All Policy Analysis by Fabrice Balanche

If Sharaa wants to avoid repeating Assad’s mistakes, he may have to genuinely decentralize political power and establish a federal system, though this would raise difficult questions about resource allocation.

At a time when Westerners are questioning the Islamist takeover in Damascus, Sunni Arab treatment of the Assad family’s broader Alawite base will offer insights into the nascent government’s true stance on religious tolerance, transitional justice, and state-building.

To offset the destabilizing measures coming from Turkey and the Assad axis, Western governments need to offer more development assistance—but in a targeted way that reassures local authorities and minimizes mismanagement.

By ceding control of its borders and airspace to various foreign actors, the regime has essentially resigned itself to a limited but potentially durable existence for the long term.

The mixed Kurdish-Arab zone could buckle under any number of security, health, and economic threats, especially if the United States surrenders to Russian and Turkish interests by withdrawing its remaining forces.

Given the military situation on the ground and the overriding interests of each party, the jihadist-run rebel pocket will likely be further reduced into a small, overpopulated border strip north of the M4 highway.

Various displacement scenarios may unfold as the fighting escalates, each carrying a high risk of negative humanitarian and economic consequences even if the parties live up to their promises.

As the latest regime offensive continues, hundreds of thousands of civilians are fleeing to overcrowded border camps, furthering Assad’s strategy of emptying as much of the Sunni Arab population as possible.

Ankara’s calculations about the rebel province appear to have shifted, though it still hopes to use the situation as leverage for constraining the YPG and preventing another refugee influx.

Reestablishing control in Manbij is the only way to build influence across the Euphrates, and now that U.S. troops are set to leave, both Russia and local Arab tribes may support this regime goal.

The district’s ethnic composition and wartime migrations make it the weakest point of the YPG defense system, and the most likely entryway for Turkish troops and their proxies.

If Assad and his allies stick with their past strategy, the initial offensive will likely be limited, though it will still spur massive refugee flows and a serious breach between Turkey and Russia.

Does Syria's climate of ethnic and sectarian hostility stem from seven years of war, or do its social fissures predate the conflict?

This study, illustrated with 70 original maps and graphics, fosters a deeper understanding of the role sectarianism has played in Syria's war and reassesses the notion that the regime's divisive efforts singlehandedly transformed the secular and democratic revolution of 2011 into the brutal sectarian conflict of today.

The international coalition must take the same comprehensive approach to HTS as it is taking to the Islamic State.

The SDF and U.S.-supported Arab fighters likely lack the might and unity to overcome Assad-regime advances and other obstacles.

A dedication to rural residents, more-efficient farming techniques, and a focus on cities other than Damascus will be necessary to build a new Syria.

Events on the ground are fluid in the eastern Syrian city and province, but dynamics suggest Syrian forces and their backers will prevail over the Islamic State and U.S.-supported fighters.

Closer examination reveals that far more refugees are leaving Syria than coming home and that security and corruption represent major obstacles to their return.