All Policy Analysis by Matthew Levitt

Drawing on lessons from the 2006 war, Israel should focus on strategic outcomes such as better securing its border with Lebanon.

Underworld entities like Foxtrot and Rumba give Tehran cover in its increasingly active campaigns against Jewish, Israeli, and other targets across the continent.

Concerns over the regime’s longstanding R&D on weaponized anesthetics and other PBAs have become more pressing given the high risk of transfer to various hostile proxies.

The group’s ability to reconstitute its military power will depend on Iran restocking its arsenal; in the meantime, it will likely attempt more terrorist attacks abroad.

The group’s false assessment of Israel’s wartime fragility is proving more costly by the day.

To rebalance limited resources, meet great power challenges, and continue forecasting diverse terrorist threats, the U.S. government will need to invest more in capabilities such as machine learning and AI.

Like his recently killed predecessor, Ibrahim Aqil had a long history of murdering Americans, Europeans, Israelis, Lebanese, and others perceived as obstacles to Hezbollah’s ambitions, and his experience as a military and terrorist commander will be difficult to replace.

Israel’s cloak-and-dagger pager ploy was extraordinary, but will it change the group’s calculus?

Three counterterrorism experts and former officials discuss a powerful new interactive tool and its implications for mobilizing international pressure on Iran and its proxies.

The 30,000-strong militia has ground forces massed along the frontier, preventing evacuated Israelis from returning home and increasing the risk of a war that both sides would rather postpone for now.

In this chapter from the Jihadist Governance and Statecraft compilation, Mattew Levitt examines how Hezbollah exercises authority from outside the halls of formal state power.

Access this powerful tool, which maps over forty-five years of Iranian clandestine operations around the globe.

For more than four decades, the late terrorist and military commander Fuad Shukr was at the forefront of the group’s most destabilizing activities, from killing American, European, and Israeli soldiers to procuring advanced weapons from Iran.

A former Israeli military planner joins three experts to discuss each side’s current calculus and the U.S. policy implications if they opt for war or a truce.

Hamas leaders have recently tempered their fiery rhetoric with more moderate-sounding statements about a ceasefire along the 1967 lines, but this is merely a tactical move designed to advance the group’s main goal—establishing an Islamist state “between the river and the sea.”

The group is following Hezbollah’s playbook to a tee: first, secure victory simply by surviving, then take hold of the postwar governance structure while retaining its independent fighting force.

Following the attack on Israel, world leaders seek to build a coalition of the willing to hold Tehran accountable for its malign activities—though sanctions won’t have their intended effect unless partners cooperate on robust enforcement as well.

Tehran may simply revive the group or replace it with another terrorist proxy, so Washington and its partners will need to disrupt the flow of Iranian arms and informal financial support to extremist elements in the West Bank and Gaza.

Two decades after a landmark study on the group, it is clear that Hamas leaders never truly strayed from their core principle of prioritizing Israel’s destruction over the well-being of fellow Palestinians.

Decades ago, Saleh al-Arouri helped the group realize that external support networks were essential to recovering from serious setbacks, and this playbook lives on despite his death.