All Policy Analysis by Hanin Ghaddar

With the IDF seemingly expanding its missile hunt to Lebanon and Iraq, the actions of Iran’s proxies, their host governments, and U.S. officials will do much to determine if wider escalation is in the cards.

The group’s local partners complied when U.S. officials warned them to back off a recent political smear campaign, but more should be done to expose and exploit their rifts.

Although Hezbollah and its allies might use the upcoming talks as a mere stalling tactic, negotiators will still have opportunities to exploit the group’s domestic vulnerabilities.

The Taif Accord, which ended Lebanon’s civil war almost three decades ago, stipulated that the country’s president be Christian, the prime minister be Sunni, and the parliament speaker be Shia. Today, two of these figures—President Michel Aoun and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri—are in their eighties, and both demonstrate sympathy for Hezbollah, the Shia militia and party that serves as a national power broker.

As U.S. pressure on Tehran heats up, many in Beirut, Washington, and Europe will argue that the group is still an independent actor, but past and recent evidence shows otherwise.

To further tighten the noose, Washington should disrupt the group’s efforts to tap international aid, Lebanese ministry budgets, Syrian smuggling revenue, and other resources.

Apart from its military intervention, Tehran has pursued a wide range of economic and social tactics for increasing its sway in Syria, but Washington can still push back with targeted assistance, innovative sanctions, and strategic messaging.

The cabinet’s composition is a fait accompli, but foreign officials may still be able to influence key security appointments—or, failing that, up the financial and diplomatic pressure on Hezbollah and its political allies.

Three experts examine Tehran's objectives, Russia's regional goals, and the way these translate to long-term threats and short-term risks for Israel.

The assistance package is small but symbolically important, demonstrating Moscow’s growing influence in Beirut while potentially throwing Hezbollah and Iran for a loop.

Iran’s economic problems have reportedly decreased the flow of financial patronage to the group, forcing it to seek another slush fund at home.