Policy Analysis

The Trump administration should not be duped by the supposed “reforms” that militia leaders are considering in parliament, which threaten to turn the PMF into another Iranian “Revolutionary Guard” and keep U.S.-designated terrorists in key posts.

Although their diplomatic and economic overtures are on the rise, bilateral ties remain largely superficial for now, indicating a shared anti-Western posture rather than risky strategic cooperation.

What do Palestinians, Israelis, and external players see as the best option for Gaza and its people now that the first phase of the ceasefire is complete?

Does Syria's transition away from Assad regime tyranny offer hope for closing detention camps, which have been home to thousands of internally displaced persons and Islamic State supporters?

After boycotting Trump in his first term, Ramallah now seeks to improve the relationship, giving Washington an opening to address the PA’s shortcomings without distracting from other Middle East priorities.

Riyadh has demonstrated the desire and ability to play a bigger diplomatic role in the Middle East and beyond, so Washington should support these aspirations—while taking care to balance relations with other Gulf states and ensure that Riyadh contributes constructively.

Iraqi militias and politicians alike have been walking on eggshells with Washington, suggesting that the “axis of resistance” is vulnerable to tough diplomatic and intelligence action.

Should a negotiated deal prove elusive, policymakers will need to consider how to define a successful strike, Iran’s potential responses, and whether a strategy of prevention can be sustained.

To maintain pressure on Hamas and preserve U.S. deterrence at a sensitive point in Gaza discussions, the Trump administration needs to lock in its diplomatic coordination and public messaging with Israel.

Despite well-founded worries about the rise of an Islamist government in Syria, the new rulers cannot be any worse than the previous regime—especially now that they are largely disarmed and disinclined to partner with U.S. adversaries like Iran and Russia.

Amid mounting civilian deaths and rampant disinformation, the conduct of Syria’s fact-finding committee will either make or break the new government’s legitimacy and the prospects for a stable transition.

A newly formed "resistance" group emerged online in January, vowing to confront Israel's presence and Syria’s interim president.

Uli al-Baas certainly looks and feels like an Iran-supported militia info-ops platform, designed to give the impression (possibly accurate) that a pantheon of armed groups are activating to fight Israel and the new Syrian government.

Refocusing postwar plans on this concept could result in 40 percent or more of Gaza’s population leaving of their own accord—a prospect that should spur U.S. and Arab leaders to reconcile their differing proposals and expedite their preparations for reconstruction.

Activists and experts from Syria, Europe, and Washington share on-the-ground insights about how the post-Assad transition is going and where local grievances might erupt into bigger problems.

Watch an expert webcast marking the publication of Institute scholar Dennis Ross's updated book on American grand strategy in today's multipolar world.

When it comes to fixing serious problems with the economy, energy, and other sectors, the reformists have been just as ineffective as the hardliners, eroding any legitimacy they might claim to reopen nuclear negotiations with Washington.

As the new government looks for quick answers to its emergency energy needs, it may turn to sanctioned Russian ship operators and other illicit actors.

Washington should act quickly to facilitate transactions for key sectors such as electricity, food, and rubble removal, lest public discontent lead to widespread protests and possibly government collapse.

By letting previous waivers expire, the United States can help Baghdad establish other suppliers and stand on its own feet for the first time.