All Policy Analysis by Michael Eisenstadt

In Marine Corps University's expanded and revised 2015 edition of The Strategic Culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran, first published in 2011, author Michael Eisenstadt discusses Iran’s unique approach to statecraft, strategy, and the use of force, focusing on the following core elements: Policy in the theocratic Islamic Republic

Experts weigh in on key questions regarding the perpetrators of the Paris attacks and the proper response, including counterterror and military measures in Syria and Iraq.

Defending the Assad regime has given Tehran multiple options for expanding its influence and projecting power in the region and beyond.

Although Iran's influence in Iraq remains limited by various political, religious, and economic factors, the rise of ISIS has created new opportunities for Tehran to present itself as the country’s savior.

Potential military action against Iran would be much more risky if the regime does in fact acquire the advanced S-300 antiaircraft missiles, but Moscow and Tehran have significant obstacles to overcome before that occurs.

Contrary to what the White House has said, the nuclear deal with Iran could make preventive military action an even more problematic proposition than it was before.

The Washington Institute is studying the potential impacts of the Iran nuclear deal, including the effects of additional Iranian money from a post-sanctions windfall. Here are some of the most important impacts.

Since the announcement of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), members of The Washington Institute’s Iran Study Group have met to assess the agreement’s relationship to the parameters outlined in the study group’s June 24 policy statement. Members of the study group have also benefited from several hours of

While the agreement has a number of significant flaws, at least some can be rectified by various mitigation measures, provided the president is willing to commit to an effective implementation strategy.

A post-sanctions windfall would give Tehran ample capacity to rescue the Syrian regime, reshape Iraq's political environment, expand its terrorist proxy activities in various theaters, and otherwise amplify the effects of its destabilizing regional posture.

The additional steps promised at the Camp David summit do not constitute a game-changer in U.S.-GCC relations, especially since the Joint Statement is so vague regarding specific steps to counter Iran's destabilizing activities.

Although Iran's missile arsenal is conventionally armed, credible reports of links with its nuclear program underscore the need for limits on missile R&D work as part of a nuclear accord.

The means-ends mismatch in Washington's approach to ISIL is a function of several problems, including inadequate commitment of resources, the jihadist group's resilience, the weakness of America's regional partners, and the incoherence of current U.S. strategy.

Washington has several options beyond a major ground commitment, including more drones and special forces in Iraq, a true effort to arm and organize the Syrian opposition, and a willingness to recognize longer-term regional threats posed by al-Qaeda affiliates and Iran.

Whether or not the P5+1 and Tehran reach a nuclear deal, deterring an Iranian breakout, most likely at clandestine sites, will remain a core U.S. imperative for the foreseeable future. Although the U.S. intelligence community has a strong record of detecting clandestine nuclear programs, it has often failed to correctly