Policy Analysis

To preserve its only reliable and capable partner in the fight against the Islamic State, the United States must help the SDF deter HTS and fend off Turkey-backed militias.

Comparing the offensive that toppled Assad with the Islamic State's 2014 campaign in Iraq shows how HTS has innovated its approach by mixing old and new tactics.

The United States can help renew the African Union mission by managing Egypt-Ethiopia tensions and mediating between various actors in Somalia.

The group maintains significant control over Gaza’s population despite its considerable losses, and removing it from power will necessitate a long campaign that no actor seems willing to undertake.

Preserving the UAE's role and synchronizing it with Turkey and Qatar's efforts could be a force multiplier for the Somali government’s offensive against al-Shabab.

Although the group’s conventional military capabilities seemingly peaked on October 7, an underperforming army is still an army, so the IDF has little choice but to continue ground operations until it can shift to a counterterrorism-centered strategy.

The United Arab Emirates has much to offer if it chooses deeper military involvement in the fight against al-Shabab, but it would need to coordinate closely with other actors, especially the United States, to optimize its contribution.

Special forces have succeeded especially in such missions, but any BWT effort requires some U.S. ground presence to achieve its goals.

As happened with past incursions, Erdogan’s latest invasion threats and preparatory strikes are fatally distracting the SDF from its crucial counterterrorism mission—and at a time when jihadist activities against it are on the rise.

The Biden administration should be encouraged by the incoming president’s ties to the UAE and apparent openness to bolstering the counterterrorism fight and normalizing with Israel.

From Iraq and Afghanistan to Somalia and Ukraine, closely mentoring special operators has been far more impactful than building up conventional forces, but this approach requires hands-on American involvement.

Two scholars of jihadism assess the group's evolving approaches to conventional and insurgent warfare, and U.S. options for combating them.

The military response to a major prison attack exhibited the strength of the U.S.-SDF partnership, but it also highlighted ongoing counterterrorism shortcomings.

The group and its offshoots pursue conventional warfare campaigns as a rule, not an exception, so the United States needs to enhance its regional military partnerships accordingly.

The IS military project led not only to the announcement of a “caliphate,” but to the proliferation of jihadist franchises that devastated countries, displaced millions, and killed tens of thousands.

The military’s shift to tribal engagement has helped reduce jihadist attacks, but Cairo’s lagging efforts on development and human rights could leave the peninsula open to a future resurgence.

U.S. military deployments create the strong alliances and local partnerships that the president said he wants.

The SDF has made remarkable progress in its anti-IS operations while Assad’s forces have stagnated, but the coalition and its local partners must still prepare for a renewed terrorist threat on their exposed southern flank.

After playing a key role in the group’s military development for years and navigating deep ideological rifts, Tehran has renewed its extensive sponsorship in ways that contributed directly to the recent bloodshed in Gaza.

Since losing its territorial base, the group has shown troubling signs of recovery amid a deteriorating situation at al-Hawl refugee camp.