All Policy Analysis by Mehdi Khalaji

The authoritarian infrastructure honed over decades by the Supreme Leader is designed to outlast his time in office.

In a climate where many clerics are unhappy about their situation and some are losing faith in the Islamic Republic, the purported minutes of a recent regime meeting show how the problem may evolve as domestic unrest continues.

The regime’s often-hypocritical handling of this year’s World Cup comes to a head with a matchup against the United States, and a political victory seems unattainable regardless of the results on the field.

Apps like Clubhouse and Instagram have greatly broadened the people’s ability to exchange ideas and even criticize the regime, but authorities have simultaneously subverted, coopted, and silenced these platforms at will.

By targeting celebs and financially coopting the clergy, the regime has revealed a great deal about what it sees as its greatest vulnerabilities.

The unrest has shown that many young people are not only rejecting the regime, but also steering away from long-time actors such as the clergy, reformers, and dissident politicians inside and outside the country.

Whether or not Tehran is proven to be involved, the incident holds significant implications for the regime's international diplomacy and terrorist activity—not to mention its claims about the applicability of Khamenei’s “nuclear fatwa.”

A more effective (and cost-effective) approach would give Iranians the tools they need to bypass regime monitoring, pare down low-impact television programming, and emphasize popular mobile apps.

Targeting the faith’s followers is a longstanding feature of the Islamic Republic but has been escalating of late.

Interest in a strong military president is growing in unexpected sectors, but such an outcome is more likely to strengthen Khamenei’s power than drastically reform the system.

​​​​​​​The foreign minister had much to say about the IRGC branch’s political interference at home and close relations with Moscow, and the regime has done nothing to dispute his account so far.

Three scholars explore the stunning breadth of Iranian dominance over Damascus and what this means for any U.S. plans to foster stability in Syria or reopen negotiations with Tehran.

The Vatican’s outreach to Iraq is laudable in its goal of decreasing religious violence, but Western officials should be realistic about what engagement with Shia religious leaders can accomplish in the near term.

By stating initial terms that he knows Washington will not meet right now, the Supreme Leader is once again signaling his lack of interest in returning to full JCPOA compliance—at least not before President Rouhani leaves office in August.

The main lesson of the nuclear fatwa is that Tehran’s national security decisions are guided by interests, not ideology, and that progress in negotiations is possible if framed in terms of "regime expediency."

The seemingly provocative legislation is as much theater as reality given the parliament’s relatively small role in foreign policy.

Joe Biden's victory in America may herald a measure of de-escalation with Iran, but the Supreme Leader is unlikely to be moved. Ayatollah Khamenei does not really distinguish between Democratic and Republican intentions—after all, he agreed to a nuclear deal with the Obama administration only to see President Trump tear

Ayatollah Khamenei is wholly focused on preserving the political system he has so painstakingly built, but trends suggest a shaky Iranian future regardless of who wins the U.S. election.

Three experts on Iranian politics and strategy assess the possibilities of last-minute dramatic developments between the two adversaries before the U.S. election.

The institutionalization of revolutionary Islamism in Iranian governance and law means there is almost no chance the current regime will pursue reform of its own volition.