All Policy Analysis by Farzin Nadimi

Three veteran observers of Iranian naval forces and doctrines assess the country's ability to punch above its weight in the Persian Gulf.

In an April 22 tweet, President Trump spoke of instructing the U.S. Navy to destroy any Iranian gunboats that "harass our ships at sea." Aside from whether it departed from existing U.S. rules of engagement, the statement highlighted a persistent reality: the military threat posed by Iranian forces in the

Recent joint drills by the U.S. Navy, Army, and Air Force have essentially challenged Tehran to a game of contested deterrence, spurring its forces to respond with swarm maneuvers and a vessel seizure.

The commander’s trip was aimed at uniting Shia militias against the United States and domestic political rivals, but facts on the ground show that the post-Soleimani Qods Force is losing its touch in Iraq.

With the regime leadership accusing the United States of using bioweapons and fomenting other hateful disinformation, the potential for violence against U.S. forces and interests will likely escalate.

Three leading Iran scholars explore how the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the broader regime will adapt their policies following the death of the seminal Qods Force commander.

In addition to dispelling any lingering notion that last year’s Aramco attack came from Yemen, the report documents Iran’s efforts to help the rebels acquire advanced missiles, weapons components, and training.

UN limits on Iranian weapons transactions will expire in a few short months, and even snapback sanctions may be insufficient to prevent proliferation of dangerous arms to and from the regime.

Britain, France, and Germany are taking a more proactive role by publicly emphasizing known concerns about the regime’s R&D efforts, but practical mechanisms for ensuring transparency are still needed.

As its concerns about domestic dissent and Western naval activity grow, Tehran may once again try to divert attention from the unrest at home by launching attacks abroad.

The demonstrations indicate widespread popular rejection of the political system, but this same system remains well organized to deflect and counter unrest.

Baghdad is under pressure to show it can protect its airspace, but procuring Russian or Iranian equipment might complicate U.S.-Iraq relations without addressing the triggers for Israeli strikes.

A newly announced system could further the regime’s longstanding desire to create an A2AD umbrella in the Gulf and forward-deploy antiaircraft missiles in other countries.

Legal ambiguities have led to disagreements over how vessels can use the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf, so Washington should highlight them in any future talks with Iran.

Recent Iranian rhetoric and actions point to further retaliation, but taking that route may lead to the same strategic miscalculations and international intervention that cost the country so dearly in the 1980s.

The latest round of shipping attacks could be another notch in Tehran’s controlled military response to U.S. pressure, and bolder escalatory actions should be expected given the bleak outlook for negotiations.

Washington should reduce tensions, open lines of communication, and restore deterrence, though managing the contradictions between these objectives will be challenging.

Greater delays, downtime, and problems acquiring new planes have made Iran feel the heat, but its civil aviation sector continues to generate revenue for the regime.