All Policy Analysis by Michael Knights

Two drones were intercepted in a mission that Sabereen News dedicated to “reminding the Americans of the September 11 attacks."

Badr is the wellspring of many of today's armed resistance groups and still operates under the indirect and sometimes direct control of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Iraqi PM Kadhimi’s recent visit demonstrates a positive vision of U.S.-Iraqi relations and improved confidence among Iraqi leaders.

A pan-Shia forum and Lebanese Hezbollah prodded the Tansiqiya to grudgingly paper over cracks in solidarity among resistance groups.

KH-commanded militia units appear to have exclusive control over Iranian-provided drones, highlighting the group's links to Tehran and its involvement in recent UAV operations.

Tehran has bolstered the ground combat capabilities of its proxy militias within the PMF, though the equipment rarely sees combat employment.

Drone systems paraded in Camp Ashraf were a show of strength, including the debut of new types of Iranian-provided airframes and control vehicles.

Caught between aggressive Tehran-backed militias and a skeptical Congress, the administration needs a better approach.

Striking back one time in twelve will not stop Iranian proxy attacks, so Washington must consider more consistent and painful retaliation in order to protect Americans in the Middle East.

Attacks on coalition points of presence are increasing in quantity and quality, making U.S. fatalities increasingly likely unless deterrence is restored.

To some, America's partnership with the SDF exemplified an economy-of-force effort that minimized U.S. casualties and wrested control of northeast Syria from the Islamic State. To others, it was a cautionary tale about a U.S. military hoodwinked into working with a terrorist group.

Regardless of the executive branch’s willingness to confront militia abuses, true rule of law cannot take hold unless judges are protected from intimidation and corruption.

The militia leader has not hesitated to provide court-quality evidence that he and his movement Asaib Ahl al-Haq are actively involved in attacks on U.S. forces.

The first wave of post-arrest deception operations tried to give the false impression that militias controlled the Baghdad zone containing the prime minister's residence, the U.S. embassy, and other sensitive sites.

Militias made a concerted effort to create the false impression that their colleague had been released immediately, and the claim was soon echoed by major global media outlets.

Baghdad effectively enforced the rule of law by detaining a senior militia figure, though it still needs to arrest other murder suspects and show the public that October’s election will be safe.

The group is employing sophisticated drone capabilities against U.S. airbases in Iraq, mirroring tactics and systems used in Yemen.

Nouri al-Maliki is gathering various Iraqi resistance figures who fought both Saddam and the coalition, but this marginal "old timer" party is not the same as Kataib Hezbollah, which has yet to show its hand in parliamentary politics.

A U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization that emerged from Iraq's Kataib Hezbollah, works directly with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and has a transnational focus on the shared regional agenda of Iran's "axis of resistance."

The Imam Hussein Scout Association is Kataib Hezbollah’s youth organization and an affiliate of Lebanese Hezbollah's Kishaf al-Imam al-Mahdi youth movement.