All Policy Analysis by Michael Knights

The Syria strike was launched from the militia's bastion in Iraq and used Iranian-provided KAS-04 explosive drones.

A Diyala-based militia that offered its services to Nouri al-Maliki on a leaked audiotape from July 2022.

The militia leader is being constrained by other members of the Iran-dominated Shia Coordination Framework regarding how to respond to Sadrist protests.

Iran’s allies in Iraq mounted a judicial coup at the start of this year. Now, Muqtada al-Sadr is trying to place the system under his control through mob action. U.S.-led friends of Iraq should care about both these developments, not just the most recent one.

This facade group is used to brand militia rocket and drone attacks on Turkish targets in Iraq.

Ankara is fighting a lethal and largely hidden counterinsurgency against PKK elements across the border, but the conflict’s rising profile may carry high costs for both U.S. interests and Iraqi sovereignty.

Sabereen News has been operating as the clearinghouse for coverage of "resistance" strikes on Turkish targets, nodding to specific facade groups and hinting at future attacks inside Turkey.

A targeted intervention could aid American interests and the global effort to find a substitute for Russian and Iranian oil and gas.

This local auxiliary unit plays an important role in consolidating Iranian and proxy influence in Iraq's strategic Nineveh Plains region.

This facade group is used to brand "resistance" attacks on Turkish targets and purportedly link the strikes to Yezidi grievances toward Turkey.

Ahrar Sinjar is a worrisome example of Iran-backed militias using minorities to undertake cross-border rocket attacks and build terrorist cells in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

Turkish counterstrikes may have instilled caution in militia rocketeers, suggesting more attacks may come against U.S. and Kurdish targets instead.

The network's hiatus may have been ordered in response to its recent lean toward Russia, or perhaps its role in enabling a controversial arson attack on a political office.

The network was closed down almost entirely from March 28 to April 8, albeit with one apparent effort by rebellious members to refuse the suspension and blame Iran.

Militia groups appear to be increasingly exercising their different kinetic capabilities in Iraq and Syria, but why now?

Alongside an apparent technical uplift, the militia network's coverage of the crisis has gone far beyond that of even the most pro-Russian outlets in Iraq.

Washington has many good options for avoiding a Kurdish economic meltdown and turning Iraq’s internal energy dispute into a net win for all players, but it must pursue them quickly.

The latest strike on Iraq points to a brazen, illegal, and dangerous strategy of exercising leverage via missile and drone attacks—a practice that has gone unchecked for too long.

The unmasking of Abu Hussein and his brothers puts the deposed Kataib Hezbollah official on the receiving end of his favorite tactic: leaking the faces and names of rivals.

With probable links to Kataib Hezbollah, this minor facade group claimed a major rocket attack on al-Asad Air Base, but mainly limits itself to claimed bombings against U.S. supply convoys.