All Policy Analysis by Aaron Y. Zelin

Given the clampdown on foreign fighters and the changed environment in Syria and Iraq, the group may be unable to break out as broadly as it once did, so Washington's approach should shift accordingly.

Although the cessation of governance-related media releases suggests a full retreat, IS remains active in military campaigns and eager to rise again by taking advantage of local grievances.

Areas of focus will likely include a damaged but still dangerous Islamic State, a regrouping al-Qaeda, and the wide network fielded by Iran and its proxy Hezbollah.

Destroying the vestiges of IS governance will not eliminate the group -- which will continue to pose an insurgent and terrorist threat -- but it will remove any arguments the jihadists might be inclined to make about the near-term viability of their state.

Over the past eight years, al-Qaeda's fortunes have ebbed and flowed. Drones, uprisings, and a challenge from the Islamic State have forced the core al-Qaeda organization—historically based in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region—and its various branches to adapt and migrate outward. In this new Policy Focus, Washington Institute fellow Aaron Y. Zelin

Even as the Islamic State continues to lose territory, its evolution in Libya since 2014 should convince Western authorities not to underestimate its capacity for directing lethal attacks abroad.

To decrease the likelihood of terrorist attacks, governments should complement traditional CT with de-securitized tools on the front and back end of the radicalization process.

Tunisia has had one of the largest foreign fighter mobilizations to the battlefields of Libya, Iraq, and Syria, so its outsize representation in the ranks of international terrorist operatives will likely persist well into the future.

Preventing and countering violent extremism is not a soft alternative to counterterrorism, but an essential toolkit to complement law enforcement's ongoing efforts to prevent violence.

Although the two groups remain rivals, their activities in the Middle East and abroad have complementary effects, whether in the form of recruiting disillusioned youths, undermining the regional state system, normalizing support for violent jihad, or other threatening developments.

The group's public executions of gay men are part of a deliberate moral policing campaign, one aimed at showing supporters and enemies alike that it means to enforce its narrow, atavistic view of Islamic law wherever it can.

The following is an excerpt from Aaron Zelin's contribution to the Carter Center report Countering Daesh Propaganda: Action-Oriented Research for Practical Policy Outcomes . To read his full chapter, download the PDF. The Islamic State provides an unprecedented amount of documentation on its own nature and the messages it hopes

The establishment of jihadi governance projects is becoming the new normal as ISIS and al-Qaida learn from past mistakes, but the long-term sustainability of these efforts remains unclear.

In this new study, jihadi expert Aaron Y. Zelin provides a framework for understanding how the Islamic State goes from no control to full consolidation of control in a particular area. Three case studies show how this framework plays out ...

Three experts discuss what polls conducted inside the group's territory tell us about its political strength, ability to govern, and appeal beyond Iraq and Syria.

Compared to where it was a year ago, the group is far stronger in the south and is gaining steam even as it faces large-scale military campaigns against its forces in the north.