All Policy Analysis by Noam Raydan

With the U.S. point man on energy development touring the Gulf and Chinese and Russian nuclear initiatives on the rise, the Trump administration should consider how best to replicate the responsible Emirati model elsewhere in the region.

Experts discuss how the new campaign differs from previous U.S. strikes in Yemen, what targets are being hit, and whether it can resolve the threat without broader American policy efforts.

Past ties between the Marina and the Lebanese terrorist group, along with the ship’s deceptive practices at sea, merit U.S. scrutiny.

As the new government looks for quick answers to its emergency energy needs, it may turn to sanctioned Russian ship operators and other illicit actors.

The Houthis have shown little willingness or ability to accurately distinguish between the ships they target, leaving Washington and its partners with no choice but to doubt the group’s supposed “ceasefire” and keep up the pressure.

Two sanctioned Russia-linked oil tankers, which were attacked by the Houthis in 2023 and 2024, recently changed their names and are flying the Djiboutian flag amid stricter Western sanctions.

Two experts offer a detailed infographic and accompanying analysis to chart attack trends over the past year and forecast what’s in store for the Red Sea and surrounding waterways.

The energy transition in both countries includes a continued need for fossil fuels while reducing emissions—though Riyadh hopes to export “all forms of energy” down the road, and Abu Dhabi seeks nuclear advances to meet power demand.

While major operators will continue to avoid the Red Sea in 2025, others are launching new services in the high-risk waterway, including some that manage China-linked vessels.

The United States and its partners should take several immediate steps to avoid an environmental disaster, counter the Houthi spin about the incident, and prevent the group from creating other hazmat emergencies in the Red Sea.

The operators are either accepting risk on a vital transport route or else no longer concerned about perceptions about their vessels’ past links to Britain.

An interactive map showing the extent to which Houthi forces, their Iranian military patrons, and other actors have been targeting vessels in regional waterways for years, including well before the Hamas-Israel war.

Available data suggests the Yemeni group has been going after vessels carrying Russian cargo, particularly if an operator's ships have visited Israeli ports.

A promising cross-Mediterranean initiative has run into political challenges, burdensome investment laws, methane leaks, and other hurdles.

Direct strikes from the Yemeni group are unlikely at the moment, but a more aggressive Hezbollah could alter the threat picture.

The immediate effects of the Houthi antishipping campaign are measurably serious, but the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other partners also need to prepare for the emboldened group to exert its newfound leverage in other ways beyond the Gaza war.

Links to Israel-linked companies, especially in light of the Rafah invasion, are again the culprit.

Even increased aggressive activity in the Indian Ocean will be unlikely to seriously disrupt maritime traffic and global trade—but vessels calling on Israeli ports will need to take extra precautions.

Low-key actions like seizures can increase regional and global concerns and increase Iran's leverage.

Riyadh’s aim to become a global logistics hub connecting three continents will face challenges if risks to southern Red Sea shipping persist at their current levels.