All Policy Analysis by Anna Borshchevskaya

Seventeen Russian vetoes have hobbled the council’s ability to keep humanitarian assistance flowing, so Washington and its allies should look to the General Assembly instead—or take matters into their own hands on the Turkish border.

Russia’s domestic military crisis could hold significant consequences for its regional operations, from heightening the risk of clashes with U.S. forces in Syria to putting a public face on its destabilizing activities in Libya.

An in-depth look at how Russian leaders have played the Kurdish card over the past two centuries, including recent engagement in Syria and Iraq.

A former coalition commander joins Washington Institute experts to discuss the war’s legacy, the country’s current challenges, and how U.S. policy should evolve in response.

Amid flare-ups in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Iran and Russia are keeping a watchful eye on developments in the South Caucasus, from Israel’s warming relations with Baku to potentially shifting control over regional transport corridors.

The region has been most receptive to Moscow’s war narrative, which Russian state-run media outlets have been permitted to spread far and wide with no Ukrainian or Western counter-narrative.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has had a ripple effect on global politics, including in the Middle East.

As the conflict enters year two, it remains unclear if the West has fully internalized the right lessons about Moscow, its partners in the “Global South,” or the parameters of long-term victory.

By taking largely ambivalent stances on the Ukraine war, states in the region have helped ease the effects of international sanctions against Moscow.

If the Assad regime's two main allies emerge victorious in Syria and Ukraine, U.S. adversaries will likely conclude that the pros of challenging Washington ultimately outweigh the negatives.

Despite the obstacles to expanded cooperation, Russian aid could help Tehran promote repression at home and instability abroad, so the United States and its allies should seek to deter such collaboration wherever possible.

Moscow’s willingness to approve another UN extension has more to do with advancing normalization between Turkey and the Assad regime than helping Syrian civilians, who will remain hostage to Russian demands if nothing is done before the next vote this summer.

The West hasn’t shown signs of abandoning Ukraine in the near term, but it also hasn’t set a clear goal of permanently changing Moscow’s strategic calculus, which remains fixed on winning the long game.

Jerusalem remains concerned that angering the Russians could jeopardize its crucial national security interests in Syria, though domestic elements and U.S. officials are still pressing it to do more.

Russia will continue using the Black Sea corridors as leverage, so Western countries and their partners should prepare alternative routes and other assistance as counter-leverage.

The partial mobilization suggests that he is more afraid of regime hardliners than the Russian public.

Given their proven capacity for jointly disrupting Western imperatives in the Middle East, both countries should increasingly be treated as part of the same strategic set.

Although alternatives to the UN mechanism carry uncertainties of their own, continuing the broken status quo will only boost Moscow, endanger Syrian civilians, and help the Assad regime avoid sanctions—not to mention whetting his appetite for natural gas shipments.

Unless the West can prod the Russian people to fundamentally reexamine their core beliefs, any notion that they will take matters into their own hands regarding Putin’s Ukraine war is just wishful thinking.

Improving U.S. relations with Riyadh is the only way to shift the Saudi stance toward Russia—failing that, Biden’s trip is unlikely to yield a strategic success.