All Policy Analysis by Simon Henderson

Rather than clearing a route to normalization with Israel, a Saudi nuclear agreement with Washington may be key to addressing Iran’s military nuclear potential and wider proliferation concerns in the region.

With oil prices sliding and Iran talks ahead, the Gulf states are bracing for a high-stakes presidential visit.

Hezbollah’s recent military defeat and the 2022 Israel-Lebanon maritime agreement mediated by Washington have enabled exploration in a distant corner of Israel’s exclusive economic zone.

Whether authorities call it “Egyptian gas” or “Jordanian gas,” the simple fact is that Israeli offshore supplies could help with Syria’s major power shortage if the necessary arrangements are ironed out.

Whatever the new administration decides on major regional issues—from Gulf involvement in postwar Gaza to next steps on Iran—local leaders should be prepared to wait awhile and brace for surprises.

Many leaders seem eager for the return of a U.S. administration that has shown a predilection for encouraging big business ties—though the ten weeks before Inauguration Day will be fraught with risks of new or escalated regional crises.

The veteran journalist dishes on the Jordanian king’s “man cave,” Biden’s pique at both Netanyahu and Abbas, and Harris’s public versus private diplomatic style.

Despite significant vulnerabilities, the redundancies in Iran’s energy production would limit the effects of any strike, while the consequences for Israeli, Gulf, and global energy markets could be significant.

The kingdom anticipates and accepts lower oil prices, according to a news report, but the impact on other producers could be comparatively damaging.

The Emirati leader will likely focus on the future of bilateral economic and technological integration, but discussions will also cover sensitive matters such as great-power concerns over China and Russia, regional nuclear proliferation, and a potential role for his country in postwar Gaza.

Iranian missiles for Russia, Houthi attacks on Israel, and North Korea’s surprise display of centrifuges have quickly changed the atmosphere of the nuclear agency’s annual meeting.

The island has objected to Chevron’s export proposals with Egypt and might look for other partners.

The small but significant step could facilitate U.S. technology transfers to the kingdom, said to be a key element in any potential Israeli-Saudi normalization deal—but proliferation concerns persist.

The deal could eventually boost supplies to Egypt, though Hezbollah’s robust missile arsenal and public threats against East Mediterranean energy targets may dampen broader regional investment in the sector.

Implied lower prices would weaken economic forecasts for major Middle East oil producers.

Tehran has a history of stepping up its nuclear violations after public rebukes; in the current environment, such escalation could have regional proliferation implications.

The new emir’s suspension of parliament, followed by the appointment of a prime minister and crown prince, suggests a different direction for the oil-rich Gulf state.

Given the latest uptick in hostilities between Iran and Israel and their reported threats against nuclear facilities, the visit will likely emphasize diplomacy.

Multiple high-level visits suggest economic desperation mixed with strategic—and possibly nuclear—opportunism.

The floating storage vessel anchored above the offshore field could be a tempting target for Hezbollah.