All Policy Analysis by Aaron Y. Zelin

If the West delays on pressing Saied to resume the democratic transition, it risks undermining the progress made so far in establishing a professional, apolitical counterterrorism infrastructure.

To shed light on the intentions and capabilities of the jihadist group that runs Idlib province, the Biden administration should clarify its relations with HTS, including any counterterrorism cooperation.

A footnote in one decade of jihadist history can become a major mobilizer for terrorists and foreign fighters in subsequent years, and few cases illustrate this problem better than the Tunisian operatives involved in the 2001 murder of an Afghan rebel leader.

Washington should publicly emphasize the importance of preserving hard-won progress on political pluralism and human rights, while privately conveying that Tunis must return to the constitutional framework in order to receive MCC and IMF funding.

Three Institute scholars discuss the fallout from Kabul, with special focus on the consequences for global jihadism, Iranian policy, and regional responses.

Regardless of the Taliban’s promises to keep foreign terrorist elements in check, its victory is already boosting elements within the jihadist movement and may once again spur foreign fighter traffic to Afghanistan.

Whether or not Tunis repeats its past security mistakes, al-Qaeda and the Islamic State may see the president’s destabilizing power move as an opportunity to prod the government’s capabilities.

Ironically, the Syrian jihadist group now acts much like a typical Middle Eastern regime, from the way it mobilizes local support to the abuses it commits against those who oppose its rule.

As eulogies for a recently slain militia figure spread online, they highlighted the differences between major jihadi organizations and revealed the solid local roots HTS has formed in northwest Syria.

Washington is no ally of HTS, but it should realize that Russian strikes against the group are aimed squarely at foiling U.S. objectives in Geneva, including the effort to maintain cross-border aid.

As Western policymakers debate potential engagement with HTS, they should do so with eyes wide open to the jihadist group’s true status in the province and its intentions toward local tribal institutions.

In addition to undermining the Biden administration’s promised focus on human rights, allowing Assad to regain legitimacy abroad would constitute a strategic blunder that cannot be explained away.

Recent protests in Daraa demonstrate that Assad’s hold over regime-controlled areas are not as total as they appear.

A closer look at the attack patterns, ideological disagreements, and shifting strategies of the world’s foremost jihadi organizations over the past year.

Despite accusations by leftist politicians, Ennahda’s commitment to national security has not wavered since it turned on the jihadi movement, but the party still needs to define what it means by “Muslim Democracy.”

Even if the growing regional and geopolitical stakes were not sufficient on their own, the regime’s domestic negligence, illegitimacy, and criminality provide ample reason to shake up Washington’s approach.

Security issues won’t top Tunisia’s agenda in 2021, but the sheer volume of citizens mobilized into the jihadist milieu over the past decade suggests that the consequences will be felt for years to come.

Even as U.S. policymakers must stay focused on the Assad regime’s culpability, they also face a complex web of power dynamics in which Russia, Turkey, Iran, Israel, and other actors are attempting to secure their various interests.

The disproportionate role of Tunisians in both campaigns can be traced to a wide array of factors, including travel routes, prison experiences, battlefield leadership, and propaganda patterns back home.

An in-depth study on how the group's outreach and proselytization activities evolved before, during, and after its jihadist state-building project in Iraq and Syria.