictions.