All Policy Analysis by Hamdi Malik

Iran-backed armed groups hate being exposed as criminals in the eyes of a populace that cares deeply about rule of law, so they have turned Iraq’s legal sector into a battlespace.

Sabereen News is the main social media conglomerate supporting all "resistance" actions and factions in Iraq.

Raba Allah is the "mothership" for vigilante and counter-protester groups developed by the Kataib Hezbollah network.

The group has intensified its claims of convoy attacks, shifting from Anbar-focused roadside bombings to incidents on the Kuwaiti border.

Qasem al-Jabbarin is a Kataib Hezbollah-directed facade group that specializes in roadside bombings against Iraqi supply trucks servicing the U.S. military in Iraq.

The first and best-known of the facade groups that Iran-backed militias use to conceal their involvement in operations, Kataib Sarkhat al-Quds (formerly known as Ashab al-Kahf) has a particularly strong connection to AAH and, more recently, HaN.

A facade group with unique ties to Kataib Hezbollah, Alwiyat al-Waad al-Haq has been used exclusively to claim or threaten attacks against Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Kataib Hezbollah is the premier militia in Iraq, operating under Iran's direct command and fielding a wide range of cells responsible for kinetic, media, and social operations, some bankrolled by the Iraqi state.

This minor facade group is occasionally used to claim bombing attacks on U.S. supply convoys and rocket attacks on the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

After being struck by U.S. forces, Kataib Hezbollah dropped the pretense of the coordination committee and acted unilaterally.

Bitter squabbles between the social media platforms of two competing Iraqi militias offer insights into the movements and their relationship.

Designating Iranian-linked media outlets can limit their activities, but a more holistic strategy is needed if Washington hopes to effectively counter the regime’s regional propaganda machine.

Qais al-Khazali, Muhammad Mohi, and Nasr al-Shammari have all provided televised prima facie evidence of their groups' involvement in acts of anti-coalition terrorism.

What to make of HaN spokesperson Nasr al-Shammari's admission that his group is a member of the top militia committee?

Even Iran’s proxies now have proxies, but authorities can still untangle and attribute their illegal acts through expanded use of rich open-source evidence.

Despite welcoming the idea of separating the nationalist “shrine units” from the Iran-leaning Popular Mobilization Forces, Washington should lighten its touch on the issue.

In the year since their most iconic leaders were killed, Iran-backed militias in Iraq have been changing in crucial ways, providing rich insights into how Baghdad and its international partners should approach them in 2021.

The Iraq-based Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) is diligently and meticulously working to achieve hegemony among Iran-backed 'resistance' militias in Iraq. The group is positioning itself as the 'true resistance' faction and obliging other Iran-backed groups to follow its lead. In order to achieve this goal, KH is operating on military and

The reform measures called for by PMF leaders are so opaque that they could enable militia consolidation masquerading as security sector improvements.

Three experts examine one of the most sensitive problems facing Iraq's new prime minister: the future of militias that were mobilized to fight the Islamic State but have since balked at subsuming themselves to the government's authority.