All Policy Analysis by Michael Eisenstadt

Tehran will likely resort to measured countermoves in the nuclear domain at first, but successful U.S. pressure could spur it to challenge JCPOA limits, take action in non-nuclear domains, or push back against U.S. and allied forces.

Tehran has generally responded to pressure by issuing threats, ramping up its nuclear activities, accepting temporary limits, and, when the heat is turned up, launching cyber, military, and terrorist operations.

Today, Syria is the sole battlefield in the world where American, Russian, Turkish, Iranian, and Israeli military forces all operate, along with a kaleidoscope of proxy actors foreign and domestic. As the preeminent arena of strategic competition in the Middle East and a wellspring of potential Islamic State resurgence, Syria

Not only is the war far from over, but a series of developments could undermine the regime's recent gains—and create opportunities for the United States.

Military action should seek to restore deterrence by hitting not just chemical weapons-related targets, but also ground and air units that are key to the Assad regime's war effort.

The gaps between Washington and Europe's positions on the JCPOA remain wide, but the potential price of failure will hopefully provide enough motivation to bridge them.

Tehran and its allies will test U.S. and Israeli limits again, requiring deterrent responses that are tough, consistent, and paired with political reassurances to allies.

This past October, President Trump rolled out a new U.S. strategy toward Iran focused, in the president's words, on the country's destabilizing regional activities, support for terrorist proxies, and proliferation of missiles; he also mentioned the need to fix "serious flaws" in the July 2015 nuclear deal. Trump's plan, however

Washington Institute experts discuss the economic, social, diplomatic, and military implications of the anti-regime demonstrations sweeping Iran. Read a summary or watch video of the full event.

Washington and its Gulf Arab partners should collectively hinder Tehran's efforts to close capability gaps, modernize its military, and develop its Shia foreign legion into a more effective expeditionary force.

The group has used social solidarities to enhance unit cohesion, encourage tactical flexibility, and strengthen its fighters’ commitment to a culture of jihad, martyrdom, and resistance.

There are signs of war on the horizon, and it could be the most destructive Arab-Israeli conflict yet.

Given recent frictions, the United States should take a number of steps to reduce the potential for escalation with Tehran and to avoid a broader conflict.

A sustainable reset will require greater consultation prior to policy initiatives, a greater willingness among GCC states to work together, and a U.S. willingness to reassume a leadership role by fashioning security policy frameworks for its partners.

There is still time to offset the gains that Iran’s proxies have made in the past three years, but only if Baghdad continues resisting the creation of a permanent, well-funded security institution that operates outside the Iraqi chain of command.

Assad's track record indicates that he will likely continue challenging the chemical redline, and that additional strikes and other pressures may be necessary to deter him from doing so.

A military expert lays out the short- and long-term strategic challenges posed by allowing Tehran to continue building up its missile arsenal.

The military cannot be effective unless it is used to implement policies based on sound geopolitical judgment and an accurate reading of the region's political and cultural realities.

In the past decade, Tehran’s cyber toolkit has evolved from a low-tech means of lashing out at its enemies to a central pillar of its national security concept.