Policy Analysis

As Gulf countries pursue dialogue with Iran, they must realize the threats posed by Iranian-backed Iraqi militias – both to Iraq itself, and to wider regional stability.

The Russian leader defied expectations of a quixotic, costly outcome for his country’s 2015 intervention in Syria. As it actually played out, explains Anna Borshchevskaya in her recently published book, Russia leveraged the conflict and U.S. inaction to position itself as a leading power in the Middle East.

With Al-Burhan’s coup sparking an international and popular backlash, the military may again look to Hamdok to renegotiate a power-sharing agreement.

Such attacks are a specialized subset of violent militia actions, with the most recent incident likely undertaken by Asaib Ahl al-Haq.

With a sizable number of independents in Iraq’s next parliament, young Iraqi MPs are hoping to push the Iraqi government to finally deliver on their protest demands from 2019.

Putin has a long list of achievements in the Middle East and is not leaving the stage anytime soon, so Washington must respond to the hardnosed realism that drives him to undermine U.S. influence.

Washington and Ankara have significant diplomatic and security incentives for considering the deal, while rejecting it outright would likely hasten Erdogan’s drift into Putin’s orbit.

Facing a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, Iran is likely to pursue pragmatism based on mutual interests and forgo escalation, even in the face of growing terrorist threats.

The recent attack on al-Tanf base and the identity of the Iraqi factions that reportedly helped carry it out indicate Iran's plans to establish a new "deterrence equation" in Syria.

Tehran no longer takes Washington seriously, so the Biden administration needs to put the prospect of military escalation back on the table if it hopes to make progress on the nuclear issue.

While Iraq’s new electoral law did have some successes, the reforms it attempted to achieve will only be able to come to fruition if the Iraqi electorate is convinced that elections can make a tangible difference in their lives.

Many Brotherhood members seem eager to exploit recent U.S.-Egyptian gestures on human rights, but there is little likelihood that the Sisi government will reconcile with the fractured, unpopular Islamist group.

After months of nebulous plotting, the domestic and foreign actors who drove opposition to Hamdok’s reformist government will become more discernible as the generals look for ways to solidify their hold on power.

After capturing Kabul, the Taliban announced that they were seeking good relations with their neighbors—China, India, Iran, Russia, Pakistan, and the Gulf Arab states. Yet given Pakistan and Qatar’s extant relations with the Taliban, the two countries appear to be the main winners in this shifted balance, and whichever one is chosen as the primary mediator will have a significant role in shaping regional policies towards Afghanistan going forward.

Questions about the viability of the Iraqi security forces—brought into sharp focus by the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan—require a data-led analysis of where the forces are today and what mix of U.S., NATO, and European efforts can help them thrive in the future.

Tehran has seemingly concluded that sanctions relief is no longer worth compromising for, so Washington needs to change that calculus by credibly sharpening the consequences.

The formation of a new Tunisian government under recently-appointed Prime Minister Najla Bourden cements the political dynamics that emerged on July 25.

His presence at a major climate event will be awash in speculation regarding Canadian hit squads, British charities, and uncertain relations with the Biden administration.

Washington still has good cards to play in terms of Iran’s destabilizing activities, the U.S. security umbrella over Gulf energy supplies, and Arab public opinion toward China and America.

Iraqi militia actors appear to have had forewarning of the attack, reflecting an increasing focus on anti-coalition operations in Syria.