All Policy Analysis by Anna Borshchevskaya

In seeking to salvage the JCPOA, Biden should not assume cooperation from Moscow, but instead focus on building a unified strategy that strengthens the U.S. negotiating position.

Institute Senior Fellow Anna Borshchevskaya explains the implications of countrywide protests across the Russian Federation.

Although Moscow and Ankara are pursuing different aims in Syria, Libya, and the South Caucasus, they have managed to avoid direct confrontation.

As the Kremlin continues to undermine Western values, institutions, and influence while expressing distorted views of counterterrorism, liberals would do well to keep defending liberalism.

The country need not be a top foreign policy priority, but the Biden administration would be wise to invest in Iraqi security, unity, and democracy amid competition with Russia, China, and Iran.

Moscow conducts far more soft-power activity in the region than one might suspect, using subversive and opaque versions of the same tools employed by the West.

Neither Moscow nor Ankara is interested in genuine peace; they are using the disputed region to their own ends, and Russia remains the only actor who can talk to all sides.

The fact that American rather than Russian mediation helped broker a major Middle East peace agreement is a blow to Putin’s ongoing quest for restored great-power status.

Putin’s Russia and the West have never shared the same goals or threat perceptions regarding terrorism and other regional issues, so Washington should craft its Syria policy accordingly.

Moscow’s quietly growing influence will only prop up the country’s anti-American forces and worsen its struggles with corruption and ethnosectarian tension.

Current events in Lebanon may seem remote compared to protests closer to Russia, but the situation in Beirut directly affects Moscow’s policy in Syria and its evolving status as a regional player.

Moscow’s growing use of international legal loopholes in Libya, Sudan, and other countries gives it a worrisome template for chipping away at the global order without confronting the United States directly.

Although state officials and media have expressed somewhat nuanced views on the Beirut disaster and subsequent protests, most of their comments boil down to preventing deeper U.S. involvement and safeguarding Moscow’s interests in the current power structure.

Putin set a trap for Erdogan long ago, and because the Turkish leader woke up too late to his predicament, he now has little leverage in the unequal bilateral relationship.

As Moscow continues to intervene in regional conflicts, politics, and energy affairs, Washington should not underestimate its deep-rooted relationships with Kurdish groups in various countries.

Moscow has intervened for self-serving reasons and claims neutrality despite clearly picking a side.

The Kremlin’s interventions in Syria and elsewhere are just one part of its society-wide efforts to bolster Putin’s domestic standing via the security sphere.

A territorial dispute between Moscow and Tokyo illustrates the challenge that midsize powers face in an era of great power competition.

Although Moscow would face many challenges if it tries to establish permanent offensive and A2AD capabilities in Libya like it has in Syria, its covert actions thus far show a commitment to playing the long game against NATO in the East Mediterranean.