Policy Analysis

On March 19, 2012, Michael Braun, David Asher, and Matthew Levitt addressed a Policy Forum at The Washington Institute. Mr. Braun, a managing partner with Spectre Group International, is former assistant administrator and chief of operations at the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. Dr. Asher, a senior fellow at Center for

Whether by choice or through the military's influence, Ayatollah Khamenei has decided to keep a formerly marginalized regime figure -- and, by extension, the possibility of nuclear compromise -- in play.

In responding to a spike in Israeli-Palestinian incitement, Washington should encourage constructive suggestions and focus on the worst cases.

What made Ankara do an about-face and re-embrace the West? Recognition of what gives it power in the Middle East.

Washington must clearly articulate what its red lines are in terms of Iranian behavior and credibly threaten the regime with military action should it cross them.

Notwithstanding their differing perspectives on the subject, the less daylight seen between Washington and Israel regarding Iran, the better.

Hizballah's response to military action against Iran could be shaped by rational cost-benefit analysis, a perceived spiritual obligation to defend its Shiite patron in Tehran, or both.

The recent ordeal of American democracy workers in Egypt was not so much about them as about Cairo's own internal power struggle.

Turkey's Syria policy seems to be mirroring its Libya strategy: speaking out against a tyrant, gathering international support for political action against him, but staying in the background when it comes to military action.

By weakening the Islamic Republic's institutions and strengthening his own authority, Ayatollah Khamenei may make himself more vulnerable in a time of crisis.

Providing arms and other materiel to the FSA stands a far better chance of success than waiting for a silver bullet.

As the confrontation with Iran enters a new, more dangerous phase, Washington must avoid the temptation of redefining its red lines in a manner that endangers national security.

The Iranian regime will not be able to survive existing sanctions, which are targeting the banking system and oil industry like never before.

Barring unexpected developments, even optimistic observers see the current Israeli-Palestinian deadlock persisting at least until after this year's U.S. elections. The key actors are too focused on other challenges, too skeptical of each other's intentions, and too limited by multiple constraints to engage in the kind of decisionmaking a peace

Although the president's AIPAC speech offered reassurances that he is committed to the full logic of a "prevention" strategy in dealing with the Iranian nuclear challenge, including potential military action, it also implied a clear preference for Israel to hold back and let the noose of international sanctions tighten.

The sooner the international community helps end the killing in Syria, the more likely it will be able to prevent radicalization of the country's population along sectarian lines.

Washington and Israel need to address their public messaging on Iran, which has undermined mutual trust and efforts to achieve their common objective: a diplomatic solution to the nuclear crisis.

The regional impact of Bashar al-Asad's eventual fate may be at least as important for American interests as the direct effects inside Syria.

For reasons of morality, and in the interest of containing the violence in Syria, the international community must accelerate Assad's departure.

Iran's upcoming parliamentary elections, while vigorously contested, offer no hope for improving U.S.-Iranian relations.