All Policy Analysis by Michael Singh

To the Russian leader, a wavering U.S. commitment to the alliance vindicates an approach based on bold action in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria and increasing aggressiveness toward American forces.

In response to a recently publicized document describing Iran's nuclear intentions, the next U.S. administration should first make clear that being aware of Iran's plans is not the same as acquiescing to them.

Political support for trade has been a high-profile casualty of the 2016 presidential election. Hillary Clinton walked back her earlier support for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement with U.S. allies in Asia, perhaps not surprising given the opposition to trade deals among her primary rival, Vermont Sen. Bernie Sanders, and

Lost amid the attention devoted to FBI director James Comey's July 5 announcement that the FBI would not bring charges against former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was his broader criticism of the "security culture of the State Department in general, and with respect to the use of unclassified e-mail

Brexit will likely heighten the sense that the international order is unraveling and complicate U.S. relations with the EU, so Washington should take steps to reassure its fellow NATO governments.

In the latest sign of how new entrants are upending the space launch industry, the Air Force announced last week that an $83 million contract awarded to SpaceX to put a GPS satellite into orbit would cost the government 40 percent less than the competing bid from United Launch Alliance

While Western officials should remain true to their longstanding support for human rights and civil liberties in Iran, they should nevertheless be cautious about their ability to shape the country's internal dynamics, focusing instead on influencing its regional and foreign policies through a mixture of pressure and engagement.

Washington shouldn't rush to resolve issues such as banking restrictions and heavy-water stockpiles without prodding Tehran to take helpful steps of its own.

Rather than debate the hypothetical results if the administration had ordered strikes in 2013, it is more instructive to examine the policy it did execute, which delivered questionable results at significant cost.

By heeding the lessons garnered from past experience and empirical studies, Washington can mitigate concerns about sanctions overreach and greatly increase their effectiveness.

President Barack Obama and Donald Trump present a study in contrasts: the former a cerebral progressive, the latter a brash populist. Yet for all their differences, the similarities in the two men's foreign policy outlooks are striking. Two common themes emerge from Obama's series of interviews with Atlantic journalist Jeffrey

As tumultuous as the region's recent struggles have been, they have also exposed opportunities to establish a more multilateral Middle Eastern security architecture via renewed U.S. leadership.

Diplomacy is shaped by facts on the ground, not the reverse, so Washington must be prepared to alter those facts by increasing its support for the opposition or expanding its own military involvement.

To ensure that Beijing's post-sanctions ambitions in the region do not include transferring dangerous nuclear and military technology to Iran, Washington and its allies need to set clear boundaries sooner rather than later.

The United States and its allies are more than up to the challenges posed by post-deal Iran, but they will need to focus on objectives rather than tactics, and engage in long-term planning rather than continuing their reactive, shorter-term approach.

When the next President enters office, Iran will be a nuclear-weapons threshold state operating more than 5,000 centrifuges, with more than 14,000 additional ones at hand but deactivated—assuming the July 14 accord is implemented and survives its infancy. It will be openly engaged in research and development on advanced centrifuges