All Policy Analysis by Fabrice Balanche

May 8, 2017 I had not been to Qamishli for twenty years. As a Ph.D. student at the French Institute for the Near East, I went with two friends in the late 1990s to explore northeast Syria. This journey led us to Raqqa, Deir al-Zour, Hasaka, and Qamishli. Since 1997

The regime's latest atrocity was spurred by clear military motivations, and the situation will likely worsen as the army begins a wider ground campaign against rebel strongholds in Idlib province.

Despite their desire for greater independence, Syria's Kurds have shown a willingness to broker agreements with the Assad regime in order to secure their near-term economic interests, and they may soon do the same with Iran.

Kurdish-led forces are in good position for a final assault on the Islamic State's Syrian stronghold, and other actors seem ready to either support them or stand aside and benefit from their faster progress on the battlefield.

The circumstances of the Russian-sponsored peace conference raise several concerns, but failure to participate could signal acquiescence to Moscow's plans in Syria and further U.S. withdrawal from the Middle East.

Helping Erdogan take the city could greatly decrease the civilian death toll and preserve U.S.-Turkish cooperation in Syria, but Washington will still need to decide what to do with the Kurds, its other key ally against the Islamic State.

The post-Aleppo lull on the western front is likely just an excuse for Russia to rotate new forces and equipment into Syria and prepare for the next major offensive.

Eastern Syria holds major hydrocarbon and agricultural resources that make it a vital asset in Assad's quest for regime self-sufficiency, and a potentially powerful source of U.S. leverage against him.

As Aleppo's eastern districts continue to collapse, the regime will soon turn its attention to other pressing fronts, but manpower shortages will likely force it to focus on just one of them first.

The Assad regime and Russia seem eager to establish full control of the city before the Trump administration takes office, essentially presenting the new president with a fait accompli on the war's most notorious front.

An in-depth look at how many fighters are still arrayed against the Assad regime, which ideology they subscribe to, and whether more moderate actors can still seize the mantle from extremist factions.

This collection of essays by Washington Institute experts explores how the United States can work with--or, in some cases, around--the various actors in heavily Kurdish-populated northern Syria to advance the fight against the Islamic State and create long-term stability. Successive pieces look at the Kurds themselves, Turkey, Arabs in the

In the unlikely event that either side decides to follow through on its declared intentions, each has multiple options for advancing on the Islamic State's heartland.

The strategically important Syrian Druze will not be won over unless they are cut off from Damascus, and even then they would need concrete assurances that international forces will protect them from hostile jihadists.

The last remaining Islamic State stronghold in eastern Syria is poised to fall, and given the potentially major strategic implications for the Kurds, Turkey, the rebels, and other actors, one of them may act quickly to determine its fate.

The episode gives Moscow a great excuse to be uncooperative, which it may have planned to be anyway, but providing clearer information could nevertheless help further the coalition's goals.