All Policy Analysis by Aaron Y. Zelin

Links between this attack and older jihadist networks underscore the complex nature of Tunisian radicalization, even if suspicious government data trends seem to suggest the problem is diminishing.

While the consensus might be that al-Qaeda is primed to benefit from Islamic State setbacks, unless conditions change locally, the so-called caliphate will likely remain a more attractive avenue for jihadi mobilization in Tunisia.

Unless Washington changes its mixed message on foreign fighters and helps its European allies find practical solutions, it may soon face another mass outbreak of seasoned operatives from Syria.

If the Syria withdrawal proves inevitable, officials should push to phase the departure, keep U.S. forces at Tanf, maintain the air campaign, forge a counterterror agreement with Turkey, and take other fallback measures.

Two leading experts discuss why thousands of young Tunisians mobilized for jihad in Iraq and Syria, and what governments are doing now that they are taking their cause back home—or to the West.

Over the past few years, the influx of Tunisian fighters to Iraq and Syria has rendered Tunisia practically synonymous with a phenomenon that is still not well understood. This new Policy Note by jihadism expert Aaron Y. Zelin seeks to remedy this gap by quantifying the flow of Tunisian fighters

An unprecedented attack by a female bomber should not come as a surprise considering the spike in women’s jihadist activism since 2011.

While the government should be commended for putting a lid on attacks, it needs to move beyond a security-only approach and reintegrate less-hardened jihadis.

The group has been conducting propaganda campaigns and violence against democratic processes throughout the region, so it may try to back up its latest warnings with attacks in Tunisia’s vulnerable interior.

As the fight against the Islamic State shifts from retaking territory to preventing regrowth, a jihadism scholar and the former deputy head of AFRICOM discuss what Washington should learn from the group's activities in Libya.

This new study offers a deeper understanding of the foreign-fighter phenomenon, its evolution, and its potential trajectories.

Given the clampdown on foreign fighters and the changed environment in Syria and Iraq, the group may be unable to break out as broadly as it once did, so Washington's approach should shift accordingly.

Although the cessation of governance-related media releases suggests a full retreat, IS remains active in military campaigns and eager to rise again by taking advantage of local grievances.

Areas of focus will likely include a damaged but still dangerous Islamic State, a regrouping al-Qaeda, and the wide network fielded by Iran and its proxy Hezbollah.

Destroying the vestiges of IS governance will not eliminate the group -- which will continue to pose an insurgent and terrorist threat -- but it will remove any arguments the jihadists might be inclined to make about the near-term viability of their state.

Over the past eight years, al-Qaeda's fortunes have ebbed and flowed. Drones, uprisings, and a challenge from the Islamic State have forced the core al-Qaeda organization—historically based in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region—and its various branches to adapt and migrate outward. In this new Policy Focus, Washington Institute fellow Aaron Y. Zelin