All Policy Analysis by David Schenker

The new emir’s suspension of parliament, followed by the appointment of a prime minister and crown prince, suggests a different direction for the oil-rich Gulf state.

Tehran and its proxies have been doing everything they can to destabilize Jordan during the Gaza war, from inciting protests and increasing drug and weapons smuggling to escalating armed threats from Iraq.

Their longstanding peace treaty may be safe, but the growing tensions threaten to unwind years of progress and distract Egypt from its most important goal—securing a ceasefire with Hamas.

The lesson from past deals involving Hezbollah is clear: the group will try to pocket any U.S. concessions on the presidency and other issues while simply jettisoning whatever border commitments it may make in return.

Israeli strikes on Hezbollah and other militias in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq have yielded visible benefits at times, but future operations may elicit a direct Iranian response.

From exploring land border talks to boosting Israel’s arsenal and recasting UNIFIL, Washington should do more to slow what may be an inevitable slide toward war on this front.

Most forces could likely be withdrawn or moved to the Kurdistan Region without harming U.S. interests—in fact, Washington might have more leverage in Baghdad without a troop presence.

​​​​​​​The administration has reversed its reversals on certain issues, signaling a more comprehensive approach toward the Houthis, Iraqi militias, Iran sanctions, and more.

Sisi’s red line against absorbing displaced Palestinians won’t budge, but Egypt can certainly host crucial initiatives that help them rebuild Gaza, train security personnel, desalinate water, and replace jobs Israel is no longer willing to provide.

The players have climbed another rung on the escalatory ladder in Iraq, Lebanon, and the Red Sea, exacerbating worries about a wider regional conflict and more serious economic effects.

A bad peace that does not address the wider issue of Hamas violence would only defer the war to a later date.

Cairo has understandable concerns about unsustainable refugee flows, Sinai terrorist threats, and longer-term Palestinian political aspirations, all of which need to be taken into account when pushing for humanitarian corridors into Gaza.

Beefing up U.S. naval deployments is not enough to boost deterrence—Washington must also respond decisively to proxy attacks on its forces and increase economic pressure on Tehran.

Iranian proxies are deliberately escalating against American forces in the region as a warning against continued support for Israel’s war, but Hezbollah attacks would take the crisis to a different level.

A former senior IDF official joins Lebanese and U.S. experts to discuss whether additional fronts are poised to open in the north, and what Washington is doing to avert this risk.

Although the existential nature of the nuclear threat understandably demanded attention, Hamas and other Iranian proxies have dramatically increased their capabilities in the meantime.

Although any decrease in tensions is welcome, Washington should be concerned that regional rapprochement is being driven by diminished confidence in the United States.

After many years serving as Iran’s mercenaries in regional wars, Hezbollah leaders now feel compelled to resume their aggressive approach to Israel.

The administration clearly dislikes the Western Sahara policy it inherited, but reversing course now would exacerbate Washington’s serious credibility deficit with the Saudis and other regional partners.

Riyadh’s reported price for peace with Israel includes a civil nuclear program, but any such deal will require Washington to carefully balance multiple diplomatic, legal, and proliferation concerns.