All Policy Analysis by Aaron Y. Zelin

Regardless of the Taliban’s promises to keep foreign terrorist elements in check, its victory is already boosting elements within the jihadist movement and may once again spur foreign fighter traffic to Afghanistan.

Whether or not Tunis repeats its past security mistakes, al-Qaeda and the Islamic State may see the president’s destabilizing power move as an opportunity to prod the government’s capabilities.

Ironically, the Syrian jihadist group now acts much like a typical Middle Eastern regime, from the way it mobilizes local support to the abuses it commits against those who oppose its rule.

As eulogies for a recently slain militia figure spread online, they highlighted the differences between major jihadi organizations and revealed the solid local roots HTS has formed in northwest Syria.

Washington is no ally of HTS, but it should realize that Russian strikes against the group are aimed squarely at foiling U.S. objectives in Geneva, including the effort to maintain cross-border aid.

As Western policymakers debate potential engagement with HTS, they should do so with eyes wide open to the jihadist group’s true status in the province and its intentions toward local tribal institutions.

In addition to undermining the Biden administration’s promised focus on human rights, allowing Assad to regain legitimacy abroad would constitute a strategic blunder that cannot be explained away.

Recent protests in Daraa demonstrate that Assad’s hold over regime-controlled areas are not as total as they appear.

A closer look at the attack patterns, ideological disagreements, and shifting strategies of the world’s foremost jihadi organizations over the past year.

Despite accusations by leftist politicians, Ennahda’s commitment to national security has not wavered since it turned on the jihadi movement, but the party still needs to define what it means by “Muslim Democracy.”

Even if the growing regional and geopolitical stakes were not sufficient on their own, the regime’s domestic negligence, illegitimacy, and criminality provide ample reason to shake up Washington’s approach.

Security issues won’t top Tunisia’s agenda in 2021, but the sheer volume of citizens mobilized into the jihadist milieu over the past decade suggests that the consequences will be felt for years to come.

Even as U.S. policymakers must stay focused on the Assad regime’s culpability, they also face a complex web of power dynamics in which Russia, Turkey, Iran, Israel, and other actors are attempting to secure their various interests.

The disproportionate role of Tunisians in both campaigns can be traced to a wide array of factors, including travel routes, prison experiences, battlefield leadership, and propaganda patterns back home.

An in-depth study on how the group's outreach and proselytization activities evolved before, during, and after its jihadist state-building project in Iraq and Syria.

Drone campaigns have greatly culled the group’s leadership, but leaders are replaceable, and the guided-attack model seen in Pensacola could be a significant force multiplier for any locally rooted affiliates who seek to strike abroad in the coming years.

Three experts on European jihadism discuss the root causes and operational significance of recent Islamist violence in France.

Recent developments in Syria indicate that the jihadi movement is splitting once again, as a prominent ideologue begins to form a third pole at odds with both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.

Two experts assess the recent attack patterns and future prospects of a group that once seemed on the cusp of defeat in both countries.

Disease prevention efforts in Idlib illustrate the movement's political evolution and its differences from the Islamic State, but the pandemic may still hit the area hard given inconsistent implementation and years of regime destruction.