All Policy Analysis by Michael Singh

A treaty would pave the way for better security integration among U.S. partners in the region and reduce the need for direct American intervention.

The true U.S. strategy debate in the Middle East is not about whether we should stay or go; it’s about how to continue advancing the interests pursued by successive administrations even as hostile competitors and unresolved threats combine to throw U.S. regional policy off balance.

Beijing doesn’t care that its “Palestinian unity” agreement is a nonstarter or that a Hamas victory would undermine Chinese interests in stabilizing the Middle East—it just wants the United States to lose.

Skewed historical comparisons do not change the fact that the president’s arms restrictions will put Israel in greater danger.

The latest IAEA report shows why the West must refocus on Tehran’s nuclear program, which continues to expand even as international will to address it seemingly declines.

The end of the Gaza war’s current phase will mark the beginning of a major U.S. diplomatic push that could reshape the Middle East if successful—but the window of opportunity is narrow.

Former legislators and administration officials discuss their findings from a recent group trip to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, and the PA.

Tehran may simply revive the group or replace it with another terrorist proxy, so Washington and its partners will need to disrupt the flow of Iranian arms and informal financial support to extremist elements in the West Bank and Gaza.

The real threat to U.S. interests in the region isn’t rising Chinese influence, but the erosion of Washington's influence.

Beijing’s sharply anti-Israel response to the Gaza conflict, prompted by its increased focus on challenging Washington, exposes the limits of its diplomatic reach in the Middle East and the broader tensions in its foreign policy strategy.

While Washington can do more diplomatically, the most glaring gap in U.S. regional engagement is economic, leaving Beijing unchallenged and American allies unsupported.

The October 7 terrorist attacks by Hamas against Israel represent a turning point that should bring home oft-overlooked realities about the Middle East and compel U.S. policymakers to rethink preconceptions about the region and America's role and interests in it.

What Washington considers de-escalation, Tehran sees as an opportunity to consolidate its nuclear gains, avoid accountability, and position itself to cross the nuclear weapons threshold at a time of its choosing.

For the first time in decades, America’s top strategic priority diverges from that of its key regional partners, but Washington can close the gap by increasing their understanding of China and removing the blinders from their threat perceptions.

Watch as an expert panel assesses the full sweep of U.S. policy toward Iran in the twenty-first century across the Bush, Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations.

Leaders in the Middle East feel more threatened by the competition between China and the United States than by the individual powers themselves, so Washington needs to adapt accordingly.

The regime's latest step on uranium enrichment should compel the United States and its partners to snap back sanctions, bolster military deterrence, and plan for potential crisis scenarios.

As with Russia, Persian Gulf states may be reluctant to cross Beijing if conflict erupts in Asia, but Washington should remind them that even narrow financial action can help counter any Chinese moves on Taiwan.

No deal is possible between a Ukraine that is making steady battlefield progress and a Russia in denial of this reality, but they might get there if Kyiv keeps winning.

Because many states are eschewing both alignment with a single great power and nonalignment, the best U.S. response to this “omni-alignment” is creating more tailored opportunities for high-value cooperation with Washington.