All Policy Analysis by Mehdi Khalaji

Regardless of whether the nuclear deal succeeds or fails, Iranian society is undergoing substantial changes that make the Islamic Republic's longer-term future difficult to predict.

The Iranian regime's anti-Western regional policy has become much more important to its identity than Islamic ideology, so confronting Tehran's "unreasonable rationality" is essential.

The release of a special-committee report to the Majlis will be seized on by hardliners, who will continue to voice their opposition even in the probable event implementation goes forward.

Supreme Leader Khamenei once warned that animosity toward the United States could harm Iran, but this and other hardline positions eventually became core means to sustain his power.

Uncertainty over the nuclear deal's economic effects will make it difficult for moderates to win more votes, as will the hardliners' greater capacity to shape public opinion and the electoral process.

If the Supreme Leader is able to continue his strategy of purposeful ambiguity by manipulating the media and parliament, the current deal could fall apart just as easily as past nuclear agreements.

Detailed accounts by top Iranian negotiators and Khamenei himself show that the initial nuclear overtures between Washington and Tehran began well before President Rouhani took office, yet the Supreme Leader still seems intent on ducking responsibility.

The Supreme Leader has remained noncommittal as usual while politicians argue about the approval process, but his hardline cadres are publicly insisting that the deal will threaten Iran's national security, damage its regional standing, and increase the risk of armed confrontation.

The Supreme Leader's initial reaction has sent discouraging signals about Iran's willingness to comply with its commitments in the long term.

The agreement is a significant achievement for Rouhani, but the hardliners are already moving to ensure that it does not empower him during his remaining time in office, in line with their previous efforts to downplay the negotiations and separate them from nonnuclear issues.

Leaked statements indicate that the Supreme Leader's private views on nuclear compromise are more flexible than his tough public posture, so the negotiators may be able to ignore his stated redlines on inspections.

The Supreme Leader's latest statements, harping on "unreasonable" demands, are not preparing the Iranian public for compromise.

The Islamic Republic views the Yemen conflict as another battlefield in its proxy struggle with Saudi Arabia, spurring Iranian government, media, and religious figures to open a war of words in recent weeks.