All Policy Analysis by Michael Knights

The Iran-backed militia tried to make its solo effort to boost the Houthi drone arsenal look like a widely coordinated and highly popular campaign, whereas it was anything but.

The Iranian general has never received such intense praise from the Iraqi "resistance," but it may just be his attempt to spin his recent disappointing visit.

Washington can help preserve the recent coalition gains by categorizing the campaign as defensive, deterring further Houthi attacks abroad, and leveraging the next military deadlock to reinvigorate peace talks.

Abu Fadak and Akram Kaabi seem to have inherited the PMF and "resistance" parts of the late militia leader's portfolio.

The process of assuaging the militia support base was carefully stage-managed in the first week of the new year, with Iran and Nujaba setting the ground rules.

Both outlets are openly advocating the murder of Iraqi security forces at a time of escalated shootings and bombings.

Desperate militias are now killing Shia civilians in mass-casualty bombings as they try to assassinate Iraqi investigators and intelligence personnel.

Kaabi has long been Iran's chosen man in the self-styled Iraqi "resistance," and his latest remarks seemed like an attempt to seize control of militia public messaging.

Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada may have exaggerated its recruiting numbers, but the episode points to militias' desperation to look potent and regain leverage by threatening to destabilize Iraq in early 2022.

Militia attacks on supply convoys are experiencing a (likely temporary) lull, and the sub-group Ashab al-Kahf appears to have taken the lead.

To deflect responsibility for the assassination attempt on Iraq’s prime minister, self-styled "resistance" groups have assembled a dodgy dossier of convincing-looking disinformation.

Elements of Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Hezbollah are seemingly trying to extract domestic and Iranian support for more forceful pushback against their recent political isolation.

Militias' repeated targeting of Kadhimi, including this week's attack on his home, emphasizes that Kadhimi has done something right in his past two years as Prime Minister of Iraq.

In the wake of their failed election campaigns and other recent setbacks, militias sought to deepen their claims of victimhood and politically damage Prime Minister Kadhimi with protests.

Militias followed up Qais al-Khazali's threats against Kadhimi by attacking his residence, shattering the narrative of victimhood they had been building through protests.

Such attacks are a specialized subset of violent militia actions, with the most recent incident likely undertaken by Asaib Ahl al-Haq.

Questions about the viability of the Iraqi security forces—brought into sharp focus by the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan—require a data-led analysis of where the forces are today and what mix of U.S., NATO, and European efforts can help them thrive in the future.

Iran-backed resistance groups are seemingly staging missile "discoveries" as a way of warning off coalition air forces.

Hardline groups are struggling to satisfy demands for action against American forces while simultaneously de-escalating U.S.-Iran tensions and evolving their non-kinetic wings.

Hoquq is competing head-to-head with other "resistance" factions in key Shia constituencies, especially Asaib Ahl al-Haq.