All Policy Analysis by Anna Borshchevskaya

By taking largely ambivalent stances on the Ukraine war, states in the region have helped ease the effects of international sanctions against Moscow.

If the Assad regime's two main allies emerge victorious in Syria and Ukraine, U.S. adversaries will likely conclude that the pros of challenging Washington ultimately outweigh the negatives.

Despite the obstacles to expanded cooperation, Russian aid could help Tehran promote repression at home and instability abroad, so the United States and its allies should seek to deter such collaboration wherever possible.

Moscow’s willingness to approve another UN extension has more to do with advancing normalization between Turkey and the Assad regime than helping Syrian civilians, who will remain hostage to Russian demands if nothing is done before the next vote this summer.

The West hasn’t shown signs of abandoning Ukraine in the near term, but it also hasn’t set a clear goal of permanently changing Moscow’s strategic calculus, which remains fixed on winning the long game.

Jerusalem remains concerned that angering the Russians could jeopardize its crucial national security interests in Syria, though domestic elements and U.S. officials are still pressing it to do more.

Russia will continue using the Black Sea corridors as leverage, so Western countries and their partners should prepare alternative routes and other assistance as counter-leverage.

The partial mobilization suggests that he is more afraid of regime hardliners than the Russian public.

Given their proven capacity for jointly disrupting Western imperatives in the Middle East, both countries should increasingly be treated as part of the same strategic set.

Although alternatives to the UN mechanism carry uncertainties of their own, continuing the broken status quo will only boost Moscow, endanger Syrian civilians, and help the Assad regime avoid sanctions—not to mention whetting his appetite for natural gas shipments.

Unless the West can prod the Russian people to fundamentally reexamine their core beliefs, any notion that they will take matters into their own hands regarding Putin’s Ukraine war is just wishful thinking.

Improving U.S. relations with Riyadh is the only way to shift the Saudi stance toward Russia—failing that, Biden’s trip is unlikely to yield a strategic success.

Such an option could limit the risk of escalation, pressure Russia, and help avert a humanitarian crisis in the Middle East.

Instead of leaving misinformation and whataboutism largely unchallenged, Washington and its allies need to express their perspective to Arab audiences more effectively while highlighting Russian and Chinese hypocrisy.

In the Middle East, rising prices combined with growing populations could stir social unrest, as occurred during the Arab Spring period.

An in-depth look at how the two countries developed such a complex strategic relationship, and why Ukraine may present them with the most serious bilateral test of the Putin era.

Ukraine is no Syria, and Putin’s miscalculations are astonishing—but the West still faces grave risks of its own, including military escalation, mass refugee flows, and food shortages for Middle Eastern partners.

Three experts discuss whether the war might alter Washington’s calculus on rapprochement with Turkey, regional military deployments, and wider great power competition.

Putin’s deep experience with manipulating ceasefires and humanitarian agreements in Syria gives ample reason to believe he will do the same in Ukraine.

One potential outcome is a shattering loss that causes the Russian people to rethink what goals their state should pursue, though domestic opinion seems sharply divided along generational lines.