All Policy Analysis by Mehdi Khalaji

With the IRGC spearheading the containment effort, the clergy shooting itself in the foot, and the regime widening its cyber-repression, Iran is ripe for an evolution in which Khamenei or his successor give way to de facto military rule.

Read or watch an expert conversation on the immediate and long-term effects of the Islamic Republic’s response to the pandemic. How will Iranian politics change? How much aid can Tehran get under sanctions? How will the global economic slowdown affect daily life there?

Even as their lack of transparency worsens the public health crisis, the Supreme Leader and other officials have systematically gutted any civil society elements capable of organizing substantial opposition to such policies.

The clergy’s ambitions for global Shia revolution made the city of Qom uniquely vulnerable to the disease, and their resistance to modern medical science weakened the state’s ability to combat its spread.

Three leading Iran scholars explore how the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the broader regime will adapt their policies following the death of the seminal Qods Force commander.

A week after Donald Trump was elected president in November 2016, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei played coy, remarking, “I have no judgment on the American election...[Both parties have been] naughty toward us.” Of course, his true reaction was far more complex. On one hand, he saw in the president-elect—who

The vote will further consolidate Khamenei’s authoritarian rule, while the Majlis seems set to continue its decline in importance.

The general’s peerless domestic stature would have served a crucial mediatory role during the eventual transition to Khamenei’s successor, so his death brings significant uncertainty to that process.

Public anger is exploding over the regime’s mishandling of the airline tragedy, and the Supreme Leader seems to realize that his normal methods of extinguishing unrest and exploiting election cycles may not suffice.

Instead of focusing on Iran's missile retaliation or future threats, the Supreme Leader used his latest speech to extoll the virtues of public unity behind the regime’s revolutionary goals.

Khamenei and other regime officials have been quick to swear revenge, but for now they may focus more on stoking patriotic and militaristic sentiment at home.

The demonstrations indicate widespread popular rejection of the political system, but this same system remains well organized to deflect and counter unrest.

Facing grim prospects in Iran’s upcoming elections, the president’s camp is trying to convince hardliners that they need to keep the nuclear deal alive in order to continue expanding their military arsenal and intervening abroad.

Emboldened by their success in attacking Gulf and U.S. interests with relative impunity, Iranian leaders are now aiming to disgrace the Saudi royal family and foster Trump’s defeat in the 2020 election.

The current holder of the highest clerical rank in Shia Islam is eighty-nine-year-old Ali al-Sistani, who is based in Najaf, Iraq. Sistani has played an important role in Iraq’s post-Saddam era, supporting political reconciliation and a constitution-based society. While the transnational reach of marjaiya will likely diminish after Sistani leaves the scene, the specific contours of this shift and Tehran's efforts to intervene remain an open question.

The Supreme Leader regards his rule as the central feature of the Islamic Revolution, so the latest White House order will seem like a shot at the entire system.

The international community must take steps to empower civil society within the Islamic Republic and protect it from being systematically persecuted and oppressed.

By holding fast to his defiant approach while stopping just short of war, Khamenei may be hoping to stall until the next U.S. and Iranian election cycles.